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Introduction and Summary of
Research Results
This doctoral thesis entitled ”Three Essays in Quantitative Finance” comprises three indepen-
dent papers.
In Chapter 1, we study the impact of economic policy uncertainty on the term structure of
nominal interest rates. We develop a general equilibrium model, in which the real side of the
economy is driven by government policy uncertainty and the central bank sets money supply
endogenously following a Taylor rule. We analyze the impact of government and monetary
policy uncertainty on nominal yields, short rates, bond risk premia, and the term structure
of bond yield volatility. Our affine yield curve model is able to capture both the shape of
the interest rate term structure as well as the hump-shape of bond yield volatilities. Our
empirical analysis shows that higher government policy uncertainty leads to a decline in yields
and an increase in bond yield volatility, whereas monetary policy uncertainty has no significant
contemporaneous effect on yields nor volatilities. However, it is an important predictor for
bond risk premia.
In Chapter 2, we study the consumption-portfolio allocation problem in continuous time
when asset prices follow Lévy processes and the investor is concerned about potential model
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misspecification. We derive optimal portfolio holdings in closed form under model uncertainty,
incorporating perturbations to the reference model affecting both the drift and jump intensity.
We then present a method for calculating error-detection probabilities by means of Fourier
inversion of the conditional characteristic function in the case when the measure change follows
a jump-diffusion process.
In Chapter 3, we present a novel method in analyzing microstructure noise of high-frequency
data as a measurement error problem. In particular, we study the estimation of endogenous
Markov-switching regression models, in which the regression disturbance and the latent state
variable controlling the regime are correlated. We show infill asymptotic results and prove that
under endogeneity the popular realized variance estimator is biased and no longer converges
to the integrated regime dependent volatility. Exploring high-frequency intraday return data
on foreign exchange rates, we find that the state variable is indeed endogenous. Similar to the
popular volatility signature plot, we propose an endogeneity plot which indicates as to which
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Abstract
We study the impact of economic policy uncertainty on the term structure of nominal
interest rates. We develop a general equilibrium model, in which the real side of the economy is
driven by government policy uncertainty and the central bank sets money supply endogenously
following a Taylor rule. We analyze the impact of government and monetary policy uncertainty
on nominal yields, short rates, bond risk premia, and the term structure of bond yield volatility.
Our affine yield curve model is able to capture both the shape of the interest rate term structure
as well as the hump-shape of bond yield volatilities. Our empirical analysis shows that higher
government policy uncertainty leads to a decline in yields and an increase in bond yield volatility,
whereas monetary policy uncertainty has no significant contemporaneous effect on yields nor
volatilities. However, it is an important predictor for bond risk premia.
2.1 Introduction
Economic policy is driven by government and central banking actions. Governments define
fiscal policy and impose regulations, while central banks manage the money supply and set
nominal short rates. These policies have a fundamental impact on financial markets. However,
despite good intentions their effectiveness remains uncertain at best. In this paper, we explore
the impact of such policy uncertainty on the term structure of interest rates, its corresponding
volatility curve, and on bond risk premia. We develop a general equilibrium model, in which
the real side of the economy is subject to government policy uncertainty and the nominal side
of the economy is affected by monetary policy shocks. Our model setup allows us to derive an
approximate analytical solution for the general equilibrium in the case where the representative
agents has CRRA-utility. A key model device is the assumption of the central bank following
a Taylor rule, which links the real with the nominal side of the economy and turns out to be
crucial in reproducing the salient features of the nominal term structure and its volatility curve.
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Our general equilibrium framework builds upon Buraschi & Jiltsov (2005). However, the
key distinction is that for our representative agent we depart from the log-utility assumption
and impose a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility. It is well known that for such
a utility specification, no closed-form solution for the term structure of interest rates can be
obtained. Using perturbation methods, we find that the agents’ optimal controls remain affine
in the state variables up to a first order approximation in the risk aversion coefficient. This
result allows us to study the effect of changing risk aversion on the term structure of interest
rates and the yield volatility curve, which previous papers such as Buraschi & Jiltsov (2005) or
Ulrich (2013a) were not able to do, and which turn out to be non-trivial.
In our model, both government and monetary policy uncertainty are affecting nominal
yields, the term structure of volatility, and bond risk premia in a fundamentally different
way. An increase in government policy uncertainty adversely affects the trend component of
real output growth. Therefore, it renders capital investments more risky, which will eventually
induce investors to favor safe assets such as government bonds. Such a flight-to-quality behavior
will raise government bond prices and therefore drives down its yields. This observation is in
line with Bloom (2009), who argues that productivity growth falls, because higher uncertainty
causes firms to temporarily pause their investment. Moreover, in our model economy higher
government policy uncertainty will not only negatively affect the long run growth path of
production. It also increases its volatility and therefore leads to a worsening of economic growth
prospects, which are fundamental to the agents consumption-investment allocation problem.2
Not only does government policy uncertainty play an important role in determining the
level of interest rates, but it has also a crucial impact on the level and shape of the term
2Our model is similar in style to the long run risk model of Bansal & Yaron (2004). However, the key
distinctive difference is that the long run growth component and the market price of output risk are both
driven by the same underlying risk factor, namely government policy uncertainty. Furthermore, our setting
can also be compared to the literature on real business cycle analysis. For instance, shocks to trend growth
exhibit fundamentally different effects on the (real) economy as opposed to transitory fluctuations. The agents
or county’s reaction to temporary shocks is to borrow in the short run to smooth out consumption. However,
if the shock is more persistent, the long run consumption level has to be adjusted as borrowing for an infinite
time horizon is not longer possible.
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structure of bond yield volatilities. Although our model belongs to the class of affine models as
introduced by Duffie & Kan (1996), we can replicate the typical hump-shape of the volatility
term structure, caused by the empirical observation that volatility tends to be highest around
the two-year maturity bucket. The key mechanism leading to this result is that government
policy uncertainty negatively affects the long run growth path of productivity, which translates
into a hump-shaped curve at a higher volatility level. With this amplification mechanism we
can also explain the ‘excess bond yield volatility puzzle’ that empirical bond yields, especially
at the long end of the term structure, cannot be reproduced by standard affine models of the
term structure of interest rates (see Shiller (1979) and Piazzesi & Schneider (2006)).3
Dealing wit policy uncertainty, a fundamental question that arises in this context is: What is
an appropriate measure for government and monetary policy uncertainty? As starting point, we
use the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index developed by Baker et al. (2012). According to
their definition, the EPU index contains uncertainty related to both government and monetary
policy. Hence, we aggregate the corresponding EPU constituents into a government (GPU) and
a monetary policy uncertainty (MPU) index.
[Figure A.1 about here]
In Figure A.1 we plot the relationship between U.S. treasury bond yields and volatilities
together with the EPU, GPU, and MPU index for the period of 1990 to 2014. The first two
prominent spikes of the EPU index are related to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the 2nd Gulf War. By the end of 2003 and until the outbreak of the financial
crisis in 2008, the US economy entered a steady economic growth phase. Both, the EPU and
GPU show similar patterns. They declined in the pre-crisis period and started to peak at
the onset of the financial crisis. The EPU and GPU index remain at a high level ever since,
exhibiting highly volatile behavior. In contrast, the MPU index slowly reversed to its pre-
3A possible solution to this problem is to introduce heterogeneous agents who have different prior beliefs
about some fundamental economic variable, such as for instance inflation as in Xiong & Yan (2010) or to
introduce time-varying risk preference as in Buraschi & Jiltsov (2007), which are however analytically less
tractable.
16
crisis level. We attribute this observation to the fact that the EPU and GPU index captures
political uncertainty, which was especially high during the debt-ceiling crisis of 2011 and lasted
until late 2013 where some governmental authorities were even forced to suspend their services
temporarily.
Figure A.1 also shows that both the EPU and GPU index exhibit a countercyclical pattern
with nominal yields. When the EPU or GPU index is high, yields tend to go down. This
apparent negative relationship is also confirmed by computing the sample correlation coefficient,
which ranges from -0.544 (EPU, 1 year) to -0.32 (GPU, 10 years) for the period January
1990 until June 2014.4 These numbers suggest that higher economic or government policy
uncertainty leads to lower treasury bond yields. Thus, as political risk increases, investors seek
safer assets and therefore start to shift from stocks to (government) bonds, which is in line with
the predictions in Pastor & Veronesi (2013).5
The discussion above suggests that government and monetary policy uncertainty may have
different effects on yields and volatilities. Therefore, we not only split economic uncertainty
into these two different components, but we allow government policy uncertainty to play a role
for interest rate policy. The empirical analysis of the model confirms our theoretical prediction
in that government policy uncertainty is the main driver in contemporaneous movements in the
term structure of interest rates and its volatility curve.
There is increasing evidence that policy uncertainty leads to direct reactions of the central
bank authority (see for instance David & Veronesi (2014)). To motivate a link between gov-
ernment policy uncertainty and yields for our model design, we estimate pairwise Vector Auto
4The time series correlation between the EPU and GPU (MPU) is 0.857 (0.657) and 0.572 between the GPU
and MPU index. As can be inferred from Figure A.1, the monetary policy uncertainty index appears to have
no link with contemporaneous movements in nominal yields. Indeed, the estimated time series correlation is
roughly zero along the entire term structure. We collect the all empirical sample correlation of treasury bond
yields and the EPU, GPU and MPU indexes in Table A.1 as well as realized volatility and EPU, GPU and
MPU indexes in Table A.2 in Appendix A.6. Furthermore, the sample correlation between the EPU and the
VIX index is 0.44 for the same period.
5Using also the EPU index of Baker et al. (2012), they show that political uncertainty raises not only the
equity risk premium but also the volatilities and correlations of stock returns.
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Regressions (VAR) for the GPU and MPU with the three-month T-bill rate, which we take as
proxy for monetary policy.
[Figure A.2 about here]
Figure A.2 reports the resulting impulse responses for the time period from January 1995
to June 2014. Panel A reveals that a shock to the GPU index leads to a sustained negative
impact on the short-term rate and hence on future monetary policy. This impact remains
highly significant up to a time horizon of more than 20 months. In contrast, from Panel B we
observe that a shock to the short-term rate has no significant impact on the GPU index.6 This
suggests that government policy uncertainty shocks drives monetary policy actions, but not the
other way around. Hence, the central bank conducts its monetary policy taking into account
uncertainty shocks from the real side whereas the central banks interest rate policy does not
seem to affect fiscal uncertainty.
We provide a theoretical explanation for the empirical results above. In our model econ-
omy, higher real uncertainty lowers productivity growth, which feeds into the monetary policy
through our assumption that the central bank controls the money supply growth following a
Taylor rule. Hence, the monetary authority’s efforts to stabilize growth (and inflation) causes
it to react to real uncertainty by lowering the cost of capital. Moreover, since we assume money
neutrality, nominal shocks do not have an impact on the real side of the economy. However, the
converse is not true. The equilibrium price level growth is driven by the capital accumulation
growth, which implies that the nominal side is also driven by shocks from the real side, namely
government policy shocks. Through these two transmission channels, inflation and capital accu-
mulation growth targeting, the money supply growth becomes a function of government policy
uncertainty. Therefore, by letting the central bank react endogenously to deviations from long
6Further analyzing the impulse responses from our VAR model, we find that the MPU index has a similar
behavior as the GPU index in that it does (negatively) influence monetary policy, but the MPU does not respond
to a shock in the short rate. Furthermore, the response of the short rate from a MPU shock is less pronounced
than from a GPU shock. Finally, the MPU and GPU responses to GPU and MPU shocks are negligible and
become insignificant after four to five months. We do not report these graphs here, but they can be obtained
on request.
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run capital growth and inflation targets establishes an important link between the real and the
nominal side of the economy that allows government policy shocks to affect nominal quantities.
This link proves to be essential in order to simultaneously match both the term structure of
interest rates and its corresponding volatility curve.
Finally, we allow both monetary and government policy shocks to carry a risk premium.
Hence, our model accommodates a time-varying risk premia in bond returns, which implies
that monetary and government policy uncertainty are priced risk factors and the equilibrium
inflation process exhibits heteroskedastic time-variation in both variables.
While our paper belongs to the class of equilibrium finance models of the term structure, it
is specifically related to the following strands of literature.7 Traditional work on asset pricing
usually abstracts from modeling government uncertainty and its impact on asset prices. How-
ever, especially since the European debt crisis starting in 2010 and the 2011 Congress debate
about raising the fiscal debt ceiling in the US, policy uncertainty has recently attracted interest
from academia. For instance, Pastor & Veronesi (2012) and Pastor & Veronesi (2013) develop
a general equilibrium model, in which the profitability of firms is driven by government policy,
and discuss the impact of policy risk on stock prices. Several empirical papers have shown that
uncertainty about political outcomes has a significant effect on asset returns and corporate de-
cisions.8 There is also a large strand of literature trying to infer political risk from government
7Equilibrium term structure models include, among many others, Wachter (2006), Piazzesi & Schneider
(2006), Buraschi & Jiltsov (2007), Gallmeyer et al. (2007), Bekaert et al. (2009), and Bansal & Shaliastovich
(2013). Recently, macro-finance term structure models have been critisized for their failure to accomodate for
the presence of “unspanned macroeconomic risk,” see Joslin, Priebsch & Singleton (2014). However, there is
support for spanned macro-finance term structure models. Basically, Bauer & Rudebusch (2015) claim to have
resolved the unspanning puzzle. Although our model belongs to the spanned model class, we do not delve
further into this discussion but refer the interested reader to the two cited papers above.
8For instance, early studies include Rodrik (1991) or Pindyck & Solimano (1993). They show empirically
that uncertainty about political factors can lead to lower investment expenditures, especially when investment
is irreversible. More recently, Durnev (2010) and Julio & Yook (2012) document that firms tend to withhold
their investment activity prior to national elections. Gulen & Ion (2012) argue, based on the newly developed
policy index by Baker et al. (2012), that policy uncertainty reduces firm and industry level investment and that
the magnitude of reduction is substantial. Boutchkova et al. (2012) take the analysis further and show that
some industries are more sensitive to political uncertainty than others. Some further related articles analyzing
the relationship between political uncertainty and asset returns include Belo et al. (2013), Bialkowski et al.
(2008) or Bond & Goldstein (2012).
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bond yields such as, e.g., Huang et al. (2013) who empirically study the relationship between
political risk and government bond yields. For an overview of this literature, we refer to Bekaert
et al. (2012).
While the literature on government policy impacts is sparse but growing, the fundamental
link between monetary policy and the term structure of interest rates and volatilities has been
studies more extensively. For the yield effects we refer to, e.g., Kuttner (2001), Piazzesi (2005),
Fleming & Piazzesi (2005), Gürkaynak et al. (2005a), and Wright (2012). For the volatility
effects see, e.g., Balduzzi et al. (2001), Piazzesi (2005) or de Goeij & Marquering (2006), among
others. The literature on the link between monetary policy and bond risk premia is surveyed
in Buraschi et al. (2014). In an empirical study, they find that monetary shocks are indeed an
important source of priced risk, helping to explain the risk premia in bond markets. Using a
standard predictability regression of excess bond returns, they find that monetary policy shocks
account for a substantial part of the variance of bond excess returns, which is in line with our
empirical results.
Despite the recent attention brought to modeling the impact of policy uncertainty on as-
set prices, the papers mentioned above either address the empirical link between government
bond yields and policy uncertainty or focus on the theoretical impact that a given government
policy has on stock returns. Our paper provides a theoretical framework for studying the im-
pact of both government and monetary policy uncertainty on the nominal yield curve and its
implications for the term structure of bond yield volatility.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model. Section
2.3 discusses the impact of government as well as monetary policy uncertainty on the term
structure of nominal interest rates, the yield volatility curve and the bond risk premium. Section
2.4 summarizes our empirical results and Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 The baseline model economy
Our model economy consists of a real and a monetary sector. For the real sector, we consider a
production economy with a representative agent producing a single good at a constant return-
to-scale production technology. As in Buraschi & Jiltsov (2005), real monetary holdings Mdt
provide a transaction service by reducing the total amount of gross resources required for a
given level of consumption Ct.
Assumption 1 (Preferences of Representative Agent). Let U(Xt) denote expected utility over
the real net consumption holdings X and β > 0 the subjective discount factor. The agent has














(Xγt − 1) , if γ < 1, γ 6= 0,




if γ = 0,
(2.2)
where γ is equal to one minus the coefficient of risk aversion. In addition, the real net con-







ξ, 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. (2.3)
The agent’s real output is denoted by Yt. The drift of Yt is influenced by a productivity factor
At that depends on a process gt, which we refer to as government policy or real uncertainty.
Assumption 2 (Real Sector Dynamics). Given a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P)
satisfying the usual conditions, the dynamics of real output Yt, productivity At, and government
9If ξ = 0, money does not provide any service and ξ = 1 implies that the agent needs to hold exactly one
unit of currency for every unit of consumption holdings. Since 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1, a higher level of monetary holdings
provides a higher level of transaction services, but at a decreasing return to scale.
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policy uncertainty gt have the following dynamics:
dYt
Yt




t , Y0 ∈ R+, (2.4)




t , A0 ∈ R, (2.5)




t , g0 ∈ (0,∞), (2.6)
with constants µY > 0, qA, θA, λ, κi > 0, ∀i ∈ {A, g}, σ2j > 0, and P-Brownian motions W jt , ∀j ∈




AY dt, dW Yt dW
g
t = ρ




Productivity At in Equation (2.5) is a mean reverting process with a trend and diffusion
term that depend on government policy uncertainty gt. Hence, not only is the productivity’s
long run mean stochastic, but also its volatility is time-varying. A crucial role is played by the
parameter λ. If λ < 0 (λ > 0), an increasing gt will have a negative (positive) effect on long run
productivity. If λ = 0, we obtain a process with constant long run mean θA and time-varying
volatility.
The government policy uncertainty process gt in Equation (2.6) describes an unconditionally
mean-reverting stationary process. It not only affects productivity At, but also the output
growth rate dYt/Yt through two channels. First, gt renders output volatility time-varying
which, as we will prove in a later section, leads to a stochastic real market risk. Second, it
affects the trend output growth rate indirectly as it influences the growth rate of productivity.
For example, if λ < 0, higher government policy uncertainty will reduce the long run level
of productivity. Provided that qA > 0, this reduction leads to a decline in expected output
growth. To get some further intuition about our model design, we derive the unconditional
expectation, variance, and covariance of productivity and government uncertainty below.
Proposition 1 (Stationary moments of productivity and government policy uncertainty pro-
cess). The unconditional expectation and variance of productivity At and government policy
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C[At, gt] = lim
T→∞





A first important observation is that the long run level of government policy uncertainty
θg affects all moments. First it raises (lowers) the unconditional expected productivity growth
whenever λ > 0 (λ < 0). Second, it not only raises the stationary long run level of gt pro-
portionally, but also the variance of At and gt. Hence, an increase in θg will lead to higher
government policy uncertainty and simultaneously also to a higher variance of productivity.
Assuming that the impact of government policy uncertainty on the drift of productivity
is negative (λ < 0) and setting ρAg = 0 for simplicity, the effect of λ has three important
implications. First, it lowers expected growth of productivity proportionally to θg/κA. Second,
it increases volatility of At linearly. Lastly, it renders C[At, gt] negative, which will be of central
importance to capture the stylized facts of bond yield volatility within our model.
We can now proceed with the formulation of the agent’s capital budget constraint. Without
loss of generality, we use capital depreciation as the only cost component.11
Assumption 3 (Capital budget constraint). The real return on capital that can either be
allocated to consumption Ctdt or cash balances M
d
t dt or reinvested dKt is given by
Ctdt+M
d







is the change in total output and δKtdt is the capital depreciation with deprecation
rate δ ∈ [0, 1].
10By E [·], V [·], and C [·, ·] (Et [·], Vt [·], Ct [·, ·]) we denote the unconditional (conditional on Ft) expectation,
variance, and covariance operators.
11In our model, we do not include a variable cost component as was done, e.g., in Buraschi & Jiltsov (2005).
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The capital accumulation process is decreasing in the optimal control variables consumption Ct
and money demand Mdt , which is intuitive as higher Ct and/orM
d
t diminish available resources
to be invested in the production technology Kt. Similar to real output, capital is nonstationary
whenever µy 6= δ and time-varying in productivity At. Furthermore, Equation (2.13) implies
money-neutrality, i.e., monetary shocks do not have an effect on the real side of the economy.12
For the monetary sector, we assume that there exists a central bank controlling money
supply MSt on the basis of a Taylor rule. The monetary authority targets a long term nominal
constant money growth rate µM , a capital growth rate k̄, and an inflation rate equal to π̄. We
assume that transitory deviations from the optimal long run money growth exhibit stochastic
volatility. We can interpret this time-variation in money supply, denoted bymt, as the monetary
policy uncertainty factor.
12Whether or not real output and capital are money-shock-neutral is debated in macroeconomics for a long
time. The neo-classical Keynesian literature argues that any increase in money supply has to be offset by an
equivalent proportional rise in prices and wages. A recent paper using a similar setup as ours is Ulrich (2013a),
who sticks to this neo-classical view. However, there are a number of reasons why inflation may affect the real
economy. See, e.g., Fisher & Modigliani (1978), who argue that inflation has a direct influence on purchasing
power, because many private contracts are not indexed. A first quantitative study that allows for dependence
of the expected return on capital on inflation is Pennacchi (1991), who uses survey data to identify inflationary
expectations. Another channel through which inflation can affect the real economy is through taxation of
nominal asset returns. This channel was exploited by Buraschi & Jiltsov (2005) to account for the violation
of the expectation hypothesis and the determination of the inflation risk premium. Since policy uncertainty
affects the real and nominal side of the economy (through the endogenous equilibrium price level), we assume
money-neutrality throughout the paper. However, we acknowledge that a feasible extension of our model is to
let the capital accumulation process be a function of the price level. We leave this as an interesting theoretical
idea which is worthwhile to be considered.
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Assumption 4 (Monetary Sector). The central bank controls money supply growth according






























where pt and Kt are the price level and capital accumulation process. We assume that the
monetary policy innovation correlates with the money supply by ρMm, but is independent of all
other sources of risk in the economy.
The crucial parameters in Assumption 4 are η1 and η2 in Equation (2.14). Their magnitude
determines the sensitivity of money supply growth with respect to deviations of endogenous




− k̄dt > 0) and provided that η1 < 0, the monetary authority shrinks the money




− π̄dt < 0) and provided that η2 < 0, the central bank’s response is to increase
the money supply. In the case when η1 = η2 = 0 money supply is exogenous and therefore does
not react to deviations from long run capital nor inflation growth rate. Furthermore, given
the money supply rule in Equation (2.14), monetary policy uncertainty renders money supply
time-varying in mt. Having introduced both the real and monetary side of the economy, we
next characterize the representative agent’s equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Equilibrium Capital Stock and Money Holdings). Under Assumptions 1 to 4,
the representative agent’s equilibrium is defined as a vector of optimal consumption, money






t ] that is a solution to the following dynamic
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmann programming problem13
0 =







t ) +AV (t,Kt, At, gt)
}
, (2.16)
13By A we denote the infinitesimal generator. See, e.g., Øksendal (2003) for technical details.
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t , the bugdet constraint in (2.12), and the
transversality condition limT→∞ Et
[
e−βTV (t,Kt, At, gt)
]
= 0.
For the problem in Equation (2.16), an explicit solution can only be obtained for the log-
utility case. The resulting optimal consumption and money demand holdings are proportional
to capital Kt. However, for γ 6= 0, the asymptotic optimal controls Ct and Mdt remain linear in
the state variables Kt, At, and gt (up to a first-order approximation in γ). This feature allows
us to find an explicit affine representation of the term structure of real and nominal interest
rates beyond the log-utility case.14
Proposition 3 (Perturbed equilibrium of the representative agent’s investment and consump-
tion problem). In equilibrium, the representative agent’s value function is









for some function φ(At, gt) of the form
φ(At, gt) = φ0(At, gt) + γφ1(At, gt) +O(γ
2). (2.18)




[1 + γ (L− φ0(At, gt))] , Md∗t = ξC∗t , (2.19)
































dW Yt . (2.21)
where
µK∗(At, gt) := µY + qAAt − β − δ + γβ (φ0(At, gt)− L) (2.22)
14Our solution strategy is based on the perturbation method. In particular, we follow the approach of Kogan
& Uppal (2001) and approximate our model with respect to the risk aversion parameter around the explicit
equilibrium computed under the log-utility assumption. Perturbation methods have been successfully applied
in many other studies such as, e.g., Hansen et al. (2008).
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φ0(At, gt) = φ00 + φ0AAt + φ0ggt (2.23)
is an affine function in the state variables (At, gt) with constants φ00, φ0A, φ0g provided in
Appendix A.2.
Since nominal shocks have no real effects, the equilibrium capital accumulation process is
only driven by the real sector of the economy, i.e., by productivity At and by the government
policy uncertainty process gt. Note that for γ = 0 the equilibrium capital drift µK∗ becomes
independent of gt. The weighting factor η2 on inflation-target deviation enters non-linearly into
the equilibrium price process.15
Proposition 3 also implies that the equilibrium price process is driven by both real and
monetary shocks. This result is a consequence of the central bank authority controlling money
supply growth based on a Taylor-rule. Hence, by endogenizing money supply growth, we
allow for an important link between the real and the nominal sector and government policy
uncertainty enters the nominal side of the economy through two different channels, namely
though its impact on both the equilibrium capital accumulation process and inflation. This
link will prove to be essential to capture key empirical properties of the yield curve and its
corresponding term structure of yield volatility.
2.3 The term structure of nominal interest rates
Having obtained the dynamics of the equilibrium price level, we can now solve for the term
structure of nominal and real bond prices. Let B(t, τ) be the nominal pure discount bond
paying one unit of currency in t + τ periods. The price of the nominal bond must satisfy the
15Note that for η2 ≈ 1, small innovations in either At, gt or mt result in dramatic changes in the equilibrium
price process. However, from an economic viewpoint, the parameter η2 should be negative which, as we will see
later, is confirmed by the data.
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following Euler equation

























which states that in equilibrium the investor should be indifferent between consuming one more
unit of currency now or investing one unit of currency in the t + τ period nominal discount
bond.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium Nominal Term Structure of Interest Rates). Under time-separable
CRRA utility as in Equation (2.2), the nominal discount bond B(t, τ) with maturity τ is given
by


























and the constant parameters Z0m, Z2i, i ∈ {g,m} and Z0g(τ), Z1g(τ), C0(τ) are time-to-maturity
functions that only depend on the structural model parameters of the economy and are defined
in Appendix A.3.
The nominal term structure of interest rates in Proposition 4 belongs to the general affine
class of term structure models of discount bond prices introduced by Duffie & Kan (1996).
Using Equation (2.25), we obtain the time t yield curve Y (t, τ) with maturity τ as
Y (t, τ) := −1
τ













The affine yield model in Equation (2.30) is driven by three factors. As noted, e.g., by Litterman
& Scheinkman (1991), such a three factor structure model of the term structure is able to
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reproduce most if not all empirically relevant shapes of the yield curve, such as upward sloping,
inverted or hump shapes. The affine property in the factor loadings implies linearity of the
local variance as in Vasicek (1977), Cox et al. (1985), and others.
Analyzing the expressions for the constant and time-varying parameters Z·,·, Z0g(τ), and
C0(τ) given in Appendix A.3, we make the following three observations. First, the target growth
rates for output k̄ and inflation π̄, the depreciation rate δ, and output µY and money supply
growth rate µM solely affect the intercept of the yield curve but not its slope. In contrast, their
weighting factors η1 and η2 affect both the intercept and the slope of the yield curve. Moreover,
they do so in a non-linear way.
Second, the parameter λ has a key impact not only on the level of the term structure
but also on its slope. The parameter λ affects the level of yields, since both CA = CA(λ)
and Cg = Cg(λ) enter the expression for b0(τ) and are functions of λ. This dependence in turn
implies that λ also affects the slope of the term structure through bA(τ) and bg(τ). Furthermore,
λ also determines the long run level of productivity At. To see this, recall that the trend growth
rate of the productivity process At is not only dependent on the long run level of productivity
θA but also on the long run level government policy θg.




< 0, the term bA(τ)
τ
At, provided that bA(τ) > 0, will be positive with high probability
and therefore will lead to a declining yield curve for any maturity.
Third, the subjective discount factor β and the degree of transaction service money provides
ξ also impact the slope of the yield curve through the factor loadings bA(τ) and bg(τ) whenever
γ 6= 0. Hence, if the representative agent would have log-utility, β and ξ would only exhibit a
level effect. In the following section we explore the impact of government and monetary policy
uncertainty on the nominal term structure of interest rates in more detail.
16In particular, we have E[At] = θA +
λθg
κA
(see Equation (2.8) in Proposition 1).
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2.3.1 Fitting the model to the data
To fit the model to the term structure data we proceed as follows. We estimate a subset of
parameters using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and calibrate the remaining param-
eters to the nominal yield and its corresponding volatility curve simultaneously. We estimate
the parameters of the policy uncertainty variables gt and mt using (exact) maximum likelihood
estimation.17 Table 2.1 summarizes the results.
GPU MPU
κg θg σg κm θm σm
Estimate 0.203 0.931 0.326 0.418 0.935 0.285
Stand. Error (0.05) (0.104) (0.021) (0.062) (0.043) (0.022)
Table 2.1: The label ’GPU’ and ’MPU’ refer to the government and monetary policy index, respec-
tively. The row ’Estimates’ represents the maximum likelihood estimator and the row ’Stand. Error’
shows the asymptotic robust standard errors (’Sandwich estimator’) of the parameters which is based
on the outer product of the Jacobian of the log-likelihood function. Estimation period is January 1990
to June 2014 (295 data points) using monthly data.
The estimated parameters between the GPU index and the MPU index differ mainly in the
magnitude of the speed of mean reversion parameter κ. Table 2.1 shows that κm is about half
the magnitude of κm. Hence, a government policy shock will have a more permanent effect
than a monetary shock has.18 Shocks to monetary policy uncertainty are more transitive and
mean-reverts faster to its long run mean θm.





set equal to their unconditional first and second sample moments. Furthermore, the correlation
parameters ρY g and ρMm are set to their unconditional sample correlation coefficients. The
preference parameters (β, γ, ξ), the structural model parameters (δ, η1, η2, k̄, π̄), the correlation
17Since for the Feller diffusion the transition density is known in closed-form (non-central chi-squared), the
transition density does not need to be approximated via quasi maximum likelihood techniques.
18The half-life of a shock in gt when κg = 0.203 is − log(0.5)/κg = 1.48 months, which implies that it takes
a about six weeks for a shock to government policy uncertainty to die out by half. Similarly for the monetary
policy shock, we have− log(0.5)/κm = 0.72 months. It takes about three weeks for a monetary policy shock to
die out by half.
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parameters (ρAg, ρAY ), and the parameters related to the productivity process (κA, θA, σA, qA, λ)
are calibrated to match key features of the empirical term structure of interest rates and its
corresponding volatility curve. The parameters not related to gt and mt are summarized in
Table 2.2 below.
Model Parameters
β 0.02 qA 0.28 σM 0.45 κA 1.08
ξ 0.85 k̄ 0.03 ρAY 0.14 θA 4.19
γ -0.82 π̄ 0.03 ρAg -0.98 σA 0.27
δ 0.08 µY 0.38 ρ
gY -0.27 λ -1.93
η1 -1.80 σY 0.23 ρ
Mm 0.12 A0 1
η2 -2.34 µM 0.26
Table 2.2: Summary of parameter values selected for Monte-Carlo Analysis: All parameter values
for the process At as given in Equation (2.5) and the model parameters β, γ, ξ, qA, δ, η1, η2, k̄, π̄,
ρAg and ρAY are calibrated to match simultaneously, the average yield curve and bond volatility curve
over the sample period January 1990 to June 2014. A0 refers to the initial value of At.
Given the parameters in Table 2.1 and 2.2, we simulate the economy M = 1′000-times on
a monthly basis with each time series having length 12 × N , where we set N = 2′500, using
a standard Euler-Maruyama scheme to obtain simulated values for the three Itô diffusions At,
gt, and mt. Having obtained simulated values for those state variables, we then compute the
nominal yield curve and its corresponding term structure of bond yield volatility with time to
maturity of ten years and then average over the number of Monte-Carlo simulation runs.19
[Figure A.3 about here]
From Figure A.3, Panel A, we see that the model is overestimating the yield curve at
medium maturities (three to seven years), whereas at the short and at the long end, the model
implied yield curve is underestimating the actual the term structure. However, the overall mean
error along the entire term structure is 3.07%.20 As Panel B of Figure A.3 shows, our fitted
19We set the starting values of the government and monetary policy uncertainty to one (m0 = g0 = 1). By
using a long time series, we avoid dependence on starting values.
20The error is calculated as 1
T
∑
τ∈T |Ŷ (t, τ)− Y (t, τ)|/m̂ where m̂ = 1T
∑
τ∈T Y (t, τ), Ŷ (t, τ) is the fitted
yield curve and T = 6, i.e. the number of maturities.
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model is able to reproduce the hump-shape in the term structure of bond yield volatility. This
stylized fact of interest rates is very challenging to replicate within the framework of affine term
structure models. Indeed, even with their more flexible specification of essentially affine price
of risk, Buraschi & Jiltsov (2005) acknowledge that their model cannot fully match the second
moments of yields. In contrast, we capture the short end of the yield volatility curve very
accurately. We slightly overestimate the actual bond volatility at medium to longer maturities.
Nevertheless, the error remains with 4.71% relatively small.
2.3.2 Yield curve and policy uncertainty
We now test a series of implications regarding the effect of policy uncertainty on the yield
curve based on our fitted model parameters. Our preliminary empirical analysis between nom-
inal bond yields and policy uncertainty as measured by the EPU index of Baker et al. (2012)
shows that there is significant negative correlation between economic policy uncertainty and
movements in the yield curve. Splitting the index into government and monetary policy uncer-
tainty shows that the GPU index maintains high negative correlation whereas the MPU index
seems to have no correlation with nominal yields at any maturity. Using our affine yield model,
we can compute the model-implied correlation in a straightforward way. More specifically, we
can show that a higher level in either fiscal or monetary policy uncertainty (gt or mt) will lead
to a downward shift in yields.
Proposition 5 (Model-implied correlation and impact of policy uncertainty on the yield curve).
1. Nominal yields are negatively correlated with either fiscal (gt) or monetary (mt) policy
uncertainty, i.e.
̺ [Y (t, τ), gt] ≤ 0, ̺ [Y (t, τ),mt] ≤ 0, ∀τ ≥ 0
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and the effect is stronger for fiscal as opposed to monetary policy uncertainty, in other
words
|̺ [Y (t, τ), gt] | > |̺ [Y (t, τ),mt] |













< 0, ∀τ ≥ 0. (2.31)








∣∣∣∣ , ∀τ ≥ 0. (2.32)
The results in Proposition 5 above are in line with the empirical observations. The reason
why the model implied correlation is negative for any maturity can be directly deduced from
the covariance between Y (t, τ) and gt which is,

















Given the fitted parameters in Table 2.1 and 2.2, the factor loading bA(τ) is always positive
whereas bg(τ) is negative, which implies that the first and second term in Equation (2.33) will
be negative. In this setting, we obtain a model-implied average (along maturity τ) correlation
of -0.2934 which is comparable to the empirical sample correlation between nominal yields and






≤ 0, ∀τ ≥ 0.
Comparing this model correlation coefficient of -0.021 to its empirical counterpart (-0.011), we
see that the model is able to match both sample correlation coefficients.
2.3.3 Equilibrium nominal short rate and bond excess returns
We now discuss how the short end of the term structure of interest rates and the bond risk
premium are affected by government and monetary policy uncertainty.
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Proposition 6 (Equilibrium nominal short rate and bond risk premium). With time-separable
CRRA utility, we have the following first order asymptotic results:
1. The nominal short rate Rt is given by
Rt =
(µY − β − δ − k̄)η1 + β + µM − η2(µY + π̄ − δ)
1− η2
+ γ





































3. The bond risk premia RP (t, τ) per unit of time is given by





















= ΛN,gt + Λ
N,m
t (2.37)
















are the factor loadings of government and monetary policy uncertainty, respectively.
The nominal short rate and the nominal market price of risk are all influenced by both
the real and nominal sector of the economy, which is a direct consequence of the Taylor rule
in Assumption 4. In the special case when money supply is entirely decoupled from the real
sector (η1 = η2 = 0), the nominal short rate reduces to Rt = µM + β − σ2Mmt and λN,gt = 0 so
that the real side does not affect the nominal short rate and output risk is no longer a nominal
risk factor. We get the same result when η1 = η2 = η, i.e., when the central bank reacts to
deviations from its nominal and real targets equally. Then, the nominal short rate is also an
affine function of mt and the risk premium does not depend on gt. In both cases, the nominal
short rate becomes independent of the risk aversion parameter γ.
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In the general case, Rt depends on the money supply control variables η1 and η2 in a non-
linear way. This suggests that relatively small fluctuations in either productivity At, monetary
or government policy uncertainty may lead to drastic movements in the nominal short rate.
Furthermore, risk aversion affects Rt through different channels. First, it affects its level through
the second term in Equation (2.34). If risk aversion increases, i.e., if γ decreases, the short rate
becomes smaller since β(η1−η2)(L−φ00)
η2−1 > 0. Secondly, the risk aversion coefficient γ loads on both
real sector variables At and gt. Therefore, risk aversion also impacts the slope and curvature of
the term structure. To what extent risk aversion changes slope and curvature depends on the
magnitude of the estimated parameter values.
When η1 6= 0 and η2 6= 0, the nominal price of risk decomposes into two state-dependent
market prices of risks λN,Yt and λ
N,M
t , which are driven by government and monetary policy
risk, respectively.21 Furthermore, the sign of those market prices of risk is determined by η1 and
η2, the parameters controlling the intensity of adjustments to the long run real output growth
target k̄ and inflation target π̄ and therefore can become negative depending on the values of
η1 and η2.
[Figure A.4 about here]
For the bond risk premium in Equation (2.37), we plot in Figure A.4, Panel A, the loadings
of the government policy uncertainty factor gt and the monetary policy uncertainty factor
mt. Under our estimated parameters, both government and monetary policy uncertainty load
positively on the risk premium. Monetary policy uncertainty has a larger impact at the short
end of the curve, but flattens out at longer maturities and eventually becomes dominated by
government policy uncertainty. Hence, our model predicts that the dominant factor at the
short end is monetary policy uncertainty, while the dominant role at the long end of the bond
risk premia curve is played by the government policy uncertainty factor.
21The results in Proposition 6 reveal that equilibrium relations such as the expected bond excess premium
and interest rate volatility as well as the forward term premium, i.e., violation of the expectation hypothesis,
will be driven by government and monetary policy uncertainty whenever η1 6= 0 and η2 6= 0.
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2.3.4 Bond yield volatility
Many empirical studies find that long run bond yields exhibit higher volatility than implied by
the expectation hypothesis. Already Shiller (1979) shows that long term bond yields exhibit
excess volatility relative to their model-implied values. From Piazzesi & Schneider (2006)
we know that their representative agent-based model explains a smaller fraction of observed
volatility of the long-end yields than of the short-end yields. Xiong & Yan (2010) argue that
excess bond volatility might be due to differences in beliefs about the long run level of inflation.
They show that a higher belief dispersion leads to volatility amplification which allows them
to account not only for the empirically observed high bond yield volatility, but also for the
hump-shape of the term structure of bond volatility.22 To explore the key determinants that
allow to reproduce the hump-shape in bond volatility, we need to derive the model-implied
unconditional variance of nominal yields. It turns out that the variance is a linear combination
of the variances of monetary and government policy uncertainty, the variance of productivity,
and the covariance of productivity and government policy uncertainty.
Corollary 1 (Term Structure of Nominal Bond Yield Variance). Let Y (t, τ) denote the current
time t yield with maturity τ . Then the unconditional term structure of bond yield variance is
given by
















and the expressions for V[At], C[At, gt], and V[gt] are given in Proposition
1.
To explore the key determinants in generating the hump-shape in bond yield variance,
Figure A.4 plots the different components contributing to the bond yield variance in Equation
(2.38).
22Closely related to the ’excess volatility puzzle’ phenomenon are also the findings of Gürkaynak et al. (2005b).
They document that bond yields exhibit excess sensitivity to macroeconomic announcements.
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[Figure A.4 about here]
The contribution of both the factor loadings bg(τ) and the cross term bA(τ)bg(τ) are hump
shaped, which causes the term structure of yield variance to exhibit a similar pattern. The
government policy factor gt exhibits a hump shape that peaks around the two year maturity.
The covariance term C(At, gt) is also contributing significantly to the hump. Its magnitude
is determined by two factors, by the correlation between government policy uncertainty and
productivity (ρAg < 0) and by the impact of government policy uncertainty on productivity
(λ < 0). The impact of the production variance V[At] as well as of monetary policy uncertainty
is monotonically decreasing in τ . The latter factor has only little impact. From Corollary 1
and Figure A.4 we can deduce the following:
Proposition 7 (Policy Uncertainty and the term structure of bond yield volatility).
❼ Government gt and monetary mt policy uncertainty raise the level of bond yield volatility.








❼ The function F g(τ) =
b2g(τ)
τ2
V[gt] is hump-shaped across maturities τ . This implies that
the effect of government policy uncertainty is highest for about 2 years maturity according
to Figure A.4.








and C(At, gt) > 0 adding the government (monetary) policy uncertainty
factor raises the level of volatility. The second statement above is far less obvious to see, as it
crucially depends on the parameter specifications of the model. Therefore, in Panels A through
F of Figure A.5, we explore in more detail the parameters responsible for generating the hump
shape.
[Figure A.5 about here]
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As Panel A illustrates, the term structure of bond yield volatility exhibits a fundamentally
different shape whenever λ is negative or when λ is set to zero, in which case government
policy uncertainty does not affect the drift of productivity. Not only is the level of the term
structure significantly higher whenever λ < 0 than compared to the case when λ = 0 but also,
bond yield volatility becomes hump-shaped in time to maturity. Panels B and C show that
the speed of mean reversion level κg and volatility σg have a similar effect on bond volatility.
A more persistent and a highly volatile uncertainty process generate not only to an upward
shift of the bond volatility term structure, but also a hump shape.23 Similar to Panel B,
we observe in Panel D that a more permanent shock in productivity (decrease in κA) also
accentuates the hump shape. In contrast, increasing production volatility σA shifts the volatility
term structure upward such that it eventually becomes monotonically decreasing (Panel E).
This follows because the factor
b2A(τ)
τ2






monotonically decreasing. Finally, Panel F shows that bond volatility is highly sensitive to
changes in either η1 or η2. When the central bank becomes less responsive to deviations of the
long term real target k̄, the level of bond volatility decreases substantially. In contrast, if the
central bank becomes less responsive to deviations of the long term nominal target π̄, bond
volatility increases significantly.24
2.4 Empirical analysis
Our theoretical model gives rise to several theoretical predictions. In the subsequent empirical
analysis, we examine the following four testable hypotheses.
23The long run mean of government policy uncertainty θg increases yield dispersion proportionally, since
∂V(Y (t,τ)
∂θg
> 0. Hence, the long term mean does not contribute to a hump shape.
24Without providing the corresponding plots, we remark that whenever both η1 and η2 are both reduced,
there will be a parallel downward shift in the level of bond yield volatility. Furthermore, the impact of risk
aversion on the term structure of bond volatilities is less pronounced and leads to an almost parallel downward
shift of the term structure.
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): Our first prediction can be deduced directly from Proposition 5, which
implies that nominal yields fall when either government or monetary policy uncertainty in-
creases and vice versa. From Proposition 5, this effect is mainly driven by government policy
uncertainty (see Equation (2.31)).
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Higher (lower) fiscal or monetary policy uncertainty increases (de-
creases) nominal yield volatility (see Equation (2.39) in Proposition 7). This effect is again
mainly driven by government policy uncertainty.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): From the second result in Proposition 7, the hump shape of the term
structure of bond yield volatility is mainly driven by government policy uncertainty and not
by monetary policy uncertainty.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): From Equation (2.37) and Panel A in Figure A.4, bond risk premia are
increasing in both monetary and government policy uncertainty.
To investigate the joint effect of government and monetary policy uncertainty on the yield
curve, its term structure of volatility, and on risk premia, we use as a proxy for both types of
policy uncertainties, the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index developed by Baker et al.
(2012). Thus, in our model this index would be approximately equivalent to setting EPUt ≈
gt +mt. In what follows, we will empirically test the above hypotheses by regressing nominal
yields and yield volatility on the EPU index and our time series of government and monetary
policy as well as a set of control variables.
2.4.1 Data
We obtain monthly Treasury Bill yields with maturity one, two, three, five, seven, and ten
years from the Federal Reserve Board ranging from January 1990 until July 2014, from which
we bootstrap the zero-coupon yield curve treating the treasury yields as par yields. From
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Datastream, we collect monthly data on a total of 2 macro variables, which we aggregate into a
real business cycle activity factor and an inflation factor.25 As a measure for real activity we use
industrial production (IP). As an inflation factor, we use the consumer price index (CPI). We
then compute monthly log-growth rates over one year for each of the macro control variables.
As an alternative to the EPU, we proxy for (policy) uncertainty using the VIX index. As a
measure for economic condition we include the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI),
which we obtain from the FRED database (St. Louis Fed).26 We also use treasury bond
implied volatility (TIV) based on weighted average of one-month options on treasury bonds
with maturity of two, five, ten, and 30 years as a proxy for bond market volatility.
In addition we collect two time series, which we refer to as Financial Variables’ (FV). They
include the monthly log growth rate of the S&P composite dividend yield index (DY), which
has been shown to have forecasting power by Fama & French (1989), and the term spread
measured as the ten-year yield less the federal funds rate (TS).
2.4.2 Construction of government and monetary policy uncertainty
index
The economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index developed by Baker et al. (2012) has been recently
used by a number of studies.27 The EPU index is constructed from three main components,
namely a news impact part which is based on news paper discussing economic policy uncer-
tainty, a component that summarizes reports by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that
25Similar control variables have also been used by Ang & Piazzesi (2003), Evans & Marshall (2007), Ludvigson
& Ng (2009) or Joslin, Priebisch & Singleton (2014) in their study of the economic determinants of the term
structure of nominal interest rates.
26The reason why we include the CFNAI regressor is to test whether either monetary or government policy
uncertainty has predictive power after controlling for the state the economy is in. This is because it is reasonable
to assume that uncertainty about the government’s future policy choice is in general larger in weaker economic
conditions.
27For instance, Pastor & Veronesi (2013) show that government policy uncertainty carries a risk premium,
and that stocks are more volatile and more correlated in times of high uncertainty. Brogaard & Detzel (2012)
use the same index and find that economic policy uncertainty forecast future market excess returns. Similarly,
Gulen & Ion (2012) show that policy-related uncertainty is negatively correlated with firm and industry level
investment. When policy uncertainty increases firm’s tend to reduce their investment.
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compile lists of temporary federal tax code provisions, and a third component called ‘economic
forecaster disagreement’, which draws on the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey
of Professional Forecasters and summarizes data on consumer price forecast dispersion and
predictions for purchases of goods and services by state, local and federal government.28
For our setting, we need to decompose the EPU index into uncertainty related to government
and monetary policy. To disentangle the two types of uncertainties, we use the ‘categorical EPU
data’, which contains time-series on uncertainty related to government and monetary policy
as well as further categorical variables.29 For our measure of government policy uncertainty,
we extract the time-series ‘fiscal policy’, ‘taxes’, and ‘government spending’. Furthermore, we
argue that disagreement about temporary federal tax code provisions and forecast variation
in local state and federal purchases of goods and services are sources of government policy
uncertainty, whereas disagreement about future inflation (CPI disagreement) can be related to
monetary uncertainty.
Therefore, in order to construct our index of ‘government policy uncertainty’ labeled as
‘GPU’ we include the time series ‘fiscal policy’, ’Taxes’, ’Government’, ‘FedStateLocal Ex dis-
agreement’ and ‘Tax expiration’. We place half of the weight to the time series ‘fiscal policy’ and
the other half is equally distributed among the time series ’Taxes’, ’Government’, ’FedState-
Local Ex disagreement’ and ’Tax expiration’.30 Our measure of ‘monetary policy’ uncertainty,
which we abbreviate by ‘MPU’, consists of the time series ‘monetary policy uncertainty’ and
‘CPI disagreement’ of which each obtain weight 1/2.
28As Kelly et al. (2013) argue, it is difficult isolate exogenous variation in political uncertainty as it likely
depends on various factors such as overall macro uncertainty. Therefore, the EPU index may not only capture
government related uncertainty, but can be interpreted as a broader measure of uncertainty about economic
fundamentals.
29This data is also available from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/.
30We divided the time series ‘Tax expiration’ by a factor of ten, because its impact would otherwise pull the
index up substantially at the end of the time series. Furthermore, as tax laws are only altered infrequently, the
‘Tax expiration’ remains constant over several months up to two years. Its unscaled inclusion would lead to an
underestimation in policy uncertainty variation.
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2.4.3 Policy uncertainty and the yield curve
To investigate the relationship between the yield curve and the EPU index, we make the
following regression,
Y (t, τ) = β0 + β1PUt + ǫt, PUt ∈ {EPUt, GPUt,MPUt}, (2.40)
where PUt denotes either the EPU, GPU, or MPU index at time t, and ǫt is the regression
error term.31
According to hypothesis H1, we expect the coefficient in Equation (2.40) to be negative
for all the three uncertainty indexes. Additionally, we run the same regression as in Equation
(2.40) above, just replacing the PUt index with the VIX index. Since the VIX index is a
generally accepted measure of overall economic uncertainty and positively correlated with the
EPU index,32 we expect the regression coefficient to be negative as well. We also regress Y (t, τ)
on both the VIX and the EPU index, and on the VIX together with the GPU and MPU indices.
By doing so, we can identify those variables that exhibit greater predictive power.
In Table 2.3 we summarize the results for the EPU index.33 The first row labeled ‘EPU’
shows that higher policy uncertainty EPU reduces yields across all maturities, confirming our
model hypothesis H1. The effect is highly significant at the 5% level and decreasing in τ ,
indicating that the short end of the yield curve is more responsive to shocks in policy uncer-
tainty than the long end. Furthermore, the adjusted R2 indicate that the single factor EPU
accounts for 29% of total variability at the short end of the yield curve. This value decreases
monotonically to 18% at the long end of the curve.
The row ‘VIX’ in Table 2.3 shows that, similar to the EPU index, a rise in the VIX index also
leads to a statistically significant decline in nominal yields along the entire yield curve. However,
31To address potential concerns about robustness of our results, we compute following Newey & West (1994)
standard errors with five lags to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) in residuals.
32For our sample, the correlation coefficient between VIX and EPU is 0.45.
33For all the regressions tables that follow the intercept estimate β̂0 and corresponding HAC errors are not
displayed.
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τ 1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
EPU EPU -3.70*** -3.68*** -3.51*** -3.02*** -2.61*** -2.16***
tEPU (-7.08) (-6.95) (-6.61) (-5.67) (-4.95) (-4.19)
R2adj 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.17
VIX VIX -0.04 -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.04* -0.04*
tV IX (-1.50) (-1.67) (-1.76) (-1.86) (-1.78) (-1.91)
R2adj 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
EPU & VIX EPU -4.07*** -4.00*** -3.78*** -3.19*** -2.75*** -2.13***
tEPU (-8.26) (-7.77) (-7.17) (-5.76) (-4.80) (-3.75)
VIX 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
tV IX (1.62) (1.37) (1.17) (0.75) (0.58) (0.15)
R2adj 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.16
Table 2.3: The table displays slope coefficients of the regression of Y (t, τ) on EPUt, Y (t, τ) on
V IXt, and Y (t, τ) on EPUt and V IXt for τ=1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 5Y, 7Y, and 10Y. Values in brackets below
represent HAC-robust t−statistics. R2adj refers to adjusted coefficient of determination. By ***, **, *
we denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.
this relationship is statistically significant only at the 10% confidence level and insignificant at
the short end of the yield curve. In addition, the impact of the VIX is substantially smaller
for any τ as the impact of the EPU and GPU indexes. Moreover, its explanatory power is also
considerably lower, with an R2 between 2% and 3%, compared to R2 ranging between 18% to
29% for the EPU and 10% to 20% for the GPU.
The row ‘EPU & VIX’ in Table 2.3 shows that the only significant predictor is the EPU
index, as the regression coefficient for the VIX is statistically insignificant across all maturities,
once both regressors are added to the regression equation. The same conclusion can be drawn
from row ‘GPU & VIX’ as government policy uncertainty remains the only statistically signifi-
cant predictor along the entire term structure. Lastly, row ‘MPU & VIX’ shows that the MPU
index has no predictive power for any τ .
To check for the robustness of our results, we add different controls to the regression equa-
tion. We add the economic condition (EC) controls ‘CFNAI’ and ‘VIX’. Furthermore, we also
include the financial variables (FV) factor and macro controls (MC) as discussed in Section
2.4.1.
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τ 1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
EC EPU -4.14*** -4.05*** -3.83*** -3.24*** -2.78*** -2.17***
tEPU (-9.51) (-8.79) (-7.95) (-6.15) (-5.10) (-4.03)
R2adj 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.16
EC+FV EPU -2.56*** -2.82*** -2.87*** -2.72*** -2.48*** -2.09***
tEPU (-4.07) (-4.27) (-4.23) (-3.91) (-3.62) (-3.22)
R2adj 0.47 0.40 0.35 0.26 0.22 0.17
EC+FV+MC EPU -2.75** -3.02** -3.07** -2.91** -2.66** -2.28**
tEPU (-5.60) (-5.81) (-5.75) (-5.47) (-5.14) (-4.73)
R2adj 0.62 0.56 0.52 0.47 0.44 0.42
Table 2.4: The table reports slope coefficients of the regression, Y (t, τ) on EPUt and EC controls
(EC), Y (t, τ) on EPUt and EC, FV variables (EC+FV), Y (t, τ) on EPUt and Y (t, τ) on EPUt, and
EC, FV, MC controls (Full Reg.) for τ = 1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 5Y, 7Y and 10Y. Values in brackets below
represent HAC-robust t−statistics. R2adj refers to adjusted coefficient of determination. By ***, **, *
we denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.
Table 2.4 shows that the EPU regression coefficient remains significant for any maturity
and across all regressions. However, compared to Table 2.3, its impact is considerably reduced
(primarily at the short end), especially when we include the financial variables (FV). The
reason for this decline is because those regressors exhibit strong positive correlation with the
EPU index. Not surprisingly, their estimated impact on contemporaneous yield changes is also
negative. Their average is -4.62 (DY), and -0.16 (TS). Whereas the R2adj essentially stays the
same after adding the CFNAI control (row ’EC’), it increases considerably, although mainly
at the short-end of the yield curve, after adding the financial factors (see row ‘EC+FV’).
Lastly, as the row labeled ‘EC,FV+MC’ shows, that whereas adding macro controls to the
regression equation does not impact the statistical significance and magnitude of the EPU index,
it considerably increases the amount of explained variation as the R2adj increases substationally
across every maturity.34
[Figure A.6 about here]
34This increase in R2adj is predominantly driven by inflation as it has a statistically significant, very large and
positive impact on the term structure of nominal interest rates.
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While Table 2.4 is concerned with the EPU index, we now turn our focus on the individual
impact of government and monetary policy uncertainty. In Figure A.6, we plot the estimated
regression coefficients of the GPU and MPU index together with their 95% HAC-robust con-
fidence intervals. Panel A and B show that, whereas the impact of fiscal policy uncertainty
remains negative and statistically significant after including all control variables (Panel B), the
monetary policy uncertainty exhibits a positive and statistically significant effect on contem-
poraneous yield movements even after including all control variables (Panel B). This somewhat
puzzling result indicates that this effect might be do to strong correlation with the GPU index
or other control variables. Therefore, in order to separately analyze the impact of fiscal and
monetary policy uncertainty, we regress yields on the GPU and MPU individually in Panel C
and D (with controls). Whereas the negative and statistically significant effect of the GPU
index on contemporaneous yields remains unchanged, the impact of MPU is insignificant for
every maturity. These results suggest that, the MPU’s strong positive impact on yields is
mainly do to its large positive correlation with the GPU index. Overall, we conclude that these
results are in line with hypothesis H1 stated above, i.e. higher fiscal as opposed to monetary
policy uncertainty decreases the nominal yields for every maturity.
2.4.4 The term structure of bond yield volatility and policy risk
Our theoretical results from Section 2.3.4 suggest that the inclusion of a time-varying govern-
ment policy risk factor not only raises the level of the yield curve, but is also a key driver
in generating the empirically observed hump shape of the bond volatility term structure. We
now test these predictions using both the EPU, and our measures of government and monetary
policy uncertainty including all the control variables from above.
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Our measure for observed volatility is realized volatility as given in Equation (2.41) aggre-
gated on a monthly level from business day data.







Y (d+ 1, τ)
Y (d, τ)
))2
, Y (t, τ), d ∈ {1, . . . , D − 1}, (2.41)
where D denotes the number of daily observations (about 20 business days per month) and
τ=1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 5Y, 7Y and 10Y to construct a time series of monthly realized bond yield
volatility. In addition to our control variables from the previous sections, we also include
treasury implied volatility (TIV) to proxy for fixed-income implied volatility.35
Vt[Y (t, τ)] = β0 + β1PUt + contt + ǫt, (2.42)
where PUt denotes either the EPU, GPU, or MPU index at time t, contt summarizes all the
control variables and ǫt is the regression error term. From our hypothesis H2, we expect the
sign of the regression coefficient in (2.42) of the EPU and the GPU index to be positive for all
maturities.36 Furthermore, from hypothesis H3 we expect that economic or government policy
uncertainty have a hump-shaped effect on the term structure of bond yield volatility. Thus, we
should observe that the estimated regression coefficients peaks around the two year maturity
as the realized bond volatility curve in Figure A.3 does.
We report the results of the regression in Equation (2.42) in Table 2.5. We find our hypoth-
esis H2 concerning the EPU confirmed. Higher economic policy uncertainty increases bond
volatility for any maturity. Once we include the financial control variables, the impact of the
EPU index is reduced for any maturity and the explanatory power increases from an average
R̄2adj = 0.40 to R̄
2
adj = 0.47. This observation suggests, similar to the results in Table 2.4, that
financial factors are also important predictors of bond variance. Analyzing in more detail, we
35Treasury bond implied volatility is based on weighted average of very liquid one-month options on treasury
bonds with maturity 2, 5, 10, and 30 years. To obtain monthly data, we compute the sample mean using daily
observations.
36From our theoretical analysis from Section A.3 and 2.3.4, the contemporaneous impact of monetary policy
uncertainty is marginal and therefore we do not expect to find any significant estimates for the MPU index.
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τ 1 2 3 5 7 10
Simple EPU 0.192*** 0.194*** 0.166*** 0.121*** 0.091*** 0.063***
tEPU (7.18) (9.72) (8.88) (8.86) (7.66) (7.01)
R2adj 0.37 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.40 0.37
EC EPU 0.192*** 0.188*** 0.156*** 0.111*** 0.079*** 0.051***
tEPU (6.39) (9.37) (8.73) (8.60) (7.46) (6.67)
R2adj 0.39 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.43
EC +FV & TIV EPU 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.118*** 0.087*** 0.064*** 0.042***
tEPU (4.08) (5.41) (4.99) (4.91) (4.18) (3.70)
R2adj 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.44
Full Regression EPU 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.125*** 0.095*** 0.071*** 0.04***
tEPU (4.27) (6.24) (5.76) (6.62) (5.90) (5.29)
R2adj 0.47 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.56
Table 2.5: The table displays slope coefficients of the regression of Vt[Y (t, τ)] on EPUt (EPU),
Vt[Y (t, τ)] on EPUt and EC controls (EC), Vt[Y (t, τ)] on EPUt EC and FV variables (EC+FV) in-
cluding the TIV and Vt[Y (t, τ)] on EPUt, EC, FV (including TIV) and MC controls (Full Regression).
The yield maturities are 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. Values in brackets below represent HAC-robust
t−statistics. R2adj refers to adjusted coefficient of determination. By ***, **, * we denote 1%, 5%,
and 10% statistical significance, respectively.
see from row ’Full Regression’ that there is only a moderate increase in predictive power once
we also include our macro controls.
Concerning hypothesis H3, although the impact of economic policy is highly statistically
significant, it gradually declines along the entire term structure. Hence, the EPU index is not
able to generate a hump in the volatility term structure. Therefore, if we would use the EPU as
our proxy for government uncertainty, this result in conflict with our hypothesis H3. However,
since in the EPU index government and monetary uncertainty factors are intermingled, we need
to analyze the impact of the government and monetary policy uncertainty index separately.
[Figure A.7 about here]
Figure A.7 shows that our hypotheses H2 and H3 are supported by the data. Not only
does realized volatility rise when government policy uncertainty increases, its effect is also
hump-shaped with a peak around a maturity of two years. Similar to the yield regressions
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from above, once we add all control variables, the estimated impact of the GPU is substantially
reduced, yet it remains statistically significant and hump-shaped (Panel B). Moreover, similar
to above, we find that the statistical significance of the MPU is misleading. In Panel C we
regress realized volatility on the GPU and MPU index individually (Panel D is with controls).
Including only the GPU or the MPU shows that, whereas the GPU remains positive, significant
and hump-shaped in time to maturity, the MPU index changes signs (compared to Panel A or
B) and is no longer significant at the 5% confidence level for all maturities.
2.4.5 Bond risk premia
Hypothesis H4 states that both government and monetary policy uncertainty should explain
bond risk premia. To explore the predictive power of the EPU index as well as our government
and monetary policy indexes on future bond excess returns, we denote by
rE,τit+1 := log (B(t+ 1, τi − 1))− log (B(t, τi))− Y (t, 1)
the log-excess return from buying at time t a bond with time-to-maturity τi and selling it
after one period. Furthermore, the log forward rate a time t for entering contracts between
time t + τi − 1 and t + τi is given by F (t, τi) = log(BN(t, τi − 1)/BN(t, τi)). The literature
on bond risk premia usually compares the predictive power of a new predictor variable against
the routinely used Cochrane & Piazzesi (2005) factor (CP), which is constructed based on a
tent-shaped linear combination of forward rates.37 Furthermore, from the covariance matrix
of yields we extract the first three principal components which are commonly referred to as
’level’, ’slope’ and ’curvature’ (see Litterman & Scheinkman (1991)) As a further set of control
variables, we also include the economic condition, the financial variables (without) and the set
of macroeconomic factors as above.
[Figure A.8 about here]
37A detailed description of the construction of this factor is given in Cochrane & Piazzesi (2005). To avoid
collinearity problems, we only include the current one year yield Y (t, 1) and the five- and ten year forward rates
and we do not restrict the regression coefficients to sum up to one.
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To analyze the forecasting power of the GPU und MPU index for the bond risk premium,
we plot in Figure A.8 the corresponding regression coefficients. In Panel A, we jointly regress
bond excess bond returns GPU and the MPU in a single regression equation. In line with
the factor loadings displayed in Panel A of Figure A.4, both the GPU and the MPU load
positively on the risk premium except for the MPU, which loads slightly negatively at the ten-
year maturity. However, the loading of the MPU is statistically insignificant at all maturities.
In contrast, the regression coefficient of the GPU is statistically significant at medium to longer
maturities. Panel B shows that once we control for PCA and CP factors, economic condition,
financial variables, and macro factors, the significance of the GPU is still preserved at every
maturity, but its magnitude is significantly reduced. On the other hand, the MPU becomes
also significant for all maturities and its slope exceeds the one of the GPU factor. The adjusted
R2 after having included all regression controls averages some 89% across all maturities. When
we only use the GPU and the MPU, however, the R2 is just some 3% for the two-year maturity,
but rises to 30% at the ten-year maturity. Analyzing the individual impact of the GPU and
MPU respectively, we conclude that both are statistically significant and positive predictors of
bond risk premia. However, including all our control variables shows that bond excess returns
only load statistically significant on the MPU index and not on the GPU index, although its
impact remains increasing in time to maturity just as in Panel B above.38 Hence, overall our
hypothesis H4 is confirmed in that both government and monetary policy uncertainty have a
positive significant impact on bond risk premia when added together to the regression equation.
2.5 Conclusion
We present a tractable dynamic equilibrium model of the term structure of interest rates with
government (real) and monetary policy uncertainty shocks. Consistent with the data, our model
is able to reproduce the flight-to-quality behavior, i.e., the observation that investors tend to
38If we exclude the CP factor from the regression, the GPU index becomes a statistically significant predictor
of bond risk premia.
49
increase their bond holdings in times of higher economic or government policy uncertainty and
thereby lowering treasury bond yields. We calibrate our model to data and provide a detailed
analysis of the dependence of the nominal yield curve and its corresponding term structure
of nominal bond yield volatility on the structural model parameters. Even though our model
belongs to the class of affine term structure models, it is capable of reproducing the empirically
observed hump-shape of the term structure of bond volatility. To achieve this result, two
key feature in our model are essential. First, that the long run growth path of productivity
is time-varying and negatively dependent on government policy uncertainty. Secondly, that
government policy uncertainty affects the nominal side of the economy whenever the central
bank responds actively to deviations of output and inflation growth from their respective target
rates.
Even though our simple empirical analysis has only illustrative character, it sheds some light
on the relationship between contemporaneous movements of the yield and bond yield curve in
response to shocks in government and monetary policy uncertainty. Our empirical results
support our model-implied predictions that, first, increased policy uncertainty leads to an
increased demand in bonds and therefore reducing their yields and, second, that higher economic
policy uncertainty not only raises bond volatility but is also a key driver of generating the
empirically observed hump-shaped structure of the bond yield volatility curve. Furthermore, by
decomposing the EPU index into its components, we identify government policy uncertainty as
the main culprit for the negative relationship between policy uncertainty and nominal yields and
for the empirically observed high and often hump-shaped term structure of bond yield volatility.
The explanatory power of the monetary policy uncertainty index for contemporaneous yields
and bond volatility movements is mixed at best and mostly insignificant. However, monetary
policy uncertainty is not irrelevant for the term structure of yields. We find it to be a key
predictor for bond risk premia at any maturity, while government policy shocks lose some of
their statistical significance once all controls are added to the regression equation.
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Abstract
We study the consumption-portfolio allocation problem in continuous time when asset prices
follow Lévy processes and the investor is concerned about potential model misspecification.
We derive optimal portfolio holdings in closed form under model uncertainty, incorporating
perturbations to the reference model affecting both the drift and jump intensity. We then
present a method for calculating error-detection probabilities by means of Fourier inversion of




The study of dynamic intertemporal portfolio choice problems in continuous time has a long
history, dating back to Merton (1969) and Merton (1971). In Merton’s model, the investor’s
optimization problem consists of how to optimize his consumption and portfolio allocation in a
riskfree and risky assets. The sources of risk in this framework are all diffusive so that sudden
large changes in the risky assets are unlikely to occur. Since then, Merton’s framework has been
extended to allow for asset price discontinuities, driven by jump processes, including Poisson,
stable or more general Lévy processes: see, e.g., Aase (1984), Jeanblanc-Picqué & Pontier (1990),
Shirakawa (1990), Han & Rachev (2000), Ortobelli et al. (2003), Kallsen (2000), Carr et al.
(2001), Choulli & Hurd (2001), Liu et al. (2003), Das & Uppal (2004), Emmer & Klüppelberg
(2004), Madan (2004), Cvitanić et al. (2008), Delong & Klüppelberg (2008), Aı̈t-Sahalia et al.
(2009) and Aı̈t-Sahalia & Hurd (2016), with the latter two providing an explicit solution to the
investor’s optimization problem.
However, the literature on portfolio optimization with jumps has so far treated the param-
eters of the returns distribution, such as the expected return, jump intensity and jump size
distribution as if they were known to the investor. In practice, these parameters are in fact
unknown and therefore the investor faces a considerable amount of model uncertainty. And
in some cases, a precise, control theory-derived optimal solution derived under a misspecified
model that is assumed to be exact can be worse than a naive, perhaps approximate, solution
that is not so closely tied to the incorrect model; for instance, in the case of portfolio opti-
mization, there is a substantial evidence that “1/n” (equally weighted) portfolios can dominate
portfolios that are mean-variance optimized, owing in part to the large uncertainty surround-
ing expected returns (see, e.g., DeMiguel et al. (2009)). If anything, the presence of jumps
makes this problem worse: jumps are rare events, which makes pinning down their distribu-
tional characteristics, or even simply their arrival rate, difficult on the basis of historical returns
data.
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One possible approach for the investor to account for this model uncertainty consists in
employing robust control, keeping his reference model in mind but also considering a set of
alternative models when optimizing his decisions. In this setting, among the class of alternative
models for asset returns, the investor recognizes that he is unable to know exactly the true
underlying model and instead seeks portfolio policies that should perform reasonably well across
the set of alternative models. We employ the penalty-based framework of robust decision
making pioneered by Hansen and Sargent (see, e.g., Hansen & Sargent (2008).2) It introduces
a set of alternative models which are statistically close to the reference model in the sense
of entropy minimization. There are alternative, related, ways to approach this problem. In
Bayesian decision analysis, the investor forms a prior over models and maximizes his expected
utility; model uncertainty adds averaging over models to integrating over shocks. Owing to
its origins in engineering, robust control by contrast typically focuses on minimizing the worst
case loss over the set of possible models, rather than averaging over models.
Knightian, ambiguity, and uncertainty aversion are closely related concepts. One way of
introducing ambiguity aversion is through the formulation of multiple priors preferences as
presented by Gilbao & Schmeidler (1989). Given such preferences, optimal decisions are taken
under the premise that state variables are governed by the worst-case probability model among
a set of candidate models.3 Chen & Epstein (2002) formulate an inter-temporal recursive
multiple-priors utility problem that incorporates Knightian ambiguity aversion. An extension of
this formulation of ambiguity aversion in continuous time is given in Leippold et al. (2007) which
combines learning based on optimal Bayesian updating and ambiguity aversion. Uncertainty
aversion has been employed to study consumption and asset allocation problems in the purely
diffusive setting. For instance, Uppal & Wang (2003) derive a model of inter-temporal portfolio
choice of an investor who takes model misspecification into account. Trojani & Vanini (2004)
2See also Anderson et al. (2003), Hansen et al. (2006), Cogley et al. (2008), Hansen & Sargent (2010) and
Hansen & Sargent (2011).
3For a discussion and comparison of the max-min expected utility of Gilbao & Schmeidler (1989) and robust
control theory, see Hansen & Sargent (2001) and Hansen et al. (2006).
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solve two versions of a robust control problem and examine its impact on the resulting asset
allocation. Trojani & Vanini (2000) derive robust consumption and investment rules that can be
compared to those of a non-robust decision-maker in Merton’s model. Maenhout (2004) studies
an inter-temporal portfolio problem of an investor who worries about model misspecification
and shows that, if the investor seeks robust decision rules, then the demand for equities is
significantly reduced. Maenhout (2006) extents the robust portfolio allocation analysis by a
allowing for a time-varying mean-reverting risk premium and shows that while the desire for
robustness lowers the total equity share, the proportion of the inter-temporal hedging demand
is increased.
Robustness with respect to model misspecification has also been applied to models of the
term structure of nominal interest rates. Ulrich (2013b) employs a robust decision making
framework to analyze how model uncertainty with respect to monetary policy affects the term
premium on nominal bond yields. Kleshchelski & Vincent (2007) present an equilibrium model
of the term structure in a robust control setting where consumption growth exhibits stochastic
volatility. They show that, if the representative agent demands optimal policies that are robust
to model misspecification substantially amplifies the effect of conditional heteroskedasticity in
consumption growth.
As of this writing, the literature on robust asset allocation and consumption problems when
assets follow jump-diffusive or Lévy processes remains sparse. Lui et al. (2005) employ a pure-
exchange economy framework with a representative agent who faces model uncertainty with
respect to jumps in the underlying aggregate endowment (rare events) in order to study the
equilibrium equity price. However the focus of that paper is not on portfolio policies; in the
setting of that paper, the representative agent sets his share of wealth allocated to the risky
asset to always be one. Drechsler (2013) uses a similar robust decision making framework
in an equilibrium model in order to capture salient features of equity and options markets
when the risky assets follow a jump-diffusion process. However, since the framework is also
an aggregate endowment economy populated by a representative agent, the optimal portfolio
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allocation consists again for the investor in putting all his wealth in the consumption claim.
Branger et al. (2014) study a model where the state of the economy is driven by a hidden
Markov chain and filtering the unknown jump intensities lead to the filtered intensities having
self-exciting properties.
The novelty in the present paper is to introduce robustness concerns of the investor when
making his consumption and portfolio choice decisions, when the underlying risky asset follows a
Lévy process, and studying the change in optimal portfolio (and consumption) policies necessary
to make them robust. We include model misspecification with respect to both the drift and jump
intensity parameters and solve for the investors’ optimal consumption and portfolio allocation in
closed form. Additionally, we derive a semi-closed form formula for detection-error probabilities,
i.e. for the likelihood that the investor selects the wrong model based on a sample time series
asset returns. This gives a quantitative upper bound on the set of alternative models which
seem reasonably close to his reference model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the general
robust portfolio allocation problem. Section 3.3 derives optimal robust portfolio weights under
both drift and jump intensity perturbation. Section ?? derives a semi-explicit expression for
computing a formula for error-detection probability when the underlying measure change follows
a Lévy jump-diffusive process. Section 3.5 conducts Monte-Carlo simulations to assess expected
utility under various different portfolio holding strategies, comparing in particular robust to
non-robust optimal policies. Section 3.6 concludes. The Appendix contains further derivations
and technical details.
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3.2 The Robust Portfolio Allocation Problem with
Jumps
We consider an infinite horizon expected utility maximization problem where the investor
chooses his consumption level and allocates his funds between a riskless and a risky asset
subject to both diffusive and jump risks. For this purpose, the investor employs a particu-
lar model which presumably represents his best estimate of the risky asset dynamics under a
benchmark or reference probability measure. However, the investor fears that the model he
uses is potentially misspecified: he believes that the true model could lie in a larger set of
alternative models that are statistically difficult to distinguish from his reference model. In
order to mitigate the effect of potential model misspecification on his utility, the investor wants
to choose optimal consumption and portfolio holdings that are robust with respect to small
perturbations of his reference model. Ultimately, he seeks to make wise decisions although he
knows enough to distrust his model.
The first issue is to specify the set of alternative models for asset returns which the investor
considers as plausible alternatives. Following the Hansen-Sargent approach, the set of alter-
native models considered by the investor consists of those models whose relative entropy (or
Kullback-Leibler) distance from the reference model is bounded. The idea is that models in
this set should be difficult to distinguish statistically by the investor from his reference model.
The Lagrange approach then converts the entropy constraint into a penalty on perturbations
from the reference model. We obtain the optimal robust solution in closed form.
3.2.1 Asset Price Dynamics under the Reference and Robust Mea-
sures
We assume a complete, filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)t≥0 ,P) satisfying the usual
assumption. P denotes the reference (or physical) probability measure. The investment set
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available to the investor at time t ≥ 0 consists of a riskless (locally deterministic) asset with
price S0,t and a risky asset with price S1,t following a compensated exponential Lévy process.
More specifically, the dynamics of the two assets are given by
dS0,t
S0,t
= rdt, S0,0 > 0 (3.1)
dS1,t
S1,t−
= (r +R)dt+ σdBt + JdỸt, S1,0 > 0, P− a.s. (3.2)
where r ≥ 0 is the riskless return, R ∈ R denotes the excess return of the risky asset over the
riskfree asset, σ > 0 is the volatility parameter, Bt = (Bt)t≥0 is a Brownian motion under P
and J ∈ (−1, 1) is a jump scaling factor. Ỹt = Yt−Λt is a compensated pure jump process with




min(1, |z|)ν(dz) <∞, so that jumps have finite variation. We write Λt = λκt where
κ = E [Zt] <∞ denotes the predictable compensator of the jump process Yt.
In the sequel, we assume that Yt is a compensated compound Poisson process, i. e. Ỹt =
∑Nt
n=1 Zn−Λt, where Nt is a scalar Poisson process with jump intensity, or arrival rate, λ. The
jump sizes Zn are independent of Nt and are assumed to be i.i.d. with Lévy measure ν(dz).




= (r +R)dt+ σdBt + JdỸt
= (r +R)dt+ σdBt + J (dYt − E [ZtdNt])














dt+ σdBt + JdYt, S1,0 > 0, P− a.s. (3.3)
In order to introduce the notion of model misspecification we need to specify a set of
alternative or worst-case robust dynamics which are statistically close to the reference dynamics
in (3.3). For this purpose, consider an equivalent probability measure which we denote by Pϑ
and in the sequel refer to it as the robust measure. The investor considers alternative models
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dt+ σdBϑt + JdY
ϑ
t , S1,0 > 0, P
ϑ − a.s. (3.4)




zνϑ(dz)) under the measure Pϑ where (ht)t≥0 is a continuous Ft -measurable function
of the Markovian state S1,t with the same dimensionality as the one-dimensional Brownian
motion. In what follows, we refer to ht as a drift perturbation function, since it perturbs the
drift dynamics of the risky asset under P and does not affect the jump component Ỹt. Second,
the stochastic process Bϑt = (B
ϑ
t )t≤0 is a Brownian motion but now under the perturbed or
robust measure Pϑ. Third, the other set of perturbations affect the jump component Ỹ ϑt in
(3.4), namely the jump intensity and the jump size distribution under Pϑ. The jump intensity
λ is transformed into λϑ under the robust probability measure as follows
λϑ = eaλ, a ∈ R (3.5)
where a is a scalar jump intensity perturbation parameter that amplifies or diminishes the
jump intensity. Therefore, under the robust measure, the investor is worried about model
misspecification with respect to the jump arrival intensity, meaning how frequently jumps
occur.
From (3.4) we observe that perturbating the intensity has two effects on the risky assets
dynamics. It both alters the drift and changes the frequency of jumps occurring in the Poisson
process Nt. Consider the case when there are only negative jumps in the stock price dynamics
of (3.4), for example by assuming that the jump size z has positive support and J ∈ (−1, 0).
Under this assumption, increasing the jump intensity leads on the one hand to more frequent
negative jumps but also on the other hand, due to compensation, raises the expected return
on the risky asset, which is consistent with the empirical risk and return trade-off observed
in financial markets. In other words, compensating the jump process leads to the stock price
St carrying a risk premium for intensity misspecification. As we later show, this modeling
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assumption has fundamental implications as to how jump risk will affect optimal portfolio
holdings. For instance, in a diffusive setting, i.e. if we set λ = 0 in (3.4), where the investor
is only concerned about potential drift misspecification, the optimal portfolio weight in the
risky asset is then simply reduced as model misspecification concerns lead to a decrease in the
expected return while leaving volatility unchanged. However, in the robust setting here, there
exists a trade-off between higher frequency of jumps occurring and simultaneously higher jump
risk compensation.
The jump size distribution under Pϑ has Lévy measure
νϑ(dz) = ν(dz; b), b ∈ RL, : L ≥ 1 (3.6)
where b is a set of possibly vector valued perturbation parameters. For instance, if the jump
size distribution is normal, Zn
i.i.d∼ N (µ, σ2), a jump size perturbed model may read Zn i.i.d∼
N (µ+ δµ, σ2vσ), where δµ ∈ R shifts the mean from µ under P to µ+ δµ under Pϑ and likewise
the variance is scaled by vσ > 0. So for a = δµ = 0 and vσ = 1 we get back the jump
distributions of the reference model under the measure P.
3.2.2 Measure Change for Itô Semimartingales
The dynamics of the compensated exponential Lévy process under the reference as well as under
the robust measure are linked through a specific likelihood ratio or Radon-Nikodym density
process ϑt. This density process not only allows to change the dynamics of the risky asset but
also, as it will be shown in the next section, restricts the size of alternative models that are
statistically difficult to distinguish from the reference model. To be more precise, let Pϑ be
the robust or perturbed measure which is absolutely continuous with respect to the reference
measure P. Fix T > 0 and define











where ϑDt is a (Ft,P)- martingale that defines the measure change of the continuous part of the
stochastic process and ϑJt , also a (Ft,P)- martingale, that defines the measure change of the
discontinuous or jump part. The change of measures of the diffusive and jump part factor only
when the continuous and the jump part of the stochastic process are independent, which is the
case in the setting we employ above, since [N,W ]t = 0.
In a jump diffusive setting, where the jumps follow a compound Poisson process, there
are three ways to change the measure, i. e. from P, the reference measure to Pϑ, the robust
measure:
1. Measure change of the diffusive part through ϑDt affecting the drift and the Brownian
motion.
2. Measure change of the jump part through ϑJt by changing the jump intensity of the process
under Pϑ.
3. Measure change of the jump part through ϑJt by changing the jump size of the process
under Pϑ.4
From Girsanovs’ theorem for Itô semimartingales, for the diffusive drift measure change ϑDt ,
with (ht)t≥0 being a progressively measurable process, we have that




is a Brownian motion with respect to the measure Pϑ. Then it follows that, an absolutely












, E0 [ϑt] = ϑ0 = 1, P− a.s. (3.9)
4One distinguishes between a finite number of jump sizes and the case where the jump sizes can take on a
continuum of values.
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where Et[·] = E[·|Ft] denotes the conditional expectation up to time t with respect to the
measure P and likewise we define by Eϑt [·] the conditional expectation up to time t with respect
to the robust measure Pϑ.
Concerning the jump part of the risky asset, we let N = (Nt)t∈[0,T ] be a Poisson process
with jump intensity λ > 0 on the probability space (Ω,Ft,P) and T > 0 again fixed. We want
to change the intensity λ of the Poisson process (Nt)t∈[0,T ] on P to a jump intensity λ
ϑ under
the robust measure Pϑ. Likewise, we want to perturb the Lévy measure such that the jumps
have distribution νϑ(dz) = ν(dz; b) under the robust measure. The appropriate measure change

















= ϑJ0 = 1, P− a.s. (3.10)
















where Ht is a compound Poisson process and Ht − λϑt is a (Ft,Pϑ)-martingale. Therefore, the
density process in (3.10) is a right-continuous, adapted process with left limits (càdlàg).
3.2.3 Relative Entropy Growth Bounds and Error-Detection Prob-
abilities
By changing the perturbation parameters a, b and ht in (3.5), (3.6) and (3.8) we control
the discrepancy between the dynamics of the risky asset under the reference measure with
respect to its dynamics under the robust measure. Therefore, the more ht, a and b deviate
from their no-perturbation values, the more different the dynamics of the risky asset become
under the reference with respect to the robust measure, i.e. the set of alternative models
expands. However, the possible set of models under consideration has to be restricted to a
subset of models which are statistically difficult to distinguish from the reference model. A
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natural statistical tool to measure distances between two probability distributions is relative
entropy, and it is well suited for the purpose of defining alternative models in robust control
(see Anderson et al. (2003)).
The alternative set of possible models that are similar in a statistical sense are linked to the
measure change ϑt. Given two probability measures P and P
ϑ, growth in entropy of Pϑ relative
to P over the time interval [t, t+∆t] is defined as











∀t ≥ 0 (3.12)
Thus the set of admissible model misspecification can be characterized as
{ϑt : R(ϑt) ≤ η, ∀t ≥, η ≥ 0} (3.13)
where η is a constant that defines an upper bound on the set of alternative models.As η → 0,
the investor becomes fully confident about his reference model, while increasing η expands the
set of alternative models that are statistically further away from the reference model,so overall
model uncertainty increases. Due to the independence of the diffusive and the jump component,




t , which implies that relative entropy growth is simply
the sum of the two components ’drift’ and ’jump’, namely R(ϑt) = R(ϑDt )+R(ϑJt ). Therefore,
by varying the perturbation function ht and perturbation parameters a and b we regulate the
space of admissible models within the set [0, η], ∀t ≥ 0.
An immediate question that arises in this context is: What is a reasonable value for η?
Anderson et al. (2003) provide a statistical tool for model detection based on the log of the
measure change ϑt in the form of detection-error probabilities in order to quantify the amount
of model uncertainty that seems plausible to the investor. The basic intuition behind this test
statistic is, given the right model is P and a finite time series sample of the state variable
(in our case the risky asset) of length T − t, how likely will the investor mistakenly assume
the data have been generated by model Pϑ instead of the true model P. The detection-error
probability is precisely quantifying the likelihood that the investor is going to select the wrong
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model. Thus if the true model is P, the investor will falsely reject it for model Pϑ based on a
time series sample of length T − t whenever log(ϑT ) > 0. Conversely, if the true model is Pϑ
he will erroneously reject it for model P whenever log(ϑT ) < 0.
3.2.4 Wealth Dynamics and Utility Specification under Robustness
We denote by Xt = (X)t≥0 the investor’s wealth at time t. Let ω0,t = w0,t/Xt be the percentage
of wealth (or portfolio weight) invested in the risk free asset and ω1,t = w1,t/Xt, an adapted
predictable càdlàg process, be the percentage of wealth invested in the risky asset; wi,t, i ∈
{0, 1} is the absolute amount of money invested into asset i. The portfolio weights satisfy
ω0,t+ ω1,t = 1. The investor consumes at an instantaneous rate Ct at time t. Under the robust

























with X0 > 0, P
ϑ − a.s. and we have set ωt = ω1,t.
As a first step, the investor’s robust consumption and portfolio allocation problem is to
choose, a set of worst-case drift perturbation functions {hs}t≤s<∞ and worst-case jump inten-
sity and jump size parameters a, b. As a second step, the investor has to select admissible
consumption and portfolio holdings {Cs, ωs}t≤s<∞ that maximize his expected utility of con-
sumption under the worst-case scenario. More formally, with β ∈ (0,∞) denoting his subjective












subject to the wealth dynamics in (3.14) and the entropy growth constraint
R(ϑt) ≤ η, ∀t ≥ 0. (3.16)
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We define as










the value function associated with the optimal stochastic robust control problem in (3.15).
Since we work in incomplete markets and thus the martingale measure is not unique, we
have to rely on standard stochastic dynamic programming techniques. Using Itô’s formula
for semimartingales, the perturbed Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation characterizing







































R(ϑt) ≤ η (3.19)
and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
Eϑt [V (Xt, t)] = 0. (3.20)
Then, usual time-homogeneity arguments for infinite horizon problems imply that




























where the third equality follows because the optimal robust control is Markov and L(Xt) is
independent of time. Thus V (Xt, t) = e
−βtL(Xt).
Next, we scale the entropy penalty term
θt = θ(Xt) = θ̃(1− γ)V (t,Xt) > 0, θ̃ ∈ R+. (3.22)
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This specification renders the Lagrange multiplier state-dependent in wealth which will allow
us to find a closed form solution to the consumers’ consumption and investment problem.



































R(ϑt) ≤ η (3.24)
and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
Eϑt [L(Xt)] = 0. (3.25)
To find a solution of the problem in (3.23) subject to the entropy growth constraint in
(3.24), we formulate it as a Lagrange optimization problem with inequality constraints. We first
determine the optimal robust control policies h∗t , a
∗ and b∗, by solving a constraint optimization
problem. We denote by L = L(Ct, ωt, ht, a, b, θt) the Lagrangian associated to the problem given
in (3.23) and by θt the corresponding state-dependent Lagrange-multiplier of the entropy growth
constraint in (3.24). Then the first order optimality conditions for the minimization part of







































= R(ϑt)− η = 0, θt ≥ 0, θt (R(ϑt)− η) = 0. (3.29)
Each equation in (3.26) to (3.29) summarizes two opposing effects. For instance, from
(3.26), the left term ∂Eϑ [V (Xt)] /∂ht = σωt characterizes the marginal impact on the investor’s
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utility that results from increasing perturbation. The right term in (3.26) (∂/∂ht) θ (R(ϑt)− η)
captures the associated increase in detectability of the robust model. Thus under the robust
measure, the perturbation of the reference model is such that its effect is most harmful to the
investor’s utility and simultaneously remaining difficult to detect statistically.
To solve the problem, from the first order conditions in (3.26) to (3.29) we obtain the optimal
amount of perturbation of the drift component h∗t , jump intensity a
∗ and size perturbation
b∗ ∈ RL, that satisfy the entropy growth constraint, the complementary slackness condition
and non-negativity constraint of θ∗ in (3.29). Having obtained a set of optimal robust control
parameters {h∗t , a∗, b∗}, we then plug them back into the Lagrangian and solve the corresponding
perturbed HJB equation for the optimal consumption policy C∗t and portfolio weights ω
∗. Thus
given {h∗t , a∗, b∗}, the first order condition for the investor’s optimal consumption and portfolio
policies are given by,




















































The first order condition for optimal consumption is standard and says that at the optimum,
marginal utility of consumption must be equal to the marginal utility of wealth. Since U
is concave, the investor wants to smooth consumption. From (3.31) we obtain the optimal
portfolio allocations as a function of the perturbation parameters {h∗t , a∗, b∗}. We are now
going to discuss the case when both drift and jump intensity are being distorted.
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3.3 Explicit Robust Portfolio Weights: Drift and Jump
Intensity Perturbations
In order to derive more explicit results, we need to make some further assumptions about the in-
vestor’s utility, the Lévy measure characterizing the jump sizes and the amount of perturbation
of the reference model we allow for. We consider an investor with power utility,
U(c) = c1−γ/ (1− γ) (3.32)
and CRRA coefficient γ ∈ (0, 1) ⋃ (1,∞); U(c) = −∞ whenever c ≤ 0. Furthermore, in order
to obtain fully explicit portfolio weights, we do not perturb the Lévy measure, in other words,
the jump size distribution is the same under both measures, i.e. ν(dz; b) = ν(dz). We only
perturb the arrival rate of the jumps.
We conjecture a solution of the form
L(x) =
K−γx1−γ
(1− γ) , with
∂L(x)
∂x
= (1− γ)L(x)/x, ∂
2L(x)
∂x2
= −γ(1− γ)L(x)/x2 (3.33)




























ν(dz), subject to R(ϑt) ≤ η. (3.34)






1−γ − 1] ν(dz)
are both concave in ωt, thus any solution to (3.34) will always have a unique maximizer. Note
that if we were to allow for a jump size perturbation, the investor would additionally need
to decide upon the optimal jump size perturbation b∗. This type of perturbation leads to
highly-nonlinear first order conditions of both the jump size perturbation parameter b as well
as for the optimal portfolio holdings which can only be resolved numerically.
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The objective function is time independent. This follows because γ,R, σ, J and λ are con-
stant which implies that the optimal drift perturbation parameter ht will also be independent
of time, ht = h, ∀t ≥ 0. Furthermore, since
[











1−γ − 1] ν(dz) does not depend on the investor’s time t wealth Xt,
the optimal portfolio share will not only be time- but also be state-independent, i. e. ω∗(Xt, t) =
ω∗, ∀t ≥ 0. On the other hand, the optimal portfolio allocation will of course be a function of
the perturbation parameters {h∗, a∗}, in other words, ω∗ = ω∗(h∗, a∗).
Lastly, we derive the measure change, in order to fully characterize the set of alternative
models. When there is no jump size perturbation, the Radon-Nikodym derivative in (3.11)
reduces to
dϑIt = (e
a − 1)ϑJt−dN̂t, ϑJ0 = 1 with N̂t = Nt − λt (3.35)
whose solution is given by
ϑJt = exp {aNt − λ (ea − 1) t} , ϑJ0 = 1. (3.36)
Therefore, together with (3.9) characterizing the measure change of the diffusive part we arrive
at




aλ (a− 1) + λ. (3.37)
The investor’s consumption and portfolio choice problem is summarized by (3.34) and (3.37),
which limits the set of alternative models. The solution to this problem is given by a two
step-procedure. In a first step, which corresponds to the min-part in (3.34), the investor has
to decide how rich the alternative set of models is that he considers reasonably close to his
reference model. In doing so, he specifies his preference for robustness with respect to small
perturbations of his reference model by optimally choosing {h∗, a∗}. In a second step, he has
to decide on his optimal consumption and portfolio policies. With CRRA preferences, from the




∗, a∗) = K(h∗, a∗)Xt (3.38)
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where we require that Xt > 0 such that consumption remains non-negative. Then given {h∗, a∗}
evaluating (3.34) at optimal consumption C∗t and portfolio holdings ω
∗
t the constant K is given
by























(1 + ω∗Jz)1−γ − 1
]
ν(dz) > 0 (3.39)
which will be fully determined once we have first solved for the optimal perturbation parameters
{h∗, a∗} and secondly obtained the optimal portfolio holdings ω∗. Furthermore, from (3.38) and
(3.39) it follows that the investor’s optimal consumption is affected by robustness concerns.
Finally, given optimal consumption in (3.38) and the constant in (3.39) we can now check
that the transversality condition is satisfied. Evaluating (3.15) and taking conditional time t
expectations with respect to the robust measure we have that












Since the optimal robust control parameters h∗ and a∗ as well as the model parameters R, σ, J
and λ are constant, applying Leibniz rule for differentiating integrals, we obtain that
Eϑ [V (t,X∗t )] =: ψ(t) (3.41)




dEϑ [V (t,X∗t )]
dt
= −K∗ψ(t), ψ(0) = K∗X0 (3.42)
from which it follows that Eϑ [V (t,X∗t )] = K
∗X0e
−K∗t converges to zero exponentially fast as
t→ ∞, which establishes that the transversalilty condition is satisfied.
3.3.1 Closed Form Robust Portfolio Weights
In order to obtain fully explicit portfolio weights, we further specify the level of risk aversion,
the Lévy measure and the treatment of the entropy growth constraints. In the sequel, we focus
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on a Lévy measure ν(dz) defined on (0, 1] and restrict the deterministic jump scaling factor J
to the open interval (−1, 0). This implies that we only consider negative jumps in the asset
price dynamics. However, those are the ones the investor is more concerned about as they are
more harmful to his utility. We set ν(dz) to follow a power law under both measures, i. e.
νϑ(dz) = ν(dz) = dz/z, if z ∈ (0, 1]. (3.43)
Concerning the treatment of the entropy growth constraints, since total relative entropy
separates into a diffusive and a jump part, i.e. R(ϑt) = R(ϑDt ) +R(ϑJt ), we can treat entropy
growth with respect to the drift and jump parts independently.5 However, this implies that the
total maximal amount of robustness η is the sum of the maximal amount of robustness with
respect to drift misspecification, denoted by ηD and the maximal amount of robustness with
respect to jump intensity misspecification, denoted by ηJ . Therefore η = ηD+ηJ which implies




η, where ζD ∈ [0, 1] denotes the share of
total amount of robustness that is allocated to drift perturbation. Therefore, when ζD = 0 the
investor has full confidence in his drift specification and all the robustness concerns relate to
the jump intensity. Likewise, when ζD = 1, the investor beliefs that there is no jump intensity
miss specification and thus is only concerned that the drift might be miss specified. With this
decomposition, the entropy growth constraints are given by
R(ϑDt ) ≤ ηD, R(ϑJt ) ≤ ηJ , ∀t ≥ 0. (3.44)
5A similar idea has also been used by Chen & Epstein (2002), Sbuelz & Trojani (2008), Ulrich (2010),
Ulrich (2012), Drechsler (2013) to solve a model ambiguity problem when the risks are only diffusive. In our
case, a joint entropy growth constraint gives rise to first order conditions of the drift and the jump intensity
perturbation parameter which cannot be solved analytically and one needs to rely on numerical techniques to
solve the system.
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Define as L(ωt, ht, θ̃D, θ̃J) the Lagrangian associated to the constraint HJB problem in (3.34)
with constant Lagrange multipliers θ̃D and θ̃J . Then taking γ = 2 we obtain









λea(a− 1) + λ− ηJ
)
. (3.45)
The necessary first order optimality conditions for the robustness parameters h and a are
∂L(ω, h, a, θ̃D, θ̃J)
∂h
= σωt + θ̃
Dh = 0, → h∗ = −σωt
θ̃D
, θ̃D ≥ 0 (3.46)




aθ̃I + log (1 + Jω)− wJ)
)
= 0, (3.47)
→ a = ωJ − log (1 + Jω)
θ̃J
, θJ ≥ 0 (3.48)
∂L(ω, h, a, θ̃D, θ̃J)
∂θ̃D
= ηD − 1
2





∂L(ω, h, a, θ̃D, θ̃J)
∂θ̃J





) ≥ 0. (3.50)
From the system of equations (3.46) to (3.50) we find that the optimal drift h∗ and jump
















= W (·;λ) denotes Lambert’s W function and e is Euler’s constant.
The function W (·, λ) is plotted in Figure B.1.6
[Figure B.1 about here]
Note that limη→0W (η;λ) = W (−1/e;λ) = −1 so that λϑ = λ, in other words we are back
to the case where there are no robustness concerns of the investor with respect to the jump
intensity parameter.
6Since η is real, the function W is not injective on the interval −1/e ≤ η < 0. However, we set W (·, λ) ≥ −1
such that W (·, λ) is single valued and therefore represents a well defined function. Furthermore, on the domain













Furthermore, λϑ > λ, ∀η, λ > 0. Thus, the robust jump intensity under the robust measure
Pϑ is always higher than the jump intensity under the reference measure P. Since λ > 0, λϑ is













) > 0 ∀ηJ , λ > 0.
This implies that the larger the set of potential models (ηJ ↑) is we allow for, the higher the
jump frequency under the robust measure becomes.
In order to make sure that the optimal robust control variables h∗ and a∗ are indeed (global)
minimizers we need to check the second order optimality conditions. For the optimal drift
perturbation parameter h∗ we have
∂2L(ω, h, a, θ̃D, θ̃I)
∂h2
= θ̃D
and thus we need θ̃D ≥ 0 such that L(ω, h, a, θ̃D, θ̃I) is convex in h and therefore the solution




≥ 0 and therefore the second
order Lagrange-conditions are satisfied for h∗ and θ̃D∗. Along the same line of argument, we
have
θ̃J∗ =













(0,∞), ∀λ, ηJ > 0, and
∂L2(ω, h∗, a∗, θ̃D∗, θ̃J∗)
∂a2
= eaλθ̃J∗ ≥ 0
which shows that a∗ is the global minimizer.
Next, using the optimal perturbation parameters h∗ and a∗ we can now solve for the optimal
robust portfolio weights in closed form. Given L = L(ω, h∗, a∗, θ̃D∗, θ̃J∗) in (3.45) the first order















/(1 + ωJ) = 0
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and we require that the solvency constraint |ω∗J | < 1 holds at the optimal portfolio allocation
ω∗. In Figure B.2 we plot the optimal robust portfolio weights as a function of the share of
total robustness assigned to drift perturbation ζD.
[Figure B.2 about here]
As expected, the robust portfolio allocation is such that the amount invested into the risky
asset is lower compared to the case when the investor has full confidence in his reference model
(η = 0). Further, regardless of the share of η allocated to drift or jump intensity robustness,
the optimal portfolio weights are more sensitive when η is low compared to the case when η
is large. This implies that the marginal effect of increasing the total amount of robustness on
ω∗(h∗, a∗) is declining. Next, comparing the case of only drift ζD = 1 to only jump intensity
ζD = 0 perturbation shows that ω∗ is reduced more in the case when there are solely concerns
about potential drift as opposed to only jump intensity misspecification. However, this is a
direct consequence of compensating the Lévy process as the expected return on the risky asset
is higher due to adding the compensator. Lastly, the asymptotic behavior of the portfolio
weights when the total amount of robustness tends to infinity, shows that
lim
η→∞
ω∗(h∗, a∗) = −∞
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which implies that regardless of whether the drift or the jump intensity is misspecified or
both, the investor optimally chooses to short the risky asset (up until the solvency constraint
|ω∗J | < 1 holds) when model uncertainty approaches infinity.
3.3.2 Further Closed Form Solutions
Other special cases which lead to fully explicit portfolio weights arise when γ = 3 or 4. The
first order conditions for optimal portfolio holdings lead to a cubic (resp. quartic) equation,
which given that |wJ | < 1, is solvable in closed form using standard methods.
There are also other settings where one can derive fully explicit portfolio weights. Using
the same dynamics of the stock price process as in (3.4), we can derive fully explicit portfolio
weights if we assume that the jump sizes are uniformly distributed on (0, 1) and the coefficient
of risk aversion is equal to either 3 or 4. An interesting example is when the Poisson process
is not compensated, meaning Yt =
∑Nt
n=1 Zn and the i.i.d. jumps Zn have symmetric Lévy





λdz/z if z ∈ (0, 1],
−λdz/z if z ∈ [−1, 0)
(3.53)
so that the underlying asset exhibits both positive and negative jumps (see Section B.1 for a
discussion). The quantitative behavior of the optimal portfolio weights is very similar to the
compensated Lévy case. An other interesting example is given when the jumps are negative
(no positive jumps) and we do not compensate the Lévy - process St. In this case, the portfolio
weights are more sensitive to jump intensity perturbation, meaning the fraction of wealth
invested into the risky asset is not only lower, but also decreases in ηJ substantially faster
compared to the compensated Lévy case. Lastly, in Section B.2 we solve the consumption and
investment problem where the investor has exponential utility and the risky asset follows a
compensated exponential Lévy process.
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3.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis of Optimal Portfolio Weights
Given the explicit portfolio weights we can now analyze their sensitivity with respect to both
the asset price parameters R, σ, J, λ of the model and the entropy growth parameters ηD and
ηJ . We start our analysis by comparing ω∗ in (3.52) to the classical Merton solution with and
without robustness concerns, which can be obtained by letting λ → 0. In this case the risks













obtained by setting ηD = 0 in (3.54).
From (3.54) one can immediately see that an investor who is concerned about potential
model misspecification will always invest less into the risky asset. Next, going back to the robust
jump diffusive weights in (3.52), for any λ > 0, we have that ω∗ = 0 whenever R =
√
2ηDσ. This
is intuitive as when the expected return under the robust measure is zero and since Eϑt [Ỹt] = 0,






























from which we see that the inequality in (3.56) will always be satisfied under both measures.
Thus increasing the expected return will lead to an increase of investment into the risky asset.




ω∗(h∗, a∗) = 0 (3.57)
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The rate at which the portfolio weights approach zero is affected by the amount of drift per-











suggesting that the rate at which the portfolio weights approach zero is lower whenever there
is doubt about the drift specification of the model. Furthermore, the partial derivative of ω∗



































The interesting observation from inspection of ∂ω
∗
∂λ
is that an increase in the jump intensity does
not necessarily lead to a decline in the share of wealth allocated to the risky asset. This is even
true if there is no concern about jump intensity misspecification, i. e. ηJ = 0. This somewhat
counterintuitive result is due to compensating the jump process.7 Increasing (decreasing) the
jump intensity leads to negative jumps occurring more (less) frequently but simultaneously
leads to an increase (decrease) in the compensator and thus in the expected return. This
explains why the sign of ∂ω
∗
∂λ
can be positive or negative depending on the parameter values of
the model. Note that when R =
√
2ηDσ we have that ∂ω∗/∂λ = 0 for any ηJ > 0. Furthermore,


















Thus, whenever R −
√
2ηDσ > 0, ω∗ > 0 the optimal portfolio weight approaches zero from
positive territory and vice versa when R −
√
2ηDσ < 0. Further, under the robust measure
the rate is lower due to both drift (downward level shift) and jump intensity perturbation
(downward scaling). Next, analyzing the sensitivity of the optimal robust portfolio weights
7In Aı̈t-Sahalia et al. (2009), an increase in the likelihood of jumps occurring always leads to a reduction in
the amount invested into the risky asset. This result is due to the fact, that in their model, the jump component
is not compensated which implies that the risky asset does not carry a jump risk premium.
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where F (·) = h2(·)
H(·) : η → (−1, 1). Evaluating Equation (3.60) above for η = 0, we can infer






which implies that optimal portfolio weights are highly sensitive when robustness concerns are
introduced into the reference model.8 Furthermore, we show in Section B.4 that the optimal
portfolio weights are monotonically declining in uncertainty η, which indicates that the investor
optimally reduces his position in the risky asset when parameter uncertainty increases. Lastly,
we plot the robust jump diffusive and the jump diffusive portfolio weights for a wide range of
parameter values for a fixed total amount of robustness η and vary the parameters R, σ, J and
λ.
[Figure B.3 about here]
Figure B.3 shows that, under robustness concerns, the amount invested into the risky asset
is always lower than when the investor has full confidence in his reference model. From Panel
A we see that increasing volatility of the risky asset leads the investor to optimally decrease
ω∗(h∗, a∗) and even short the asset whenever R is sufficiently low. Panel B shows that when
both J and λ are high, then the investor simply allocates all his funds into the risk free asset.
Thus, the model can capture the well-documented empirical flight-to-quality behavior when
jump risk λ is high and J approaches -1. However, contrarily to the case when jumps are only
negative and the process is not compensated which leads the investor to optimally short the
risky asset, i. e. ω∗ → −∞ as λ→ ∞ (see Aı̈t-Sahalia et al. (2009)), in this setting, our robust






which implies that the marginal impact of increasing model uncertainty diminishes as η increases.
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investor does not short the risky asset whenever J and λ are sufficiently high, but instead
optimally chooses ω∗ = 0.
Further, if either the jump scaling parameter or the intensity approach zero, i. e. the
risky assets dynamics converges to a purely diffusive process, ω∗(h∗, a∗) increases non-linearly
and the gap between the robust and non-robust portfolio weights widens. This suggests that
for low jump risks λ ↓ and simultaneously low jump size scaling J → 0, perturbations of the
reference model have a higher impact on ω∗(h∗, a∗), meaning that there is a significant drop in
the amount invested into the risky asset, compared to the case when both J and λ are high.
3.4 Error-Detection Probability for Lévy Jump-Diffusive
Processes
The robust portfolio weights derived in the previous sections crucially depend on the amount of
model uncertainty we allow for. In order to quantify how much uncertainty seems reasonable to
the investor, we make use of detection-error probabilities as suggested by Anderson et al. (2003).
More formally, let ξt = log (ϑt) and Ft be the filtration with respect to which the probabilities
and expectations are conditioned, the error-detection probability π(t, T ; η) is defined as the
conditional probability at time t of making a detection-error given a sample of length T > 0,




P [ξT > 0|Ft] + Pϑ [ξT < 0|Ft]
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.63)
Therefore, as η increases, so does the set of admissible models for the risky asset under P and
Pϑ, thereby causing the detection-error probability to decrease towards zero. Thus the larger
η, the easier statistical discrimination between the model dynamics under P and Pϑ becomes.
Anderson et al. (2003) suggest to choose η such that the error-detection probability is at least
10%. Note that when π(t, T ; η) = 0.5 the models are statistically indistinguishable.
We now derive an expression for the conditional probabilities in (3.63) by means of Fourier
transformation of the conditional probability measures. The conditional characteristic functions
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of ξT , under the reference measure P, denoted by φP(k, t, T ) and φPϑ(k, t, T ) under the robust
measure Pϑ are given by






















−1 and k ∈ R is the transform variable. Using a simple measure change of the
form
φPϑ(k, t, T ) =
∫
ω∈Ω






the Fourier transform under the robust measure can be obtained by integrating with respect
to the reference measure. By an application of Feynman-Kac’s theorem, we can compute the
conditional expectations (3.64) and (3.66) by solving a partial differential difference equation
(PDDE) with appropriate boundary conditions. If we were to also perturb the jump sizes, the
measure change would satisfy a partial integral-differential equation.
In order to derive this PDDE for both conditional Fourier transforms we need the dynamics
of the measure change under P given the optimal perturbation policies h∗t and a
∗. An application














































From (3.67), the dynamics of the log measure change are




































and therefore the PDDE for φP(t) = φP(k, t, T ) is given by



















h∗2t + λ (φP(k, t, T )− φP(k, t−, T )) (3.69)
subject to the following boundary condition
φP(k, T, T ) = ϑ
ik
T (3.70)
Likewise the PDDE for φPϑ(t) = φPϑ(k, t, T ) is equivalent and given by



















h∗2t + λ (φPϑ(k, t, T )− φPϑ(k, t−, T )) (3.71)
subject to a different boundary condition given by
φPϑ(k, T, T ) = ϑ
1+ik
T .
The PDDE in (3.71) admits a unique affine solution of the form
φP(k, t, T ) = e
α(T−t)+β(T−t)ξt (3.72)
where α(·) and β(·) are both deterministic functions of time to maturity τ = T − t. Inserting
the conjecture of (3.72) into (3.69) gives



















Using the fact that this equation has to hold for all ξt and the constant terms we get two
equations, namely





= K → K = ik = β (3.73)

























(T − t) (3.74)
where the expression for β in (3.73) follows from the boundary condition in (3.70) and α(0) = 0.
The solution for (3.71) is identical except that β = 1+ik. Given these conditional characteristic
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functions φPϑ(k, t, T ) and φP(k, t, T ), the error-detection probability in (3.63) based on a sample
of length T − t is given by



















where Re(·) denotes the real part of a complex number. In Figure B.4, we plot the error-
detection probability as a function of the robustness parameter η using monthly and weekly
sampled data points over a time period of one year T = 1.
[Figure B.4 about here]
As expected, π(t, T ; η) is monotonously decreasing in η, which is intuitive as the set of
alternative models increases, which implies that the dynamics of the process under P becomes
more distinct from the dynamics of the process under Pϑ. Furthermore, the two graphs in
Figure B.4 imply that making an error in classifying, whether a given time series was generated
under the reference or the robust measure, is smaller in the case when we have weekly data
available as opposed to only monthly data. This is due to the fact that it becomes increasingly
easier to distinguishing between two stochastic processes (one under the reference and the other
under the robust measure), the longer the available time series is. Lastly, the same conclusion
can be drawn when increasing the jump intensity parameter λ.
3.5 Expected Utility Comparison: Monte-Carlo Simula-
tions
In this section, we conduct simulations to compare the utility resulting from following four
different portfolio policies: standard Merton diffusive policy, robust Merton diffusive policy,
standard optimal jump-diffusive policy and robut optimal jump-diffusive policy.
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∗,i, h∗, a∗) := EJt [V (t,X
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∗, h∗)V (u,X∗u)] du
(3.75)
under both the reference and robust measure J = {P,Pϑ} for the four different portfolio hold-
ings ω∗,i(h∗, a∗), i ∈ {M, rM, JD, rJD} which are, the Merton (i.e. (3.54) with ηD = 0), the
robust Merton (3.54) where ηD = η), jump-diffusive (i.e. (3.52) with ηD = ηJ = 0) and robust
jump diffusive weights, i.e. (3.52), respectively. Under the correct measure, the optimal port-
folio holdings will maximize (3.75), meaning that if the stock price follows the compensated
exponential Lévy process under the robust measure, the robust jump diffusive portfolio weights
will give highest expected utility.9
The aim of this Monte Carlo simulation exercise is not only to verify this under a variety
of different parameter specifications, but also to quantify the utility loss that results from
using the wrong portfolio strategy. Of course, since the notion of expected utility is ordinal, a
numerical comparison, we can only rank expected utility for the various portfolio strategies. The
benchmark parameters for the Monte Carlo simulations as well as the alternative parameters,
which we use for conducting a comparative static analysis, are given in Table B.1.
[Table B.1 about here]
In order to fully specify the dynamics under the robust measure Pϑ we have to quantify the
maximal amount of robustness η = ηD + ηJ . We numerically choose η such that the target




||π(t, Td; η)− π̄||, 0 ≤ t ≤ Td.




P [ξT > 0|Ft] + Pϑ [ξT < 0|Ft]
)
and Td is the time series length.
9Likewise, if the stock price follows the compensated exponential Lévy process under the reference measure,
the jump diffusive portfolio weights will give highest expected utility.
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We also vary ηD as well as ηJ in order to quantify the effect of changing the absolute level
of drift against jump intensity perturbation. In the extreme case when ηD = 0 (ηJ = 0), the
investor has full confidence in the drift (jump intensity) estimate of the stock price process.
The reason we consider differential time series lengths for quantifying the amount of maximal
robustness and the investment horizon, is due to the fact we mentioned in Section 3.4 (see
Figure B.4), namely that statistical discrimination between two processes becomes easier the
longer the available time series is. For instance, if we consider a sample path of the risky
asset for two different time series lengths T 1d = 1 and T
2
d = 3 and evaluate (3.76) such that
the error-detection probability is 10%, we find that η(T 1d ) = 0.0132 and η(T
d
d ) = 0.0044,
which corresponds to a threefold increase in the amount of model uncertainty. Furthermore,
comparing the optimal drift h∗ and jump intensity a∗ perturbation parameters for the two time
series lengths we find that h∗(T 1d ) = 0.051 and a
∗(T 1d ) = 0.067 as opposed to h
∗(T 2d ) = 0.030 and
a∗(T 2d ) = 0.039. Hence, if the investor has fewer data points available, the estimated maximal
amount of robustness is considerably higher, as it is more difficult two distinguish between two
realized sample paths obtained over a shorter time period.
We consider two different frequencies, daily (assuming 252 trading days per year) and intra-
daily (60min sampling) assuming 6h 30 min. hours per day which are the official trading hours
of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). This gives us a total number of observations of
N = Td×252×6.5×60/m = 1, 512, where m is the sampling frequency. Lastly, we specify two
jump size distributions, namely the power law in (3.53) and uniform jumps on (0, 1) for which
fully closed form solutions of the portfolio weights are obtainable as we showed above. The
simulation of jump sizes in the case when they follow a power law is detailed in Appendix B.3.
In the case when jumps are uniformly distributed on (0,1), fully closed form portfolio weights
can be obtained for risk aversion γ = 3, 4.
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where REUP denotes the ratio of expected utility deviation for each portfolio allocation, relative
to the expected utility derived using the correct jump - diffusive portfolio weights under the
reference measure. Similarly, REUP
ϑ
denotes the ratio of expected utility deviation for each
portfolio allocation, relative to the expected utility derived using the correct robust jump -
diffusive portfolio weights under the robust measure. Clearly, we would expect that |REU J| >
1, J = {P,Pϑ} whenever we do not use the optimal portfolio weights.
In Table B.2, we summarize the simulation results for the benchmark parameters.
[Table B.2 about here]
Using daily data, the first column labeled ’Weights’ shows that the standard optimal Merton
weight ω∗M is the highest holding of the risky asset, whereas its robust counterpart ω
∗
RM has
the lowest holding in the risky asset. This is mainly a consequence of setting ηD = η in which
case the maximum amount of model uncertainty concerns only the drift part and therefore
lowers to excess considerably (see column ’Drift’). The optimal jump diffusive and robust
jump diffusive weights lie in between the two Merton weights. Since we are compensating the
negative jumps, a higher jump intensity not only increases the likelihood of jumps occurring,
but also raises the expected return as the compensator adds a jump risk premium to the drift
of the stock price. Following this line of argumentation, this also implies that under the robust
measure, the jump intensity as well as the jump risk premium are higher, compared to the
jump intensity and jump risk premium under the reference measure. Furthermore, the next
four columns essentially verify our claim from above that under the correct measure with the
optimal portfolio allocation, expected utility is highest. For instance, under the robust measure,
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expected utility of the investor is highest, whereas using the wrong portfolio weights leads to a
utility loss.
Lastly, the remaining four columns compare the drift and jump intensities under the two
different measures. Comparing the drift in a purely diffusive setting, the stock price drift is 5%,
whereas in a jump diffusive setting the drift is increased to 6.09% which is a direct consequence
of compensating the jump part. Furthermore, under the robust measure, the jump intensity is
increased by a little less than 16% indicating that jumps are 16% more likely to occur compared
the jump process under the reference measure. The last two columns quantify the robust control
parameters for optimal drift and jump intensity perturbation. In the robust Merton case, the
expected drift is reduced by h∗(ζD = 1)σ = 3.23%, whereas for the robust jump diffusive case,
the reduction in expected return due to drift robustness is only h∗(ζD = 0.1)σ = 1.03%. This
is due the fact that we only allocate 10% of total robustness η to drift perturbation and the
remaining 90% to jump intensity perturbation. The second part of Table B.2 summarized the
results for case when the stock price data are sampled intra daily. Since model misspecification
does not affect the classical Merton and jump diffusive weights, those holdings do not change
compared to the case when the stock price data are collected on a daily basis. However,
the robust Merton and robust jump - diffusive holdings are now larger compared to the their
counterpart portfolio holdings based on daily data. The reason why those weights are higher
when we use intra day data, is because we have more data available which makes it easier to
distinguish between the reference and robust dynamics of the risky asset and therefore reduces
the maximal amount of robustness η (Compare the two graphs in Figure B.4). This also
explains why the optimal drift perturbation h∗, for both the robust Merton and the robust
jump-intensity weights (also true for a∗), is considerably reduced in the case we use intra day
data.
Next, we now conduct a comparative static analysis in order to assess the utility loss under
various different market scenarios. To be more precise, we vary each parameter of the model
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individually and compute expected utility for each portfolio strategy.10 Table B.3 summarizes
the results.
[Table B.3 about here]
A first conclusion we can draw from Table B.3, is that regardless of the market scenario, the
robust jump - diffusive weights give highest expected utility whenever the stock price follows
the compensated exponential Lévy dynamics under the robust measure Pϑ (see 3.4 above).11
Secondly, the ordering of the investors’ utility loss crucially depends on the market scenario we
analyze. For instance, comparing utility loss when the risk free rate increases to 2%, to utility
loss when the jump intensity increases fivefold, we see that the Merton portfolio weight yields
second highest expected utility in the former scenario but gives lowest expected utility in the
latter scenario.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study a robust optimal consumption and portfolio choice problem where the
underlying risky asset follows a Lévy process. We introduce model misspecification with respect
to drift and jump intensity parameters and derive explicit expressions for optimal consumption
and portfolio rules. Even though our setting is only slightly different from the standard jump
diffusive robust control frameworks used so far in the literature (see for instance Drechsler (2013)
or Lui et al. (2005)), it introduces an intensity misspecification premium which has important
implications for robust portfolio allocations. This is achieved by simply compensating the jump
component of the exponential Lévy model we employ in this paper. This implies, that under
the robust measure, the drift of the risky asset is also reduced under the robust measure which
is a standard result when doing asset pricing with the robust control, however, the reduction is
10The alternative parameter values are given in row ’Alternative’ in Table B.1.
11The same is true for the jump diffusive weights, as expected utility under the reference measure is highest
for those weights no matter the market scenario.
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smaller as through compensating the jump component, we add a jump intensity misspecification
premium that increases the drift of the risky asset. A direct consequence of this assumption is
that the optimal allocation in the risky asset is higher under the assumption that the stock price
follows a compensated exponential jump diffusive process, compared to the case when the risky
asset follows a non compensated jump diffusive process which is the standard assumption on
the robust dynamics of the process. This modeling specification helps to address the commonly
stated critic that robust portfolio allocations are too conservative, meaning the weight in the
risky asset is too low, and therefore the investor forgoes much of the upside potential. Lastly,
the introduction of a jump compensator adds more realism to the model as in times of higher
uncertainty, stocks become more risky and therefore have to offer a higher risk compensation
in order for the investor to hold them. Furthermore, analyzing various different specifications
of the risky assets price process, we find that perturbations of the drift are relatively more
important than perturbation of the jump intensity in the case when jumps are symmetric about
zero, i. e. the occurrence of positive and negative jumps is equally likely. However, assuming
only negative jumps and without compensating the jump part in the underlying asset shows that
optimal portfolio weights become not only more sensitive to perturbations of the jump intensity
but also, that misspecification with respect to the jump intensity becomes more important than
misspecification of the drift. Additionally, we derive a semi-closed form solution for detection-
error probabilities by means of Fourier inversion techniques. Our analysis shows that the
detection-error probability is very sensitive to the length of data we have available, which
implies that for two processes, one generated under the reference and another one generated
under the robust measure, it becomes easier to statistically discriminate one from another the
long the available time series of observations is. Finally, in our Monte - Carlo analysis, where
we quantify utility loss under various portfolio strategies shows that the utility loss largely
depends on the specific market scenario we are investigating. However, as expected, highest
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Abstract We present a novel method in analyzing microstructure noise of high-frequency
data as a measurement error problem. In particular, we study the estimation of endogenous
Markov-switching regression models, in which the regression disturbance and the latent state
variable controlling the regime are correlated. We show infill asymptotic results and prove that
under endogeneity the popular realized variance estimator is biased and no longer converges
to the integrated regime dependent volatility. Exploring high-frequency intraday return data
on foreign exchange rates, we find that the state variable is indeed endogenous. Similar to
the popular volatility signature plot suggested by Andersen et al. (2000b), we propose an
endogeneity plot which indicates as to which sampling frequency the assumption of exogeneity
of the state variable controlling the regime remains valid.
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4.1 Introduction
Markov switching regression models have gained much popularity in recent years not only in
applied macroeconomics but more increasingly also in empirical finance. Ever since Hamilton
(1989) suggested to describe the business life cycle as a Markov switching autoregressive pro-
cess the model was used in numerous empirical studies both in finance and economics.2 The
increasing availability of high frequency data opens up another natural application of Markov
switching regression models (see Chen et al. (2013) for a recent application of these models).
For example, many empirical studies have documented (see for instance Andersen et al. (2012))
that intraday volatility is U-shaped across trading days. Thus one can easily imagine that
intraday volatility is subject to different regimes depending on the intensity of trading in the
market. In practice however, the estimation of such Markov switching regression models based
on high frequency return data is a delicate issue due to microstructure contaminations. The
assumption that the continuous log-price process is observable and free of any measurement
error does not hold in the real data. The log-price process in continuous time is latent and
one can observe the process at discrete time intervals only. More recently, for single regime
switching diffusions, the study of the stochastic properties of returns and realized volatility
has surged. One of the first paper to rigorously discuss the econometric properties of realized
volatility, defined as the sum of squared intra-day log-returns, is due to Barndorff-Nielsen &
Shephard (2001) and Barndorff-Nielsen & Shephard (2002). Under the assumption of a very
general class of volatility models they were able to characterize the asymptotic distribution of
the realized volatility error - the difference between realized and the ”actual” volatility which
is the discretized integrated volatility. They show that from the theory of quadratic variation
(see Protter (2004)), the realized volatility estimator converges uniformly in probability to the
2For instance the volatility feedback model of Turner et al. (1989), regime switching interest rate models
as in Ang & Bekaert (1998) and regime switching VARs as in Sims & Zha (2006). There exists an extensive
literature on Markov switching (G)ARCH processes, see for instance Cai (1994), Hamilton & Susmel (1994),
and Mun (1998) or Haas et al. (2004), Gray (1996) and Klaassen (2002).
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integrated volatility as the sampling frequency tends to infinity.3 However, with increasing
intra-day return sampling frequency, various empirical studies have shown that market mi-
crostructure noise distort the efficient and unbiased estimation of volatility considerably (see
Fang (1996), Andreou & Ghysels (2002) and X. Bai (2004)). Hence any econometric measure of
integrated volatility will be subject to finite-sample measurement error,4 since the computation
of the realized variance is contaminated by market microstructure noise. Since the publication
of an article by Zhou (1996), numerous papers have studied the impact of market microstruc-
ture frictions on the estimation of integrated volatility (see Aı̈t-Sahalia et al. (2005), Hansen
& Lunde (2003), Hansen & Lunde (2006), Zhang (2004) and Zhang et al. (2003)).5 A simple
form of market microstructure noise arises because stock price time series are only observed
discretely. Harris (1990) and Harris (1991) show that discretization of the stock price process
introduces noise to the price series which in turn induces increased return variances and adds
negative serial correlation to return series. Additionally, bid-ask bounces and price reporting
errors tend to amplify serial correlation at higher sampling frequencies. Other sources of market
microstructure noise are due to properties of the trading mechanism. Amihud & Mendelson
(1987) argue that the mechanism by which securities are traded significantly effects stock price
behavior. They find that opening returns tend to exhibit greater dispersion, larger deviations
from normality and a more pronounced negative autocorrelation pattern relative to closing re-
turns.6 Furthermore, the construction of intraday returns requires the use of different sampling
schemes such as the previous tick (Wasserfallen & Zimmermann (1985)) or the linear interpo-
lation method (see Andersen & Bollerslev (1997)) which constitutes another form of market
microstructure noise. So far, the academic literature has come up with various econometric
measures of realized variance, such as kernel-based estimators (see Zhou (1996), Hansen &
3See also Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold & Labys (2001).
4We use the term measurement error or endogenity interchangeably.
5High-frequency based quantities of realized volatility have proven to be useful in obtaining accurate measures
of daily volatility, see e.g. Maheu & McCurdy (2002), Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2002), Frijns & Lehnert (2004)
and Owens & Steigerwald (2009). High-frequency based estimators are also extensively used in the context of
forecasting of volatility, see e.g. Engle & Sun (2007), Koopman et al. (2005), Andersen et al. (2011) and Ghysels
et al. (2006).
6For more references on this literature see O’Hara (1995) and Hasbrouck (2004).
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Lunde (2003) and Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2004)) or the closely related subsample based esti-
mators as in Zhou (1996), Zhang et al. (2003) and Zhang (2004) and filtering techniques as in
Ebens (1999), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold & Ebens (2001) and Maheu & McCurdy (2002).7
Standard Markov regime-switching models which are used in empirical studies treat the latent
variable controlling the regime as exogenous. However, many applications of the model are in
macroeconomics or in finance in situations where it is natural to assume the state to be endoge-
nous.8 For example, to motivate the usage of endogenous switching, it is often the case that
the state variable has a strong correlation with the business cycle. In recent applied work on
identifying exogenous and endogenous component in monetary policy, regime-switching VARs
have been estimated (see for instance Oomen (2002)). It seems plausible that the shocks to the
regression, such as macroeconomic shocks to the VAR, would be correlated with the business
cycle. A further example is the application of models where the parameters depend on the
reactions of agents to realization of a state (See for instance the volatility feedback model by
Turner et al. (1989)). However, it seems reasonable to assume that agents do not directly ob-
serve the state but instead draw their conclusions based on a specific information set available
to them at a given time, which does not necessarily coincide with the information set of the
econometrician. The use of the actual state as a proxy for this inference leads to a measurement
error in the explanatory variables of the regression and thus to endogeneity.
Our paper has two main contributions. On the theoretical side, we show that when the state
variable is endogenous the popular realized variance estimator will be biased. The reason why
the state variable may emerge endogenously is, because the estimation of the efficient price
process subject to microstructure noise can be interpreted as a measurement error problem
which in turn in a Gaussian regime-switching context leads to endogenous switching. We argue
that by allowing the state variable to switch endogenously, the effect of noise induced by market
7More recent papers by Jacod et al. (2009) present a pre-average approach or range-based estimators (see
Christensen & Podolskij (2007)) that allows for consistent estimation of realized volatility.
8Several ideas have been proposed in the literature on how to deal with the problem of endogeneity in
Markov-switching regression models, for instance Kim (2004), Kim et al. (2008), Kim (2009), Otranto et al.
(2005), Kimhi (1999) , for a survey see Dutoit (2007) and for an analysis of the problem of endogeneity in an
extented state space representation see Kang (2010).
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microstructure frictions on the estimation of the regime dependent integrated variance can be
quantitatively measured. We also discuss the econometric techniques employed to measure the
degree of microstructure noise and therefore of endogeneity in the data. From the empirical
side, we make use of the econometric model developed in Kim et al. (2008) and show, using FX
intraday data, for various standard Markov switching models that microstructure noise indeed
renders the state endogenous and therefore leading to biased parameter estimates. We also
introduce an ”endogeneity plot” which essentially, similar to the popular ”Volatility Signature
plot” as proposed by Andersen et al. (2000b), indicates as to which maximal sampling frequency
one can safely assume exogeneity of the state variable controlling the regime.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic setup of endogenous regime
switching. Section 3 discusses the estimation of endogenous Markov switching regression mod-
els under microstructure noise. Section 4 presents the Monte-Carlo analysis. Section 5 discusses
the sampling scheme used to construct the high-frequency data. Section 6 presents empirical
stylized facts about microstructure noise. Section 7 presents the empirical results and Section
6 concludes. All proofs, tables and additional figures are given in the Appendix.
4.2 Endogenous regime switching
In this section, we introduce first the basic setup of endogenous regime switching. We then
derive some limit results and discuss the estimation of integrated variance. Throughout this
section, we assume that the Markov Chain and the Brownian Motion are defined on the same
complete filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft},P).
4.2.1 Basic setup and notation
We denote the latent continuous-time log-price process by p∗t . We consider a price process,
which follows a local martingale with regime-dependent volatility.
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where {Wt}t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion independent of the regime-dependent cádlág
volatility process σrt and regimes rt. We assume that the price process is measurable with respect
to Ft = Frt ∪ FWt = σ {rs, Ws; s ≤ t}, where Frt = σ {rs, s ≤ t} and FWt = σ {Wu, u ≤ t}.
The true underlying price process p∗(t) is not observable. We denote the observable price
process by p(t). The wedge between p∗(t) and p(t) is caused by microstructure noise such
as bid-ask bounces, but it may also arise due to the technique used to construct pt out of
transaction data.
Assumption 6. The discrepancy between the latent and observable price process p(t) is caused
by some microstructure contamination ξt,
ξ(t) = p(t)− p∗(t), (4.2)
which is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with mean zero.
Finally, we need to make some assumptions about the regime switches.
Assumption 7. The finite-state and unobservable regime rt ∈ {1, . . . , N} with generator Q,




evolves according to a continuous-time first-order Markov chain with transition probabilites:
P [r(t+ s) = i|r(s) = j,Frs ] = Pij(t), s, t ≥ 0, i, j = 1, . . . , N.







Since the integrated variance in (4.4) is not directly observable, we need to search for a consistent
estimator. Although the formulation of the price dynamics in terms of a stochastic differential
equation as in Assumption 5 is very convenient from a theoretical viewpoint, the prices we
need to calculate a variance estimator are invariably observable only at discrete time intervals.
Therefore, we partition a given time interval [t0, T ] into m subintervals. For a fixed m, the k-th
subinterval is given by [tk−1,m, tk,m] with t0 = t0,m < t1,m < . . . < tm,m = T and we assume that
supk=1,...,m∆m = O (1/m) with ∆m ≡ tk,m − tk−1,m. Furthermore, we define the returns taken
at the discrete points in time as





yk,m ≡ ptk,m − ptk−1,m ,
respectively. To find an estimator of integrated variance, we focus on a discrete approximation of
the efficient log return process. Analogously to Assumption 5, we make the following assumption
for the return process in discrete time.
Assumption 8. In discrete time, the state-dependent return process evolves as
y∗k,m = σrk,muk,m, (4.5)
where uk,m
iid∼ N (0, 1) and we assume that σrk,m is bounded.
Hence, given the specification in Assumption 8, we are looking for a variance estimate such














= denotes equivalence in distribution and rk,m is the continuous-time regime rt at time k.
Under the specification of the price process in (4.1), we have V(y∗k,m|rk,m) = E[y∗2k,m|rk,m] = σ2rk,m,
where V(·) denotes the standard variance operator. Hence, we can estimate the integrated
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variance over the interval [t0, T ] using the realized variance defined by the sum of squared
intraday latent log returns,




given the partition with m subintervals.
For the single regime case, the asymptotic properties of realized variance is discussed in
Barndorff-Nielsen & Shephard (2002), Meddahi (2002) and Mykland & Zhang (2006). Fur-
thermore, as shown in Protter (2004), RV ∗t0,T is a consistent estimator of IVt0,T as m → ∞.
However, RV ∗m is an estimator based on the latent process p
∗
t and thus infeasible to compute.





However, the estimator in (4.8) is biased and inconsistent (see, e.g., Bandi & Russell (2008)
and Zhang et al. (2003)).
In contrast to the previous literature, we work in a multiple regime setting. Since we can
only observe returns and prices at discrete times, we also need a discrete-time version of the
continuous-time Markov chain rt given in Assumption 7. To this end, we introduce the following
notation. By P [rk,m|rk−1,m,Fk−1,m] we denote the probability of moving to regime rk,m at time
k conditional on the information set Fk−1,m and the previous regime rk−1,m. The information
set Fk−1,m is generated by the observed realized path of the dependent variable yk,m given by
ỹk−1,m = {yk−1,m, yk−2,m, . . .} and the unobserved regime path r̃k−1,m = {rk−1,m, rk−2,m, . . .}.
For the specification of the regime switching process, we rely on a probit model as in Kim et al.
(2008).
Assumption 9. The regime rk,m evolves according to a discrete-time first-order Markov chain
with transition probabilities,
P [rk,m = i|rk−1,m = j,Fk−1,m] = Pij, i, j = 1, . . . , N,
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and stationary unconditional probabilities P [rk,m = i] = P [r = i]. The regime switching process





1 if −∞ ≤ ηk,m < a1,j(∆m)




N − 1 if aN−2,j(∆m) ≤ ηk,m < aN−1,j(∆m)
N if aN−1,j(∆m) ≤ ηk,m < ∞
, (4.9)
where ηk,m
i.i.d∼ N (0, 1).
Under Assumption 9, the transition probabilities are then given by
Pij(∆m) ≡ P(rk,m = j|rk−1,m = i) = Φ (ai,j(∆m))− Φ (ai−1,j(∆m)) , (4.10)
with a0,j(∆m) = −∞, aN,j(∆m) = ∞, and Φ (·) the standard normal cumulative distribution
function. To model endogenous switching, the regression disturbance uk,m has to be linked with
the state variable ηk,m controlling the regime. Given the Gaussian regime setting, we can model
endogeneity by letting the error terms through their bivariate normal joint density function be
correlated. In other words, we make the following assumption.













where uk,m and ηh,m are uncorrelated for h 6= k. Furthermore, uk,m is independent of rh,m,
h 6= k.
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4.2.2 Limit results for regime switching under endogeneity
The following theorem, based on the three-series Theorem by Kolmogorov, summarizes the infill
asymptotic results in the case where the state variable controlling the regime is exogenous. We
relegate all proofs to Appendix A.
Proposition 8. (Infill asymptotics: Exogenous switching) Given Assumptions 8 to 10


























E [|yk,m|p|Fk−1,m, rk,m] D−→ 0. (4.15)
Proposition 8 shows that under exogenous regime switching, the discrete-time approxima-
tion of the return process converges in distribution to a regime dependent martingale. As a
next step, we examine the case when the state is switching endogenously.
Proposition 9. (Infill asymptotics: Endogenous switching) Given Assumptions 8 to 10




























E [|yk,m|p|Fk−1,m, rk,m] D−→ 0, (4.18)
where φ(·) denotes the probability density function of a standard normally distributed random
variable.
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Proposition 9 suggests that under endogenous switching the expectation of the discrete
approximation is biased whenever ρ 6= 0. Moreover, the discrete approximation does not
converge in distribution to the integrated regime dependent variance. We also note that the
scaled sum is not divergent when m → ∞, which differs from the findings of Hansen & Lunde
(2006) or Bandi & Russell (2008). The reason for this result is that the noise in our setting
is of the same order as the efficient price process, whereas in the setting of Hansen & Lunde
(2006) or Bandi & Russell (2008) the noise is O(1) and the efficient price process is O(1/m).
As Aı̈t-Sahalia et al. (2005) have shown, under the assumption of serially correlated diffusive
noise the realized variance estimator is no longer divergent as m → ∞, since both noise and
efficient price process are of order O(1/m).
4.2.3 Two-states Gaussian regime switching model
To illustrate the effect of endogeneity on the realized variance estimator, we assume that the
efficient price processes follows a two-states regime switching diffusion with constant variance
within each state. Hence, the model is conditionally Gaussian. For the regimes switching





1 if ηk,m < aj(∆m)
2 if ηk,m ≥ aj(∆m)
. (4.19)
From Proposition 8, it follows directly that if ρ = 0, the squared log-returns are an unbiased
estimator of the latent variance process. However, under endogeneity we do not obtain conver-
gence of the realized variance estimator to the integrated regime dependent variance process.
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To see this, we can explicitly calculate the expectation of the realized variance as






























where for rk,m = i the formula in equation (4.20) reduces to



















Hence, by dominated convergence and since σ2rk,m is bounded, the regime dependent variance
process converges in distribution to the regime dependent integrated variance if and only if

























For ρ 6= 0 the realized variance estimator is biased. However, by Proposition 9, the bias remains
finite as the sampling frequency m approaches infinity.
Proposition 10. (Asymptotic Convergence) Given Assumptions 8 to 10denoting by
V(·|Fk,m, rk,m) the conditional variance given the information set, the current and previous
regime at a given sampling frequency m. Then using the bias results from Equation (4.20),
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respectively, the conditional variance of the realized variance estimator for rk,m = i is given by




















1 if i = 1,
−1 if i = 2.
(4.24)










D→ N (0, 1) (4.25)
as m→ ∞.
Proposition 10 shows that the conditional variance of the realized variance estimator is
biased whenever ρ 6= 0. If ρ = 0, we obtain












σ4rudu is the regime dependent analog of the integrated quarticity as introduced by
Barndorff-Nielsen & Shephard (2002) when there is no microstructure noise.
4.3 Endogenous Markov Switching Regression Models
and Microstructure Noise
In this section, we discuss the econometric techniques to account for microstructure noise in
the data and the latency of the efficient price process y∗k,m. We consider a Gaussian regime-
switching model where the return process {yk,m} can switch between two states rk,m ∈ {1, 2}.
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k,mβrk,m + σrk,muk,m where uk,m
i.i.d∼ N (0, 1), (4.27)
where x ∈ RP is a vector of observed explanatory variables. These variables are exogenous,
regime dependent, and may also include lagged values of yk,m. By βrk,m we denote the set of
possibly regime dependent parameters, which need to be estimated. The variance σ2rk,m is regime




k,m + ek,m, E [ek,m|rk,m] = 0, (4.28)
with ek,m = ξtk,m − ξtk−1,m . Hence, the intraday return consists of the efficient latent return
process plus an unobservable noise component. However, one can not directly estimate (4.28)
as both the efficient price process as well as the microstructure noise is not directly observable.
From an econometric point of view, the microstructure noise can be interpreted as any other
noise. In this Gaussian regime-switching context we may take ǫk,m |Fk−1,m, rk,m i.i.d∼ N (0, σ2rk,m)
as a measure for the microstructure noise. However, the econometrician does not observe
the efficient price but has to rely on the contaminated observable price process and therefore
has to approximate the efficient price process by a parametric regime-switching model as in
(4.27), in other words replace yk,m by x
′
k,mβrk,m . Using this substitution gives directly an
estimateable equation for the observable log return process but introduces measurement error,
i.e., correlation between the state variable controlling the regime and the regression disturbance
as given in (4.19). To see this, we start with (4.28) rewrite the equation as follows
yk,m = y
∗
k,m + ek,m = x
′








Thus if we assume a regime dependent parametric model of the form yk,m = x
′
k,mβrk,m + νk,m










holds true of course only if there is no measurement
error. Note that with the model specification given in (4.29) and (4.30) we have transformed
the original equation (4.28) involving only unobservable quantities into a Markov Switching
regression framework based on observable exogenous regressors. However, in doing so we also
introduced a measurement error, namely that the regressors in βrk,m are now correlated with





















where C(·) denotes the standard covariance operator. Thus (4.31) shows that the regressor
βrk,m is correlated with the disturbance term νk,m due to the errors-in-variable problem. Note,
if νk,m = wk,m, where wk,m, |rk,m,Fk−1,m is an exogenous i.i.d. mean zero and unit variance er-
ror term, would imply exogeneity of the regression disturbance and therefore no measurement






= 0. Hence any Markov switching
regression model that is based on the assumption of independence of the state variable con-
trolling the regime ηk,m and the regressors βrk,m will result in biased parameter estimates. To
account for this possible measurement error problem an empirical model may read
yk,m = xk,mβrk,m + σrk,muk,m, uk,m
i.i.d∼ N (0, 1)
rk,m = ark−1,m , ηk,m





0 if ηk,m < ark−1,m














with E [uk,mηk−l,m] = 0 for all l 6= 0. Hence, we account for this endogeneity problem by
allowing the regression disturbance and the state variable to be correlated. This allows us to
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estimate the model by quasi maximum likelihood (QML) and controlling for microstructure
noise by the correlation parameter ρ. The more severe the measurement problem, the larger
(in absolute value) ρ will be.
4.4 Monte Carlo Analysis
In this section we investigate the finite sample properties of the quasi-maximum likelihood
(QML) estimator for the endogenous Markov switching model. We focus on several regime
models which will be latter on applied to real intra day FX data. The goal of this analysis is on
the one hand side to study the performance of the endogenous maximum likelihood estimator
on the other hand to numerically quantify the bias when endogeneity is neglected.9 The models
we consider are the following
INSERT TABLE D.1 ABOUT HERE
The models with regime dependent drift aim at capturing different dynamics depending on
the prevailing regime. As shown in Timmermann (2000) such a specification is able to intro-
duce autocorrelation in the return series depending on the persistence of the Markov chain.
To be more precise, if
∑N
i=1 Pii > 1 where Pii denotes the probability of staying in a given
regime, the model will produce positive serial correlation and if
∑N
i=1 Pii < 1 it will produce
negative serial correlation. Thus, to some limited extend, the models with regime dependent
conditional mean may be able to capture excessive first order dynamics of the return series
induced by microstructure noise. Additionally, different intercepts across regimes is necessary
to capture the significant sample skewness for higher frequently sampled return series.10 The
9One important point to be mentioned is that the conditional density is non-Gaussian when ρ 6= 0 and
thus rendering the maximum likelihood estimator a QML estimator which is inconsistent for Markov-switching
models in general (see Kim et al. (2008) and Campbell (2002)). This study provides some limited evidence to
which extent the QML estimator does not exhibit the theoretical asymptotic normality assumption.
10We estimated sample skewness and kurtosis of the return series and found that for higher frequent data the
return series is heavily negatively skewed and excess kurtosis is very large compared to lower frequent return
series such as for instance return series sampled every hour.
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models incorporating an AR(1) structure, possibly regime dependent, aim directly at correcting
the bias introduced microstructure noise which manifests itself empirically by significant (first
order) serial correlation in the intraday return series (see section 17).11 Additionally, including
unequal lagged autoregressive components across regimes also allows to disentangle the dif-
ferent first or higher order dynamics of the return series in each regime. While both, regime
dependent conditional means and first order autoregressive models with possibly regime depen-
dent parameters may capture some of the microstructure noise contamination and the return
dynamics, the residual noise effect should manifest itself in an significant nonzero endogeneity
estimate ρ̂.
We consider two time series length T = 800 and T = 8′000 and simulate each time M = 1′000
Monte Carlo runs. For each simulation run we generate data from a given model as in D.1 with
parameter values as given in table D.2 below.
INSERT TABLE D.2 ABOUT HERE
We start our Monte Carlo analysis by investigating the finite sample properties of the
endogenous quasi-maximum likelihood estimator, i.e. ρ 6= 0 for all the models as described
above. We take ρ = (0.1, 0.5, 0.9) for both time series lengths T = 800 and T = 8′000. Table
D.3 to D.8 summarize the results for both time series length.12
INSERT TABLE D.3 ABOUT HERE
11This has also been suggested by Dacorogna et al. (2001).
12We also considered endogeneity levels of |ρ| < 0.1. However, our Monte Carlo analysis shows that for
such low levels of measurement error, the endogenous and exogenous estimators delivers practically identical
results, meaning that the finite sample bias is of about the same magnitude even for the longer time series.
To separate estimation error from bias induced by endogeneity, we also tested the estimators for time series of
length T = 16′000 or 24′000 where the exogenous estimator is slightly yet only marginally more biased than
the endogenous estimator.
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INSERT TABLE D.4 ABOUT HERE
INSERT TABLE D.5 ABOUT HERE
INSERT TABLE D.6 ABOUT HERE
INSERT TABLE D.7 ABOUT HERE
INSERT TABLE D.8 ABOUT HERE
For longer time series lengths, the endogenous estimator produces point estimates that are
very close to the true simulated values, which indicates that the joint normality assumption
of the regression disturbance term and the state variable is a reasonable approximation. For
shorter time series the QML estimates show signs of biasedness, as the average Monte Carlo
QML estimates are further away from their true value compared to the estimates based on
the longer time series. However, this deviation is mainly due to estimation error which is
more pronounced for shorter than for longer time series. Next, we analyze the efficiency of the
endogenous estimator when in fact the state is exogenous, i. e. ρ = 0. Tables D.10 and D.9
report QML estimates for the endogenous and exogenous estimator, respectively.
INSERT TABLE D.10 ABOUT HERE
107
INSERT TABLE D.9 ABOUT HERE
The endogenous estimator is inefficient when ρ = 0, i. e. exhibits higher standard errors. This
can be seen in both Tables D.10 and D.9 for T = 800 and T = 8′000, respectively. Lastly,
we investigate the finite sample properties of the exogenous ML estimator when the state is in
fact endogenous. We take again ρ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9} and simulate data from the data generating
processes with endogenous switching as given in Table D.1 with values as reported in Table D.2
and analyze the biased incurred when neglecting endogeneity. Tables D.11 and D.12 summarize
the results when T = 800 and T = 8′000, respectively.
INSERT TABLE D.11 ABOUT HERE
INSERT TABLE D.12 ABOUT HERE
Table D.11 and Table D.12 demonstrate that the ML estimates are in general biased when
endogeneity is erroneously omitted. As expected, the deviations of the Monte Carlo aver-
ages for shorter time series is larger for shorter time series than longer time series due to
the presence of estimation error. However, not all the parameters are affected by neglecting
endogenous switching in the same manner and the bias strongly depends on the time series
length. For shorter time series, similar as to the results before, the observed deviation from
the true parameter is not only due to endogeneity in the data but also due to estimation error.
Furthermore, whereas the bias is increasing in the endogeneity level ρ for some parameters, for
other parameters the opposite or no particular pattern can be found. To put this somewhat
surprising result into perspective, we calculate the Monte Carlo average relative bias for a given





i=1 |θ̂p,i − θp|/|θp| where θp,i and θ̂p,i are the true and estimated QML values for
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parameter p for a given model k and Monte Carlo simulation i as summarized in Table D.1.
This test statistic, the sum of the relative bias (SrBk), gives an indication of the total bias for
a given model. Therefore, the longer the time series, the less is the QML estimator prone to
estimation error and therefore the observed deviation of the Monte Carlo ML estimates from
the true values, can be attributed to the effect of neglecting endogeneity in the data generating
process. Furthermore, whereas SrBk exhibits no particular pattern for T = 800, it is strictly
increasing for all the models considered when T = 8′000 showing that endogenous switching
renders the parameter estimates indeed biased.
4.5 Sampling Scheme
Before we turn to the empirical section, we briefly discuss the sampling scheme we use for
constructing equispaced intra day returns. The literature mainly focuses on two sampling
schemes, namely the previous tick method (see Wasserfallen & Zimmermann (1985)) or a linear
interpolation method as employed for instance in Andersen & Bollerslev (1997). A price series
can then either be constructed using the former method where simply for each τ ∈ [tk−1,m, tk,m )
the first quoted price will be recorded, i.e.
p(τ) ≡ ptk−1,m
or using the latter method we obtain the equidistant price series as follows




As Hansen & Lunde (2006) have shown, linear interpolation cases the realized variance esti-
mator to converge in probability to zero as the sampling frequency is increased. This a direct
consequence of the piecewise (Lipschitz) continuity and linearity of pl(τ) on the interval [t0, T ].
On the other hand, constructing the price series by the previous tick method leads to a piecewise
constant and discontinuous price series.
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Lemma 1. Let the equidistant price series be constructed using the previous tick method, i. e.
τ ∈ [tk−1,m, tk,m ) , p(τ) ≡ ptj and let the efficient log price series follow a regime dependent
diffusion process as in (4.1). Then assuming no microstuctural noise in the data, i.e. ρ = 0 the
quadratic variation is bounded away from zero for every t > 0 if the regime dependent diffusion
process is not degenerate, i.e. σrτ = 0 and finite P a.s.
Moreover, since the differences between two instantaneous prices constitute a stochastic
integral we may also bound it from above. If there exists a K such that σrτ < K <∞ ∀ τ ≥ 0,















∀ δ > 0. (4.34)
Therefore, the regime switching diffusion is well defined over the interval [tk−1,m, tk,m).
4.6 Measuring microstructure Effects: Empirical Evi-
dence
In this section, we analyze our data set using two standard statistical measures for detecting
microstructure noise in intra day return series (see Zhou (1996), Andersen et al. (1999) or
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold & Ebens (2001)). As a first measure we computed the empirical
sample autocorrelation function. As an other measure we plot the realized variance estimator
as a function of the sampling frequency, which is commonly referred to as a ”volatility signature
plot”. It is a well known fact (see Zhou (1996) or Hansen & Lunde (2006)) that the former is
a measure for microstructure effects, as intra day return series tend to be more autocorrelated
at higher sampling frequencies. Complementary to the former, the latter measure provides
information as to which sampling frequency the realized variance estimator is not (upward)
biased. To start the empirical analysis, in Figure 4.1 below, we show the average first order
autocorrelation estimates for varying degrees of frequency levels.
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Panel A: EURUSD (07) 














Panel B: EURCHF (07) 














Panel C: EURGBP (07) 














Panel D: EURJPY (07) 
Figure 4.1: The figure shows the estimated first order autocorrelation coefficient ϕ̂
(1)
m as a function
of the sampling frequency m. Red lines represent approximate α = 5% confidence intervals as given
in Box et al. (1994) for a given sampling frequency m. Log-return series were constructed using Mid-
quotes of the currency pairs EUR/USD, EUR/CHF, EUR/GBP and EUR/JPY of the year 2007 using
previous tick price recording, starting on January 2nd 5pm.
What is common to all return series is the highly negative and statistically significant
first order autocorrelation coefficient at the highest sampling m = 5 sec. until roughly 5 −
20 min. sampling frequency. This particular pattern is mainly due to bid-ask bounds which
is a well-known empirical stylized fact. Decreasing m the coefficients tend to be less negative
or even reach positive territory but eventually stabilize around zero and become statistically
insignificant at the 5% confidence level.13 Interestingly, the autocorrelation coefficients for the
EUR/JPY exchange rate and to a lesser extent also for the EUR/USD show large significant
positive first order serial correlation at around 50 min. to 3h sampling for the former currency
pair and simliarly for the latter pair this can be observed at around 2h sampling frequency. We
13Note that the grid in 4.1 is not equidistant. This explains the kink in the confidence bands at m = 1min.
and m = 1hr.
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also estimated higher order autoregressive terms for all currency pairs for various frequencies.
Figure E.3 below displays the estimates for the first five lags of the EUR/USD currency pair.14











Panel A: EURUSD (07) 












Panel B: EURUSD (07) 










Panel C: EURUSD (07) 












Panel D: EURUSD (07) 
Figure 4.2: The figure shows the estimated autocorrelation coefficient ϕ̂
(L)
m for lag values L =
1, . . . , 10 for the spot EUR/USD exchange rate. The selected sampling frequencies are m =
10sec., 30sec. 1min. and 2hr., respectively. Red lines represent approximate α = 5% confidence
intervals as given in Box et al. (1994). Log-return series were constructed using Mid-quotes of the
currency pairs EUR/USD, EUR/CHF, EUR/GBP and EUR/JPY of the year 2007 using previous tick
price recording, starting on January 2nd 5pm.
A first observation is the decreasing number of significant autocorrelation coefficients as the
sampling frequency decreases. Also, the magnitude of the first order autocorrelation coefficient
is decreasing in m. This observation is line with many empirical findings such as for instance
the well-known article by Cont (2001) or a more recent study by Goncalves & Meddahi (2008a)
showing that log-return series at roughly daily sampling frequency do not exhibit any signifi-
cant first order serial correlation. As a second measure for analyzing microstructure noise we
14The remaining higher order serial correlation plots are given in appendix E.
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compute the realized variance estimator R̂V
m
t and plot it against the sampling frequency m,
shown in Figure 4.3 below
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Panel D: EURJPY  (07) 
Figure 4.3: Volatility signature plot of RV mt based on mid quote data for the currency pairs
EUR/USD, EUR/CHF, EUR/GBP and EUR/JPY on the 1st of January 2007 at 8.00 pm. until
2nd of January 2007 using previous tick price recording. Redlines represent approximated edgeworth
corrections for realized volatility using the approximation given in Goncalves & Meddahi (2008b).
In absence of microstructure noise, the realized variance estimator as a function of the
sampling frequency should lie on a straight horizontal line. As Figure 4.3 clearly indicates, at
higher sampling frequencies the return series, tends to be upward biased, which is a standard
empirical observation documented in many studies (see for instance Andersen et al. (2000b)).
Furthermore, the bias seems to increase over proportionally in m, which an indication that
the impact of the noise is larger at higher sampling frequencies. To sum up this section,
standard empirical measures presented in this section demonstrate that microstructure noise
is indeed present in the data. Furthermore, lagged serial correlation coefficients, and among
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them most prominently the first order autoregressive coefficient, tend to be only significant at
higher sampling frequencies.
4.7 Empirical Analysis
In this section we demonstrate empirically the presence of endogeneity in the return series at
higher sampling frequencies and that parameter estimates for the endogenous and exogenous
model differ substantially. To be more precise, we investigate the QML estimates for the models
1-8 when the state variable is assumed to be endogenous and compare these estimates to the
ones where we restrict ρ = 0. We consider a time series length of T = 8′000 and fit for
each frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 59min, 1hr, 2hr, . . . , 24hr} a model as
specified in Table D.1. In Table D.13 we present the estimation results based on the log-return
series sampled every ten seconds.
INSERT TABLE D.13 ABOUT HERE
Overall the model estimates differ substantially between the endogenous and exogenous es-
timator for all models. The difference in magnitude appears to be related to the degree of endo-
geneity in the data. For instance, for the most basic modelM5 where only the volatility parame-
ter is different across regime, the estimated coefficient for ρ indicates very high level of endogene-
ity. As a result of this, the regime persistence parameters a1 as well as a2 and the high volatility
parameter σ2 differ sizable in comparison to the exogenous QML estimates. Furthermore, stan-
dard model selection criteria such as AICEndo = 2p−2 log L̂ = −3′355.2 (AICExo = −52′440.4)
and BICEndo = −2 log L̂ + p log(T ) = −3′320.3 (BICExo = −52′405.1), where p denotes the
number of parameters for a given model, indicate that the endogenous is superior to the exoge-
nous estimator.15 The same conclusion can be drawn when a constant mean is added to the
15Furthermore, the likelihood ratio test statistic is 5.4928 which is significant at the 5% confidence level
(P-value=0.0191), however not at the 1% level (critical value 6.635).
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regression equation (M6). Adding instead a regime dependent drift (M1) shows that the esti-
mated endogeneity level decreases considerably. This might be partially due to the introduced
first order autocorrelation which can be easily obtained when the drift differs across regime.16
As Dacorogna et al. (2001) propose and section 17 demonstrated, at higher sampling frequen-
cies, it is necessary to include lagged autoregressive terms to capture the statistically significant
negative (first-order) autocorrelation. Its interesting to see that for both regime independent
(M7) and regime dependent λ (M2) the coefficient is large, negative and statistically significant
for all the models considered. Adding a regime dependent autoregressive coefficient (λrk−1,m)
shows that for the calm volatility regime 1, the autoregressive term is of the same magnitude as
for the single regime parameter λ. However, the coefficient λ2 has opposite sign and is of lower
magnitude indicating positive autocorrelation in the high volatility regime. Additionally, the
estimated endogeneity level decreases with the inclusion of autoregressive terms, either regime
dependent or not. Furthermore, this indicates that these autoregressive terms capture some
of the first order dynamics of the contaminated return series which are driven primarily by
microstructure noise.17 To analyze the endogeneity level across frequencies we reestimate all
the models at 20 min. sampling. As section 17 on serial correlation and the volatility signature
plots has shown, returns sampled every 20 min. contain very little or no microstructure noise
16Note that the autocorrelation function for model M1 assuming that the state variable is exogenous is given
by
γ1M1 =






























. Thus with the given parameter estimates as in D.13 this implies a
first order autocorrelation of the exogenous model of 0.0648. Since the presence of the process in the two state
is persistent,i.e. P11 + P22 − 1 > 0 the model will produce positive first order correlation.
17Including higher order autoregressive terms is not straight forward as one would need to calculate the joint
density of yk,m, yk−1,m, . . . , yk−l,m where l < k is the number of lags. In the case of endogenous switching, it is
not clear if it is possible to derive the joint density for an arbitrary lag l > 1. However, as the empirical analysis
in section has shown, the first order serial correlations seem to capture most of the spurious first order effects
which are due to microstructure noise.
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and thus we expect the QML estimate for ρ to be of smaller magnitude. Table D.14 summarizes
the results.
INSERT TABLE D.14 ABOUT HERE
A striking difference in comparison to Table D.13 is that the estimated endogeneity level
for all models is significantly reduced. This gives an indication that to some extent the endo-
geneity coefficient ρ captures microstructure noise. The autoregressive terms, possibly regime
dependent, are of considerably smaller magnitude compared to the autoregressive terms in
Table D.13 indicating that the return series is no longer contaminated by microstructure
noise. Interestingly, the regime determining parameters a1 and a2 are in both regimes of
lower magnitude as compared to the estimates in Table D.13 for both the endogenous and
exogenous estimator. This implies also that regime persistence is lower at lower frequencies
for both regimes.18 Furthermore, the parameter estimates do not differ considerably any-
more for most models, except for model M4 where the autoregressive term and both regime
dependent drift parameters have opposite sign. However, as the Monte Carlo analysis has
shown, this observation might be due to the fact that the endogenous estimator is ineffi-
cient. Therefore, this difference in the estimates can be attributed to estimation error. Next
as a robustness exercise we examine the endogeneity parameter for each sampling frequency
m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 59min, 1hr, 2hr, . . . , 24hr} in more detail. To be pre-
cise, for each model we estimate ρ for a given sampling frequency m and time series length
T = 8′000. Then we shift the estimation window by W periods and reestimate ρ again for each
model.19 We repeat this procedure S-times and compute the average absolute endogeneity level
18Note the average regime persistence across models in Table D.13 is P11 = 0.9989 (0.9970) and P22 =
0.9106 (0.9137) for the endogenous (exogenous) estimator and in Table D.14it is P11 = 0.9354 (0.9343) and
P22 = 0.8348 (0.8298) for the endogenous (exogenous) estimator, respectively.
19The reason why we use a rather long time series of length T = 8′000 is because shorter time are more prone
to estimation error. As the Monte Carlo analysis demonstrated, the QML estimates are less precise, i.e. having
higher bias in absolute value and also higher dispersion, meaning larger standard errors on average for T = 800








m,T,s|. In Figure G.7 and Figure G.8 we show the average absolute endogeneity
level for a given sampling frequency.




s=1 |ρ̂Wm,T,s| for models M1 − M4 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 8’000 observations with rolling win-
dow of W=200 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
For all the models considered, the endogeneity plot exhibits a similar shape, i. e. as
the sampling frequency increases so does the average estimated absolute endogeneity level.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the measurement error is only substantial when sampling at 60
sec. or higher. At the highest sampling frequency 5 − 15sec. we see that ¯̂ρWm,T however differs
substantially across models. For instance in figure G.7, for model M1 where we only included a
regime dependent drift, the estimated average absolute endogeneity level is about double of the
endogeneity level of model M2 where we included lagged regime dependent regressors. Also, as
used for estimating the models regardless of the frequency we consider. Of course, this procedure implies that
for a given model, the data used is not that same for two different frequencies and thus the data sets for a given
model are overlapping.
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s=1 |ρ̂Wm,T,s| for models M5 − M8 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 8’000 observations with rolling win-
dow of W=200 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
Figure G.8 shows, including autoregressive terms (see modelM7) helps to reduce the estimated
endogeneity level relative to a model with a constant drift (see M6). This implies that on
average, models with lagged coefficients tend to capture the spurious first order serial correlation
introduced by measurement error such as microstructure noise better than for instance models
with constant drift, possibly regime dependent. Concerning the former models, their estimated
level of endogeneity is not only significantly reduced in magnitude but also appears to be
present only at higher frequencies as compared to the other models. However, at the highest
sampling frequencies, all endogeneity plots show that there is still residual endogeneity present
which is not captured in any of the model coefficients. As a robustnes check for our results,
we repeated the analysis also for the remaining currency pairs where we find similar results,
i. e. higher (lower) estimated endogeneity when the sampling frequency increases (decreases).
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When reducing the time series length to T = 800 (see section G), the estimated endogeneity
level is substantially larger as compared to the case when T = 8′000. However, as section 4.4
shows, this observation is mainly due to higher estimation error as opposed to higher levels of
endogeneity in the data. A final observation to conclude is that as the sampling frequency is
reduced, the estimated average endogeneity level appears to vanish, i. e. becomes insignificant
indicating that exogeneity of the state variable can be safely assumed.
4.8 Conclusion
In this paper we establish a link between microstructure noise and endogenous switching and
discussed its effect on the estimation of the integrated regime dependent variance. We quantify
the bias induced by this endogeneity problem on the realized variance estimator, when the state
variable controlling the regime is indeed endogenous. The empirical application of the model
shows due to the presence of microstructure noise, that at higher sampling frequency there
is indeed significant evidence for endogenous switching of the regime. However, the degree of
endogeneity varies across models and also the highest sampling frequency as to which the state






Economic Policy Uncertainty and the
Yield Curve
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We start by deriving an n-th order recursive moment formula for the expectation of the
government policy uncertainty process gt with dynamics





To compute its moments, let f(g) = gn where n ∈ N, then an application of Itô’s lemma and






n(n− 1)gn−2t σ2ggtdt (A.2)
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Integrating from t to T , taking expectations on both sides, using Fubini’s theorem and the law
of iterated expectation, differentiating with respect to T gives
ψ
′
t(T ) = Υ0(T ) + Υ1(T )ψt(T ) (A.3)










Υ1(T ) = −nκg (A.5)
Conditional on κg > 0, the solution to Equation (A.3) is




Υ0(t+ τ − u)eΥ1(t+τ−u)du (A.6)
Then the first moment satisfies
ψ
′
g(t, T ) :=
Et[gT ]
dT
= κg(θg − Et[gT ]) (A.7)
ψg(t, t) := gt > 0 (A.8)
where Equation (A.8) represents the initial condition. The solution this fist order linear differ-
ential equation in (A.7) can be represented as
ψg(t, T ) := Et[gT ] = θg + (gt − θg)e−κgτ (A.9)
and similarly, using Equation (A.9) one obtains that the second moment is given by
ψg2(t, T ) := Et[g
2









g) (1− e−κgτ )2
2κg
ψg2(t, t) := g
2
t > 0
from which one can immediately deduce that the variance of gt is
Vt[gT ] = E[g
2
T ]− E[gT ]2 =
(
2gt (e













Along the same line of argumentation, integrating Equation (2.5), applying Fubini’s theorem
and the law of iterated expectations we obtain that the conditional expected value of At satisfies
ψ
′
A(t, T ) :=
Et[AT ]
dT
= κA (θA − ψA(t, T )) + λψg(t, T )
ψA(t, t) = At ∈ R (A.12)
where Equation (A.12) represents the initial condition for the process At. Using the expression
for ψg(t, T ) in Equation (A.9), the solution can be obtained using standard methods. Passing
to the limit, i.e., T → ∞, gives the stationary expectation of At in Proposition 1. Next, in
order to derive the second moment of the productivity process At, we have to first derive the
an expression for the product expectation ψAg(t, T ) := Et [At+τgt+τ ]. An application of Itô’s

















Then, as above, integrating from t to T = t + τ , applying Fubini’s theorem and taking time t
conditional expectation shows that ψAg(t, T ) satisfies
ψ
′








ψg(t, T ) + κAθAψA(t, T )− (κA + κg)ψAg(t, T ) + λψg2(t, T )
ψAg(t, t) = Atgt (A.13)
where Equation (A.13) represents the initial condition. Solving this first order differential
equation with time-dependent functions ψg(t, T ), ψg2(t, T ) and ψA(t, T ) gives the conditional
covariance expression. Having obtained explicit conditional moments for At, gt and Atgt, the
stationary covariance expression immediately follows from letting T → ∞, i.e. limT→∞ =
Ct(At+τ , gt+τ ) = Et[At+τ , gt+τ ] − Et[At+τ ]Et[gt+τ ]. Finally, by similar arguments as above and
an application of Itô’s formula to A2t we obtain that the second moment of At satisfies
ψ
′





= 2κA (θA − ψA(t, T )) + 2λψAg(t, T ) + σ2Aψg(t, T )ψg2(t, T )




Solving this ordinary first order differential equation with time-dependent coefficients gives the
expression for the conditional expectation of At. From Vt(At+τ ) = E[A
2
t+τ ] − E[At+τ ]2 and
letting T → ∞ we immediately obtain the stationary variance expression for At.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3























subject to the capital constraint in Equation (2.12).
To simplify notation, let Xt = (At, gt) such that the value function is given by










In equilibrium, there exists a value function V (t,Kt, Xt) and control variables {Ct,Mdt } satis-








t ) +AV (t,Kt, Xt)
}
. (A.17)
By standard time-homogeneity arguments for infinite horizon problems we have that



























≡ H(Kt, Xt), (A.18)
where the third equality follows because the optimal robust control is Markov and H(Kt, Xt)
is independent of time. Therefore, we conjecture that the value function has the following form













where φ : R2 → R is CN -differentiable function of the state vector Xt that needs to be de-
termined in equilibrium. Inserting (A.19) into the HJB equation in (A.17), the first order


























































with Q = 1 + ξ. In general, the function φ(Xt) cannot be obtained in closed form. However,
we can obtain an asymptotic expansion to g(Xt) with respect to the risk aversion parameter γ.
Assuming a power series expression for φ(Xt) in γ as follows
φ(Xt) = φ0(Xt) + γφ1(Xt) +O(γ
2),
where φ0(X, t) is obtained from the logarithmic utility case, we can then solve the HJB problem
in Equation (A.17) for γ 6= 0 in closed form. To do so, we solve first the HJB problem in the
case where utility of the representative agent is logarithmic.
Log-utility case

























1The proof of this proposition is similar to the one presented in Buraschi & Jiltsov (2005).
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subject to the capital constraint in Equation (2.12). In equilibrium, there exists a value function
V log(t,Kt, Xt) = a(t)H













t ) +AH log(Kt, Xt)
})
. (A.24)
We consider the following linear conjecture for the value function V log(·)
a(t)H log(Kt, Xt) =
e−βt
β
[Q log(Kt) + g0(Xt)] , (A.25)
and where the function g(Xt) is affine in the state variables, i.e.,
φ(Xt) = φ00 + φ0AAt + φ0ggt. (A.26)
Applying the generator to Equation (A.25), using the productivity, the government policy, and
equilibrium capital accumulation dynamics in Equation (2.5), (2.6) and (2.20), we obtain

































+ (κA (θA − At) + λgt)φ0A + κg (θg − gt)φ0g. (A.28)





















Substituting the optimal controls C∗t and M
d∗
t into Equation (A.24) and matching coefficients
of log(Kt), At, gt and the constant terms, we obtain




(1 + ξ) (−θgκgσ2Y (β + κA) + 2µY (β + κA)(β + κg) + 2θgκgλqA)
2β(β + κA)(β + κg)
(A.32)






















The coefficients are all uniquely determined, state-independent and also independent of Kt.
Substituting the expressions back into the HJB equations verifies that the guess was correct.
Perturbed solution
To derive an asymptotic approximation to the function φ(Xt), where the expansion taken with
respect to the risk aversion parameter γ, let V = V (t,Kt, Xt) denote the value function as














From the HJB equation in (A.17), the optimal consumption C∗t and money demandM
d∗
t policy






























Inserting optimal money demand (A.37) into the first order condition of consumption (A.36),
using the power series representation of g(Xt) as given in Equation (2.18) and perturbing the
2Inserting Equation (A.36) into (A.37) gives the optimal money demand in Equation (A.21) from which the
optimal consumption in Equation (A.20) can easily be deduced.
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resulting expression around the log-utility case (and analogously for optimal money demand),
substituting Q = 1 + ξ from Equation (A.31), the perturbed optimal consumption and money





























There are a number of important conclusions that can be drawn from the optimal perturbed
solutions in Equations (A.38) and (A.39). First, both equations only depend on φ0(Xt) and do
not depend on φ1(Xt) which implies that solving the consumption-investment problem with log-
utility is sufficient to fully characterize the optimal perturbed consumption and money holdings
up to first order. Secondly, C∗,Pt and M
d∗,P
t are affine functions not only of capital Kt but also
of the state vector Xt. This property of the solution will not only render the equilibrium




t remain affine in the
state variables. Next, substituting C∗,Pt and M
d∗,P
t into Equation (2.13) immediately gives the
equilibrium capital process K∗t in Equation (2.20). To show the equilibrium price dynamics in





















Then using the optimal controls C∗t andM
d∗
t and inserting the money market clearing condition


















Inserting the money supply rule of Equation (2.14) and the equilibrium capital accumulation
process into (A.41) gives the equilibrium price process as in Equation (2.21). To verify that the
guess for the value function V (·) was correct, we substitute the equilibrium values back into
the HJB problem in Equation (A.17).






A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
To simplify notation, let κ∗t = log(K
∗
t ) + βt. The using the equilibrium capital accumulation
process implies that κ∗t satisfies
dκ∗t =
(
µy + qAAt − δ −
1
2







The Euler condition in Equation (2.24) can then be expressed as






















































To solve the problem in Equation (A.43) we follow Ulrich (2013a) and Buraschi & Jiltsov (2005)
and define
f = f(κ∗t , p
∗








Then, conjecturing a log-linear guess for f(·) of the form
f(κ∗t , p
∗





exp {−b0(τ)− bA(τ)At − bg(τ)gt − bm(τ)mt} . (A.45)
If our log-linear guess in Equation (A.45) solves the stochastic problem in (A.44) then it is also
the solution to the following PDE
−∂f(·, τ)
∂τ


















Setting Θ = {κ∗t , p∗t , At, gt,mt}, an application of Itô’s lemma to the right-hand side of (A.46)
gives




















Writing out the expression above, recalling that ρgm = ρAg = ρMA = ρMg = 0 and substituting
the dynamics of κ∗t , p
∗


























(κA(θA − At) + λgt) +
∂f
∂g



































































Computing the derivatives and separating variables one obtains the following system of first
order asymptotic (Riccati) ODE’s:
0 = −CA + κAbA(τ) + b
′
A(τ), (A.49)










0 = −b′0(τ) + C0(τ) (A.52)
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subject to bA(0) = bg(0) = bm(0) = b0(0) = 0 and where


























Z1g(τ) = κg + bA(τ)ρ
AgσAσg +



















4Z0mZ2m − Z21m, (A.57)
C0(τ) =






β(η1 − η2)(L− φ00)
η2 − 1
. (A.58)
For the existence of a solution to the bond pricing PDE that excludes arbitrage opportunities,
requires that the Riccati equations in (A.50) and (A.51) above, satisfy the following periodicity
condition
4Z0g(τ)Z2g − Z21g(τ) < 0, 4Z0mZ2m − Z21m < 0, ∀ τ ≥ 0. (A.59)
This condition essentially rules out singularities of the solution of the Riccati equation above,
i.e., for τ ≥ 0, the function bi(τ), i ∈ {g,m} is continuous in τ .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
The unconditional correlation coefficient of the nominal yield curve Y (t, τ) and gt is given by
̺ [Y (t, τ), gt] =
C [Y (t, τ), gt]√
V[Y (t, τ)]V[gt]
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Using the affine expression in Equation (2.30) and the results from Proposition 1, the uncon-
ditional covariance is





































C [At, gt]. Along the same line of argumentation, we have that








and since bm(τ) ≤ 0, τ ≥ 0 the result follows immediately.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
In this section we derive the first order asymptotic nominal short rate and the market prices of
real and nominal risks when the investor has CRRA utility. The nominal short rate is defined
as the following limit
Rt := lim
τ→0




(log(B(t, τ))) . (A.61)




we set f(τ) :=
∫ τ
0















(µY − β − δ − k̄)η1 + β + µM − η2(µY + π̄ − δ)
1− η2
+ γ































which gives the expression for the short rate in Equation (2.34). Next, in order to derive the
bond excess return, we apply Itô’s rule to the closed-form bond price formula in Equation (2.25)



















where Θ = {A, g,m}. Taking time t conditional expectation on both sides and using Equation
(A.50) and (A.51) from above, we obtain that the expected infinitesimal bond risk premia is
given by
























which is after defining the nominal market price of risks the expression in Equation (2.37). The
results for the log-utility agent can be easily derived by simply setting γ = 0 in Proposition
(6). However, for verifying our results and to explain why we defined the market prices of
government λN,Yt and monetary policy risk λ
N,M
t as above, we derive both the nominal short
rate, the market prices of risk and the term premium from a different angle using the stochastic
discount factor approach. Recall that the real short rate can be obtained directly from the real
stochastic discount factor which we denote by ζRt . Its dynamics take the general form
dζRt = µ(ζ
R, t)dt+ σ(ζR, t)
′
dWt, (A.65)
where µ(·, ·) and σ(·, ·) are Ft-measurable bounded scalar drift and vector diffusion processes






















from which we can read off the real short rate as rt = −µ(ζR, t) and the market price of the real




. Following Veronesi & Jared (2000) or Piazzesi
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from which we deduce that Rt = −µ(ζN , t). Similarly we have that the nominal market prices
of risk is given by λN,·t = −σ(ζN , t). Next, in order to determine the term premium on nominal
bond yields under log-utility, we make use of the closed-form solution of the nominal bond price
as given in Proposition 4, and the nominal short rate together with the associated market prices
λN,Yt and λ
N,M
t as in Proposition 6. An application of Itô’s lemma to Equation (2.25) shows
















where W̃ it , i ∈ {A, g,m} are Ft-measurable Brownian innovation processes under the risk
neutral measure Q. According to Proposition 4, only government and nominal monetary policy





orthogonal complements as follows
dW̃At = ρ
AY dW̃ Yt +
√
1− ρAY 2dŴAt , dW̃ Yt dŴAt = 0,
dW̃ gt = ρ
Y gdW̃ Yt +
√




1− ρMm2dŴmt , dŴMt dŴ Yt = 0. (A.69)
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Hence, substituting the decomposed Brownian motions into Equation (A.68), the bond price















ρY gdW̃ Yt +
√











Next, in order to express the bond under the physical measure P we apply Girsanov’s theorem
to perform a measure change from Q to P as follows. We set the change of the drift equal to the











Then, given the correlation structure of the factors we obtain that the equilibrium term premium




















EPU GPU MPU 1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
EPU 1 0.857 0.657 -0.544 -0.542 -0.533 -0.500 -0.468 -0.425
GPU 1 0.572 -0.450 -0.444 -0.435 -0.401 -0.369 -0.324
MPU 1 -0.036 -0.037 -0.026 0.006 0.029 0.056
1Y 1 0.993 0.982 0.952 0.927 0.896
2Y 1 0.997 0.979 0.961 0.936
3Y 1 0.991 0.979 0.958
5Y 1 0.997 0.987
7Y 1 0.996
10Y 1.000
Table A.1: Sample correlation matrix of EPU, GPU and MPU index with nominal yields with τ=
1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 5Y, 7Y and 10Y using data from January 1990 until June 2014.
EPU GPU MPU 1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
EPU 1 0.8573 0.6573 0.6272 0.6611 0.664 0.6533 0.6254 0.6048
GPU 1 0.5724 0.4898 0.527 0.5211 0.5218 0.495 0.462
MPU 1 0.1081 0.1236 0.1451 0.1309 0.1175 0.1243
1Y 1 0.9406 0.9214 0.8784 0.8497 0.8261
2Y 1 0.9887 0.9644 0.9381 0.9067
3Y 1 0.9815 0.9595 0.9335
5Y 1 0.9935 0.9728
7Y 1 0.9877
10Y 1
Table A.2: Sample correlation matrix of EPU, GPU and MPU index with realized volatility as in
Equation (2.41) with τ= 1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 5Y, 7Y and 10Y using data from January 1990 until June 2014.
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τ 1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
Full regression GPU 0.051 0.0558 0.05* 0.042** 0.032* 0.022**
tGPU (2.89) (5.36) (5.37) (8.22) (8.03) (7.46)
R2adj 0.69 0.81 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.83
Full Regression MPU 0.011 -0.012 0.011* 0.01** 0.007* 0.05**
tMPU (1.11) (1.49) (1.67) (1.961) (1.91) (1.961)
R2adj 0.65 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.77
Table A.3: Summary of regression results: Table displays the slope coefficients of the regression of
Vt[Y (t, τ)] on MPUt and GPUt individually, plus the economic condition controls (EC), the financial
variables (FV) plus macro factors (RA and IF) for τ=1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 5Y, 7Y, and 10Y. Values in brackets
below represent HAC-robust t−statistics. R2adj refers to adjusted coefficient of determination. By ***,
















Figure A.1: US Treasury bond yields (Panel A) and realized yield volatility (Panel B) with maturity
τ = 1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 5Y, 7Y and 10Y and the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index as constructed
by Baker et al. (2012) plus the government (GPU) and monetary policy (MPU) index. Sample period
ranges from January 1990 until June 2014. All indexes are scaled to match the scale of the Treasury
bond yields and volatilities.















































Figure A.2: The figure plots the impulse response functions of a shock to the GPU on the short rate
(Panel A) and a shock to the short rate on the GPU (Panel B). The short rate is approximated by
the three-month T-bill rate. The impulse response functions are based on a VAR model including the
GPU, MPU, and the three-month T-bill rate. The data sample spans the period from January 1990
to June 2014. The shaded are corresponds to the 95% confidence interval.,
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Figure A.3: Empirical and fitted affine yield curve model. In Panel A we plot the empirical uncon-
ditional nominal yield curve based on monthly zero-coupon bonds (solid line) with the model implied
yield curve (dashed line). Panel B compares the model-implied bond volatility term-structure (dashed
line) to the empirical unconditional realized volatility term structure (solid line). Unconditional re-
alized volatility is computed using monthly log-yield changes as described in Equation (2.41) with
maturities of one, two, three, five, seven and ten years. Parameter values are given in Table 2.1 and
2.2, respectively.












































Figure A.4: Loadings for bond risk premia and bond volatility. Panel A shows the different loadings
of the government (dashed line) and monetary (solid line) policy uncertainty factors in the bond risk
premium in Equation (2.37). Panel B shows the different loadings to total yield variance V[Y (t, τ)] in
Equation (2.38) of the productivity factor variance V[At] (solid line), government policy uncertainty
factor variance V[gt] (dashed line), the cross term C[At, gt] (dash-dotted line) and the monetary policy
uncertainty factor variance V[mt] (dotted line).
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Figure A.5: Volatility curve sensitivities. In Panel A, we plot the volatility term structure for λ = 0
(solid line) and λ = −1 (dashed line). In Panel B, we increase κg from 0.3 (dashed line) to 3 (solid
line) and in Panel C we increase σg from 0.05 (dashed line) to 0.5 (solid line). In Panel D, we plot the
volatility curve for κA = 0.75 (dashed line) and κA = 2.5 (solid line) and Panel E shows the volatility
curve for σA = 0.15 (dashed line) and σA = 0.5 (solid line). In Panel F, we analyze the impact of
changing η1 and η2. The dashed (solid) line represents the case when we leave η2 (η1) unchanged
while reducing η1 (η2) by 20%. All other parameters are as in Table 2.2. Shaded areas correspond to
95%-confidence bound of the estimated yield curves.141








































































































Figure A.6: Yield curve regressions. Panel A displays the slope coefficients of the joint regression
of yields Y (t, τ) on both the GPU (dashed line) and MPU (full line). In Panel B, we regress jointly
Y (t, τ) on the GPU (dashed line) and on the MPU (full line) including the controls EC, FV and MC.
Similarly in Panel C we display the slope coefficients of the individual regression of Y (t, τ) on only
the GPU (dashed line) and Y (t, τ) on only the MPU (full line). In Panel D, we regress individually
Y (t, τ) on the GPU (dashed line) and Y (t, τ) on the MPU (full line) including the controls EC, FV and
MC for each regression. The yield maturities are 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. Shaded areas represent
HAC-robust 95% confidence bounds.
142















































































































Figure A.7: Yield volatility curve regressions. Panel A displays the slope coefficients of the joint
regression of yield volatility Vt[Y (t, τ)] on both the GPU (dashed line) and MPU (full line). In Panel
B, we regress jointly Vt[Y (t, τ)] on both the GPU (dashed line) and on the MPU (full line) including
the controls EC, FV (with TIV) and MC. Similarly in Panel C we display the slope coefficients of the
individual regression of Vt[Y (t, τ)] on only the GPU (dashed line) and Vt[Y (t, τ)] on only the MPU
(full line). In Panel D, we regress individually Vt[Y (t, τ)] on the GPU (dashed line) and Vt[Y (t, τ)] on
the MPU (full line) including the controls EC, FV (with TIV) and MC for each regression. The yield
maturities are 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. Shaded areas represent HAC-robust 95% confidence bounds.
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Figure A.8: Bond risk premium regressions. Panel A displays the slope coefficients of the joint
regression of the monthly excess returns rE,τit+1 on both the GPU (dashed line) and MPU (full line). In
Panel B, we regress jointly rE,τit+1 on both the GPU (dashed line) and on the MPU (full line) including
the controls CP, PCA, EC, FV and MC for each regression. Similarly in Panel C we display the
slope coefficients of the individual regression of the monthly excess returns rE,τit+1 on the GPU (dashed
line) and the monthly excess returns rE,τit+1 on the MPU (full line). In Panel D, we regress individually
the monthly excess returns rE,τit+1 on the GPU (dashed line) and the monthly excess returns r
E,τi
t+1 on
the MPU (full line) including the controls CP, PCA, EC, FV and MC for each regression. The yield
maturities are 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. Shaded areas represent HAC-robust 95% confidence bounds.
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Appendix B
Robust Portfolio Optimization with
Jumps
B.1 Joint Drift and Jump Intensity Perturbation with
CRRA Utility and Symmetric Jumps
In this section, we derive explicit portfolio weights when the risky asset follows an exponential
Lévy process (no jump compensation) under the robust measure Pϑ of the form
dS1,t
S1,t−




t , S1,0 > 0, P
ϑ − a.s.
and jumps follow a symmetric power law distribution as in (3.53). Then the corresponding
Lagrangian reads

































Note that θ̃J∗(ω) ≥ 0 for any ω satisfying the solvency constraint |ω∗J | < 1. Given the optimal
perturbation parameters in (B.2) and (B.3), the objective function is
L(ω, h∗, a∗, θ̃D∗, θ̃J∗) = ωR− σω
√












log (1− ωJ) (B.4)
and the first order condition for the optimal portfolio weight is















J/(1− ωJ) = 0. (B.5)
So (B.5) is a cubic polynomial in the portfolio weights ω. Let












, DDJ = R−
√
2ηDσ
Then (B.5 can be written as Ax3 + Bx2 + Cx + D. Defining aDJ = BDJ/A, bDI = CDJ/A,
cDJ = DDJ/A and GDJ = (aDJ
2− 3bDJ)/9, HDJ = (2aDJ2− 9aDJbDJ +27cDJ)/54 the solution
















B.2 Exponential Utility: Closed - form portfolio weights
with compensated exponential Lévy dynamics
In this section we consider an investor with exponential utility of the form
U(C) = −1
q
e−qC , with CARA coefficient q > 0
where his wealth dynamics under the robust measure evolves as in (3.14), that is no jump size
perturbation. We analyze robust optimal portfolio holdings where the jumps sizes follow an
exponential distribution, i. e. Zn
i.i.d∼ Exp(ξ), with ν(dz) = fZ(z; ξ) = ξe−zξ, z ≥ 0. Then
conjecturing a solution to (3.23) of the form L(x) = −K/qe−rqx where are r > 0 is the risk free








































h2t ≤ ηD, λea(a− 1) + λ ≤ ηD, ηD ≥ 0, ηJ ≥ 0 (B.9)




































h2t ≤ ηD, λea(a− 1) + λ ≤ ηJ , ηD ≥ 0, ηJ ≥ 0 (B.11)
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We define as L = L(Ct, ht, a, θ̃D, θ̃J) the Lagrangian corresponding to the perturbed HJB
problem in (B.8) with Lagrange multiplier θ̃D and θ̃J for the diffusive and jump intensity part
of the entropy constraint respectively. Then we have1




























λea(a− 1) + λ− ηJ
)
(B.12)
where w = ωtXt is the (absolute) amount of money invested into the risky asset. Given the
optimal perturbation parameters, the objective function is

























Then optimal consumption given (B.13) is




Furthermore, in order to determine the constant we evaluate (B.13) and use optimal consump-
tion C∗t from above and the optimal robust portfolio holdings w(h




























Then, assuming that the jump sizes are exponentially distributed with parameter ξ, we obtain
that the Lagrangian satisfies



















ξ − qrw (B.15)
1The integral with respect to the jump measure in B.10 is only convergent if ξ− qrw > 0 which is very likely
to be satisfied given standard parameter values for risk aversion q ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, r ∈ [0, 0.05] and ξ > 10 which
would correspond to a jump size of 10% or less.
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ξ − qrw −
√
2ηDσ − qrσ2w +R = 0 (B.16)
which is a cubic polynomial in the amount invested in the risky asset. Let

































Then (B.16) can be written as A(ξ)x3 + BDI(ξ)x2 + CDI(ξ)x + DDI(ξ). Next, we de-








2 − 9aDI(ξ)bDI(ξ) + 27cDI(ξ)
)
/54 such that the















where w∗E refers to both drift and jump intensity compensated portfolio weights when the
investor is assumed to have exponential utility. In Figure (B.5) we plot the portfolio weights for
different levels of jump sizes ξ. [Figure B.5 about here]
A first important observation from Panel A to D is that increasing the size of the jumps
(ξ ↓) reduces the absolute amount invested into the risky asset w∗E as Eϑ[z] = E[z] = 1/ξ. A
tenfold increase in the coefficient of risk aversion (q) leads to a proportional decrease in w∗E.
On the other hand, increasing the frequency of jumps (λ) by a factor of ten, shows that the
optimal investment into the risky asset decreases over-proportionally.
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B.3 Simulating Power Law Distributed Jump Sizes
The power law measure defined in (3.53) is not a proper probability density function as it does
not integrate to one. Moreover, for simulating the jump sizes we have to truncate the support
of the power law to the closed interval [ǫ, 1], where ǫ > 0 but close to zero.2 To see why, let the
Lévy measure be defined as νǫ(z) = 1
z













, z ∈ [ǫ, 1] (B.17)
which by construction satisfies
∫ 1
ǫ
f ǫZ(z)dz = 1. In order to simulate random power law dis-
















Then, let U be uniformly distributed, i.e. U ∼ U [0, 1], we invert (B.18) by solving
u = F ǫZ(z) ↔ z = ǫeu log(
1
ǫ ) = F ǫZ
−1(z) (B.19)
Therefore, we obtain random samples of Z by generating uniformly distributed random variables
U on (0,1) and apply (B.19) above.
B.4 Proof Monotonicity of optimal portfolio weights
with respect to uncertainty
In this section, we show that the derivative of the optimal portfolio weights with respect to
η is strictly negative for any η ∈ (0,∞). Let f ′(η) := ∂ω∗
∂η
denote the partial derivative of
2For our simulation, we set ǫ = 10−4.
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the optimal portfolio weights with respect to uncertainty where η ∈ (0, η̃) and η̃ is some finite



























In order to proof that the optimal portfolio weights are monotonically declining in uncertainty,
we need to show that f
′















































































> 1, ∀η̃ > 0, only the first term in (B.23) is negative. Recalling that








but with positive sign immediately implies
that the inequality in (B.22) has to hold and therefore shows that the partial derivative of the
optimal portfolio weights with respect to uncertainty is indeed negative, i.e. is monotonically
declining in η.
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r R σ J λ β γ ζD Jump Dist. Freq. Td Th π̄
Benchmark 0.01 0.05 0.2 -0.10 1 0.01 2 10% Power Law Daily 1 1 10%
Alternative 0.02 0.07 0.3 -0.15 5 0.03 3 50% Uniform ID 3 10 20%
Table B.1: Benchmark parameter values for Monte Carlo simulations
Notes: ζD refers to the percentage of total maximal amount of robustness η which is allocated
to drift perturbation. Td refers to the time series length in years used to quantify the maximal
amount of robustness η, whereas Th refers to the investment horizon (in years). ID stands for
intra day returns where we sample the data every m = 60 min. Number of simulation runs is
M = 10′000 and initial wealth X0 as well as stock price S0 are equal to 100.
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Daily Data
Weights Ref. M. Rank Ref. Rob. M. Rank Rob. Drift Jump Int. h∗ a∗
w∗M 0.625 1.012 2 1.077 4 5.00 - - -
w∗rM 0.217 1.168 4 1.075 3 1.77 - 16.2 -
w∗JD 0.552 1.000 1 1.031 2 6.09 1 - -
w∗rJD 0.431 1.015 3 1.000 1 5.23 1.159 5.16 14.74
Intra Day Data
Weights Ref. M. Rank Ref. Rob. M. Rank Rob. Drift Jump Int. h∗ a∗
w∗M 0.625 1.012 4 1.030 4 5.00 - - -
w∗rM 0.459 1.008 3 1.001 2 3.68 - 6.59 -
w∗JD 0.552 1.000 1 1.006 3 6.09 1 - -
w∗rJD 0.502 1.001 2 1.000 1 5.74 1.063 2.09 6.16
Table B.2: Monte Carlo simulation results
Notes: The time series length for daily sampled data is Td × 252 = 252, whereas for intra
daily sampled data, the time series length is = Td × 252× 6, 5× 60/m = 1′512 where m = 60
min denotes hourly sampling frequency. The column ’Weights’ refers to the optimal portfolio
holdings, where w∗M denote the Merton, w
∗
rM the robust Merton, w
∗
JD the jump diffusive and
w∗rJD robust jump diffusive weights, respectively. Columns ’Ref. M.’ and ’Rob. M.’ show the
expected utility ratio as defined in (3.76) and (3.77), respectively. The columns ’Rank Ref.’
and ’Rank Rob.’ rank expected utility using the four portfolio allocations. The column ’Drift’
represents the expected return in percent where the Merton drift is R, the robust Merton drift is
R−h∗σ where h∗ =
√
2ηD with ηD = η, the jump diffusive drift isR+((1− ǫ) / log (1/ǫ)) Jλ and
the robust jump diffusive drift is R− h∗σ+ ((1− ǫ) / log (1/ǫ)) Jλea∗ . The column ’Jump Int.’
compares the jump intensities λ (reference measure) and λϑ (robust measure). The column ’h∗’
shows the optimal drift perturbation in percent for the robust Merton solution with h∗ =
√
2ηD
where ηD = η and for the robust jump diffusive solution with h∗ =
√
2ηD. The last column







the robust jump diffusive solution.
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Risk Free Rate r = 0.02 Excess Return R = 0.07 Volatility σ = 0.3
Weights Ref. M. Rob. M. Weights Ref. M. Rob. M. Weights Ref. M. Rob. M.
w∗M 0.5 1.006 1.051 0.875 1.027 1.099 0.278 1.002 1.043
w∗rM 0.092 1.162 1.073 0.467 1.078 1.030 0.006 1.312 1.145
w∗JD 0.442 1.000 1.023 0.771 1.000 1.031 0.263 1.000 1.031
w∗rJD 0.323 1.014 1.000 0.646 1.004 1.000 0.18 1.025 1.000
Jump Scaling J = 0.05 Jump Intensity λ = 5 Impatience Rate β = 0.03
Weights Ref. M. Rob. M. Weights Ref. M. Rob. M. Weights Ref. M. Rob. M.
w∗M 0.625 1.002 1.033 0.625 1.220 1.510 0.625 1.009 1.048
w∗rM 0.217 1.215 1.106 0.219 1.048 1.010 0.217 1.096 1.041
w∗JD 0.605 1.000 1.025 0.379 1.000 1.029 0.552 1.000 1.020
w∗rJD 0.478 1.019 1.000 0.294 1.008 1.000 0.431 1.008 1.000
Risk Aversion γ = 3 ζD = 50% Jump Size Dist. U(0, 1)
Weights Ref. M. Rob. M. Weights Ref. M. Rob. M. Weights Ref. M. Rob. M.
w∗M 0.417 1.018 1.136 0.625 1.012 1.284 0.625 1.003 1.05
w∗rM 0.144 1.341 1.145 0.219 1.166 1.010 0.217 1.195 0.139
w∗JD 0.368 1.000 1.052 0.552 1.000 1.157 0.574 1.000 1.024
w∗rJD 0.287 1.032 1.000 0.295 1.089 1.000 0.45 1.020 1.000
Sampling Length Td = 3 Invest. Horizon Th Error Detect. Prob. π̄ = 20%
Weights Ref. M. Rob. M. Weights Ref. M. Rob. M. Weights Ref. M. Rob. M.
w∗M 0.625 1.012 1.040 0.625 1.011 1.046 0.625 1.011 1.046
w∗rM 0.39 1.030 1.010 0.375 1.047 1.017 0.374 1.047 1.017
w∗JD 0.552 1.000 1.011 0.552 1.000 1.014 0.552 1.000 1.014
w∗rJD 0.482 1.003 1.000 0.475 1.005 1.000 0.472 1.005 1.000
Table B.3: Comparative statics
Notes: Unless stated otherwise, the parameter values are those from Table B.1. The column
’Weights’ refers to the optimal portfolio holdings, where w∗M denote the Merton, w
∗
rM the
robust Merton, w∗JD the jump diffusive and w
∗
rJD robust jump diffusive weights, respectively.
Columns ’Ref. M.’ and ’Rob. M.’ show the expected utility ratio as defined in (3.76) and
(3.77), respectively. Number of simulation runs is M = 10′000 and initial wealth X0 as well as
stock price S0 are equal to 100. For all the simulation runs, we generate daily sample paths of
the stock price.
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Figure B.1: Lambert’s W -Function for various levels of jump intensities λ.
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Figure B.2: Comparison of optimal robust portfolio weights
Notes: The optimal robust portfolio weights aere as given in (3.52) for ζD ∈ {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1}.
The selected parameters values are: R = 0.1, σ = 0.1, J = −0.3, λ = 1, γ = 2, jump size
distribution is given in (3.43) and η ∈ [0, 0.05].
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Figure B.3: Comparison of robust and non-robust portfolio allocations when both drift and jump
intensity are perturbed
Notes: Panel A displays the optimal robust jump - diffusive weights ω∗(h∗, a∗) (in red) and the
optimal jump diffusive weights ω∗(h∗ = 0, a∗ = 0) (in blue) when both the expected return R
and the volatility σ vary. Panel B displays optimal robust jump - diffusive weights ω∗(h∗, a∗)
(in red) and optimal jump diffusive weights ω∗(h∗ = 0, a∗ = 0) (in blue) when both the jump
scaling parameter J and the intensity λ vary. Unless stated otherwise, the selected parameters
values are: R = 0.05, σ = 0.1, J = −0.1, λ = 1, γ = 2, ζD = 0.1, jump size distribution is
given in (3.43) and η = 0.05.
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Figure B.4: Error-detection probability π(t, T ; η) computed from a time series length of 1 year
Notes: The left figure plots π(t, T ; η) using weekly data (52 observations) and the right figure
plots π(t, T ; η) using monthly data (12 observations). The selected parameters values are:
σ = 0.2 and η̂D = 10%.
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Figure B.5: Optimal portfolio holdings in the case of exponential utility when the underlying risky
asset exhibits compensated Lévy dynamics and both drift and jump intensity are perturbed
Notes: The compensated Lévy dynamics are as given in (3.3). The benchmark parameters




C.1 Proof of Proposition 8
The proof relies on Theorem 2.28 in Jacod & Shiryaev (2003) and Theorem 2.2.14 and The-
orem 2.2.15 in Jacod & Protter (2012). However, we first need the following lemma on the
decomposition of discrete-time Markov chains.
Lemma 2. Given the continuous time Markov chain r(t) with generator Q given in equa-
tion (4.3), the transition probability matrix Pij(∆m) of the discrete Markov chain r∆m can be
constructed as follows
P(∆m) = I+∆mQ+ o(∆m), (C.1)
where I is the N dimensional identity matrix.
Proof. By the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation (see, e.g., Lawler (1995), Karlin & Taylor (1981),
and Norris (1998)), the transition probability matrix is differentiable. A Taylor expansion at
tk,m = 0 gives
P(∆m) = P(0) + P
′
(0)∆m + o(∆m) (C.2)
For the first term note that




1, for i = j
0, for i 6= j,
(C.3)
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Pij(rt+∆m = i|rt = j)
∆m
. (C.5)
These probabilities describe the transitional dynamics, the rate at which a transition is made

























where the last equality, i.e., the interchange of summation and the limit, follows from the
finiteness of the state space M and the limit follows from the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation.









t ∈ [tk, tk +∆m). (C.6)
Then, we have the following result on the weak convergence of the Markov chain and the
Brownian motion.
Lemma 3. Given the interpolated processes in (C.6) we have
1. r∆m(·)
D→ r(·), i.e. the discrete time Markov Chain rk,m converges weakly (in distribution
D) to r(·) the Markov Chain with generator Q.
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2. W∆m(·)
D→ W (·), i.e. the discrete time Brownian Motion W∆m(t) converges weakly to a
standard Brownian Motion.
Proof. The proof of the first assertion follows directly by an application of Lemma 3.1 in Yin
& Zhou (2004). The second assertion follows by Donsker’s Theorem (see, e.g., Billingsley
(2008)).












Hence, both the discrete-time Markov chain and the sum of i.i.d. normally distributed ran-
dom variables converge weakly to the continuous-time Markov chain and Brownian motion,



















Note that unconditionally, yk,m are independent but not identically distributed since their
variance can take N different regimes. Therefore, to show that the series converges we need
a slight generalization of the central limit theorem, the Lindeberg-Feller Theorem (see, e.g.,
Jacod & Shiryaev (2003)). Then, the third statement can be shown if the Lindeberg condition
is satisfied, which states for every ǫ > 0, if









Applying the tower property of conditional expectations and since σrk,m is a constant given rk,m,















































where the second term in (C.9) can be shown to converge to zero by an application of l’hÃ´pitals
rule and Φ(·) and φ(·) denote the standard normal cumulative and density function respectively.










































































































 D−→ 0, (C.13)
when m→ ∞. 
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C.2 Proof of Proposition 9
Since the state variable controlling the regime and the regression disturbance are correlated we














i.i.d∼ N (0, 1), uk,m ∼ N (0, 1) ωk,m ⊥ ηk,m where the symbol ⊥ stochastic indepen-
dence between random variables and A is the Cholesky decomposition of Σ so that AA′ = Σ.
Therefore, we can write
uk,m = ρηk,m +
√
1− ρ2ωk,m. (C.15)
Applying Bayes’ rule yields
E [uk,m|ai−1,j(∆m) ≤ ηk,m ≤ ai,j(∆m)] =






E [uk,m; ai−1,j(∆m) ≤ ηk,m ≤ ai,j(∆m)]
Pi,j(∆m)− Pi−1,j(∆m)
, (C.16)
where Pi,j = Φ(ai−1,j(∆m)). Using (C.15) and the independence of uk,m and ωk,m, the numerator
in (C.16) is































































By a similar argument using u2k,m = (ρηk,m +
√




















which proofs the second claim. For the last statement, note that the distribution of the error is
now skewed normal, i.e. uk,m
i.i.d∼ SN (0, 1, ρ) where SN (µ, σ, ·) is the location-scale skew-normal
with centrality parameter µ, scale parameter σ and skewness parameter ρ. For p a positive
integer the even moments of uk,m are equivalent to ω
2
k,m for which the statement follows directly
from the previous theorem. For p = 2l + 1 where l ≥ 0 the odd incomplete moments can be

































where (2l + 1)!! = 1 × 3 × 5 · · · × (2l + 1) and C(φ,P, ρ) is some constant depending on the




































C.3 Proof of Proposition 10
Since the ỹ2k,m are uncorrelated for rk,m = i, we can write























k,m|Fk−1,m, rk,m = i, rk−1,m = j
])2}
(C.22)
Using similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 9, the first term can be obtained
by setting u4k,m = (ρηk,m +
√
1− ρ2ωk,m)4 and the second term in (C.22) is given in equation
(4.20) from which the variance expression for rk,m = i for i = 1, 2 follows directly.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 1
Define p(τ) = I{τ≥tk−1,m} and pm(τ) = I{τ≥tk−1,m− 1m}
with m ∈ N for some τ ∈ [tk,m, tk+1,m] with
I{·} denoting the indicator function. Thus we have
lim
m→∞
sup |pm(τ)− p(τ)| = 1, (C.23)
if ptk−1,m 6= ptk,m . Therefore if there exists at least one i, j = 1, . . . , N such that pti,m 6= ptj,m it









(ptk,m − ptk−1,m)2 > 0. (C.24)
As the sum in (C.24) contains at least one none zero element. If not then the price process is
not only locally constant, but globally in other words price process is not changing over the
entire interval [a, b].
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To proof equation 4.34, we rely on the Doobs martingale inequality and the law of iterated






























































λ2K2(tk,m − tk−1,m)− λδ
)
.




λ2K2(tk,m − tk−1,m)− λδ
)
with respect to λ and obtain for the optimal value λ∗ = δ
2





D.1 Model and Parameter Specification
M1 : yk,m = µrk,m + σrk,muk,m M5: yk,m = σrk,muk,m
M2 : yk,m = λrk−1,myk−1,m + σrk,muk,m M6: yk,m = µ+ σrk,muk,m
M3 : yk,m = µ+ λrk−1,m (yk−1,m − µ) + σrk,muk,m M7: yk,m = λyk−1,m + σrk,muk,m




+ σrk,muk,m M8: yk,m = µ+ λyk−1,m + σrk,muk,m
Table D.1: Model Selection for Monte Carlo Study.
Monte Carlo Study: True model parameters specification
a1 a2 µ λ µ1 µ2 λ1 λ2 σ1 σ2 ρ
M1 2.5 -2.2 - - 0.1 -0.15 - - 0.2 1 0.1 0.5 0.9
M2 2.5 -2.2 - - - - 0.05 -0.2 0.2 1 0.1 0.5 0.9
M3 2.5 -2.2 0.1 - - - 0.05 -0.2 0.2 1 0.1 0.5 0.9
M4 2.5 -2.2 - 0.05 0.1 -0.15 - - 0.2 1 0.1 0.5 0.9
M5 2.5 -2.2 - - - - - - 0.2 1 0.1 0.5 0.9
M6 2.5 -2.2 0.1 - - - - - 0.2 1 0.1 0.5 0.9
M7 2.5 -2.2 - 0.05 - - - - 0.2 1 0.1 0.5 0.9
M8 2.5 -2.2 0.1 0.05 - - - - 0.2 1 0.1 0.5 0.9
Table D.2: Monte Carlo Study: True model parameters specification. The selected true parameter
value a1 and a2 correspond to regime persistence probabilities of P11 = 0.9938 and P22 = 0.9861,
respectively.
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D.1.1 Performance Endogenous Estimator: T = 800
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M1 M2 M3 M4
Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value
a1 2.543 2.500 2.535 2.500 2.531 2.500 2.529 2.500
(0.103) - (0.063) - (0.090) - (0.074) -
a2 -2.118 -2.200 -2.100 -2.200 -2.100 -2.200 -2.085 -2.200
(0.168) - (0.080) - (0.107) - (0.104) -
µ - - - - 0.100 0.100 - -
- - - - (0.001) - - -
λ - - - - - - 0.046 0.050
- - - - - - 0.007 -
µ1 0.100 0.100 - - - - 0.098 0.100
(0.001) - - - - - (0.009) -
µ2 -0.145 -0.150 - - - - -0.150 -0.150
(0.051) - - - - - (0.020) -
λ1 - - 0.049 0.050 0.046 0.050 - -
- - (0.005) - (0.008) - - -
λ2 - - -0.197 -0.200 -0.193 -0.200 - -
- - (0.013) - (0.021) - - -
σ1 0.200 0.200 0.201 0.200 0.210 0.200 0.206 0.200
(0.002) - (0.001) - (0.001) - (0.005) -
σ2 0.991 1.000 0.989 1.000 0.975 1.000 0.984 1.000
(0.021) - (0.007) - (0.010) - (0.011) -
ρ 0.103 0.100 0.085 0.100 0.081 0.100 0.081 0.100
(0.135) - (0.080) - (0.039) - (0.038) -
M5 M6 M7 M8
Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value
a1 2.522 2.500 2.525 2.500 2.522 2.500 2.527 2.500
(0.093) - (0.071) - (0.147) - (0.067) -
a2 -2.129 -2.200 -2.127 -2.200 -2.126 -2.200 -2.124 -2.200
(0.134) - (0.087) - (0.174) - (0.076) -
µ - - 0.100 0.100 - - 0.100 0.100
- - (0.001) - - - (0.001) -
λ - - - - 0.051 0.050 0.049 0.050
- - - - (0.020) - (0.004) -
µ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
µ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
σ1 0.212 0.200 0.206 0.200 0.215 0.200 0.211 0.200
(0.004) - (0.001) - (0.002) - (0.001) -
σ2 0.985 1.000 0.990 1.000 0.975 1.000 0.984 1.000
(0.011) - (0.008) - (0.011) - (0.008) -
ρ 0.101 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.076 0.100 0.088 0.100
(0.041) - (0.033) - (0.049) - (0.027) -
Table D.3: Monte Carlo Simulation: The table reports QML estimates averaged over M = 1′000
simulation runs for the endogenous estimator. Time series length is T = 800 and ρ = 0.1. Aver-
aged standard errors are given in parentheses and are based on numerically evaluating second order
derivatives of the log-likelihood function. 170
M1 M2 M3 M4
Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value
a1 2.533 2.500 2.538 2.500 2.541 2.500 2.544 2.500
(0.063) - (0.067) - (0.072) - (0.053) -
a2 -2.125 -2.200 -2.115 -2.200 -2.116 -2.200 -2.108 -2.200
(0.070) - (0.098) - (0.079) - (0.073) -
µ - - - - 0.100 0.100 - -
- - - - (0.001) - - -
λ - - - - - - 0.045 0.050
- - - - - - (0.003) -
µ1 0.100 0.100 - - - - 0.099 0.100
(0.001) - - - - - (0.001) -
µ2 -0.152 -0.150 - - - - -0.158 -0.150
(0.014) - - - - - (0.016) -
λ1 - - 0.048 0.050 0.046 0.050 - -
- - (0.005) - (0.006) - - -
λ2 - - -0.196 -0.200 -0.195 -0.200 - -
- - (0.013) - (0.014) - - -
σ1 0.200 0.200 0.202 0.200 0.210 0.200 0.202 0.200
(0.000) - (0.001) - (0.000) - (0.001) -
σ2 0.994 1.000 0.988 1.000 0.981 1.000 0.984 1.000
(0.007) - (0.008) - (0.012) - (0.006) -
ρ 0.488 0.500 0.490 0.500 0.470 0.500 0.493 0.500
(0.044) - (0.061) - (0.061) - (0.054) -
M5 M6 M7 M8
Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value
a1 2.529 2.500 2.523 2.500 2.523 2.500 2.523 2.500
(0.102) - (0.063) - (0.066) - (0.080) -
a2 -2.137 -2.200 -2.131 -2.200 -2.142 -2.200 -2.157 -2.200
(0.127) - (0.080) - (0.083) - (0.077) -
µ - - 0.100 0.100 - - 0.101 0.100
- - (0.001) - - - (0.001) -
λ - - - - 0.048 0.050 0.048 0.050
- - - - (0.004) - (0.004) -
µ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
µ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
σ1 0.216 0.200 0.206 0.200 0.229 0.200 0.208 0.200
(0.001) - (0.000) - (0.001) - (0.001) -
σ2 0.974 1.000 0.986 1.000 0.964 1.000 0.989 1.000
(0.009) - (0.008) - (0.009) - (0.008) -
ρ 0.462 0.500 0.487 0.500 0.455 0.500 0.477 0.500
(0.081) - (0.048) - (0.057) - (0.059) -
Table D.4: Monte Carlo Simulation: The table reports QML estimates averaged over M = 1′000
simulation runs for the endogenous estimator. Time series length is T = 800 and ρ = 0.5. Aver-
aged standard errors are given in parentheses and are based on numerically evaluating second order
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M1 M2 M3 M4
Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value
a1 2.531 2.500 2.535 2.500 2.539 2.500 2.533 2.500
(0.475) - (0.439) - (0.512) - (0.667) -
a2 -2.140 -2.200 -2.136 -2.200 -2.145 -2.200 -2.132 -2.200
(0.633) - (0.645) - (0.437) - (0.495) -
µ - - - - 0.100 0.100 - -
- - - - (0.011) - - -
λ - - - - - - 0.047 0.050
- - - - - - (0.096) -
µ1 0.100 0.100 - - - - 0.100 0.100
(0.015) - - - - - (0.017) -
µ2 -0.159 -0.150 - - - - -0.161 -0.150
(0.148) - - - - - (0.222) -
λ1 - - 0.050 0.050 0.044 0.050 - -
- - (0.086) - (0.146) - - -
λ2 - - -0.192 -0.200 -0.194 -0.200 - -
- - (0.114) - (0.134) - - -
σ1 0.200 0.200 0.205 0.200 0.207 0.200 0.203 0.200
(0.012) - (0.011) - (0.008) - (0.018) -
σ2 0.989 1.000 0.985 1.000 0.985 1.000 0.987 1.000
(0.155) - (0.094) - (0.142) - (0.143) -
ρ 0.897 0.900 0.889 0.900 0.888 0.900 0.901 0.900
(0.614) - (0.644) - (0.505) - (0.711) -
M5 M6 M7 M8
Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value
a1 2.517 2.500 2.545 2.500 2.503 2.500 2.517 2.500
(0.352) - (0.340) - (0.456) - (0.354) -
a2 -2.164 -2.200 -2.142 -2.200 -2.165 -2.200 -2.153 -2.200
(0.285) - (0.342) - (0.524) - (0.423) -
µ - - 0.100 0.100 - - 0.100 0.100
- - (0.005) - - - (0.014) -
λ - - - - 0.049 0.050 0.049 0.050
- - - - (0.049) - (0.080) -
µ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
µ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
σ1 0.224 0.200 0.207 0.200 0.247 0.200 0.213 0.200
(0.012) - (0.006) - (0.008) - (0.012) -
σ2 0.964 1.000 0.986 1.000 0.950 1.000 0.979 1.000
(0.059) - (0.160) - (0.142) - (0.094) -
ρ 0.837 0.900 0.882 0.900 0.790 0.900 0.872 0.900
(0.409) - (0.418) - (0.542) - (0.463) -
Table D.5: Monte Carlo Simulation: The table reports QML estimates averaged over M = 1′000
simulation runs for the endogenous estimator. Time series length is T = 800 and ρ = 0.9. Aver-
aged standard errors are given in parentheses and are based on numerically evaluating second order
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D.1.2 Performance Endogenous Estimator: T = 8′000
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M1 M2 M3 M4
Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value
a1 2.503 2.500 2.508 2.500 2.506 2.500 2.504 2.500
(0.015) - (0.011) - (0.009) - (0.009) -
a2 -2.195 -2.200 -2.195 -2.200 -2.191 -2.200 -2.195 -2.200
(0.019) - (0.015) - (0.011) - (0.010) -
µ - - - - 0.100 0.100 - -
- - - - (0.000) - - -
λ - - - - - - 0.050 0.050
- - - - - - (0.001) -
µ1 0.100 0.100 - - - - 0.100 0.100
(0.000) - - - - - (0.000) -
µ2 -0.149 -0.150 - - - - -0.152 -0.150
(0.005) - - - - - (0.002) -
λ1 - - 0.050 0.050 0.049 0.050 - -
- - (0.001) - (0.001) - - -
λ2 - - -0.199 -0.200 -0.200 -0.200 - -
- - (0.002) - (0.002) - - -
σ1 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
(0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) -
σ2 0.999 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000
(0.003) - (0.001) - (0.001) - (0.001) -
ρ 0.102 0.100 0.096 0.100 0.098 0.100 0.102 0.100
(0.025) - (0.015) - (0.012) - (0.014) -
M5 M6 M7 M8
Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value
a1 2.502 2.500 2.505 2.500 2.506 2.500 2.503 2.500
(0.013) - (0.013) - (0.013) - (0.012) -
a2 -2.199 -2.200 -2.192 -2.200 -2.196 -2.200 -2.197 -2.200
(0.018) - (0.015) - (0.015) - (0.015) -
µ - - 0.100 0.100 - - 0.100 0.100
- - (0.000) - - - (0.000) -
λ - - - - 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
- - - - (0.001) - (0.001) -
µ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
µ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
σ1 0.207 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
(0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) -
σ2 0.993 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.002) - (0.002) - (0.002) - (0.002) -
ρ 0.100 0.100 0.098 0.100 0.099 0.100 0.101 0.100
(0.018) - (0.016) - (0.016) - (0.018) -
Table D.6: Monte Carlo Simulation: The table reports QML estimates averaged over M = 1′000
simulation runs for the endogenous estimator. Time series length is T = 8′000 and ρ = 0.1. Aver-
aged standard errors are given in parentheses and are based on numerically evaluating second order
derivatives of the log-likelihood function. 174
M1 M2 M3 M4
Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value
a1 2.502 2.500 2.476 2.500 2.506 2.500 2.501 2.500
(0.007) - (0.006) - (0.008) - (0.007) -
a2 -2.195 -2.200 -2.193 -2.200 -2.189 -2.200 -2.192 -2.200
(0.009) - (0.009) - (0.008) - (0.010) -
µ - - - - 0.100 0.100 - -
- - - - (0.000) - - -
λ - - - - - - 0.049 0.050
- - - - - - (0.001) -
µ1 0.100 0.100 - - - - 0.100 0.100
(0.000) - - - - - (0.000) -
µ2 -0.151 -0.150 - - - - -0.150 -0.150
(0.001) - - - - - (0.002) -
λ1 - - 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 - -
- - (0.001) - (0.001) - - -
λ2 - - -0.200 -0.200 -0.200 -0.200 - -
- - (0.001) - (0.001) - - -
σ1 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
(0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) -
σ2 1.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000
(0.001) - (0.001) - (0.001) - (0.001) -
ρ 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
(0.009) - (0.006) - (0.008) - (0.009) -
M5 M6 M7 M8
Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value
a1 2.505 2.500 2.507 2.500 2.508 2.500 2.506 2.500
(0.009) - (0.010) - (0.009) - (0.008) -
a2 -2.194 -2.200 -2.197 -2.200 -2.196 -2.200 -2.192 -2.200
(0.012) - (0.010) - (0.011) - (0.009) -
µ - - 0.100 0.100 - - 0.100 0.100
- - (0.000) - - - (0.000) -
λ - - - - 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
- - - - (0.001) - (0.001) -
µ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
µ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
σ1 0.201 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
(0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) -
σ2 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.001) - (0.001) - (0.001) - (0.001) -
ρ 0.499 0.500 0.497 0.500 0.503 0.500 0.499 0.500
(0.008) - (0.008) - (0.008) - (0.008) -
Table D.7: Monte Carlo Simulation: The table reports QML estimates averaged over M = 1′000
simulation runs for the endogenous estimator. Time series length is T = 8′000 and ρ = 0.5. Aver-
aged standard errors are given in parentheses and are based on numerically evaluating second order
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M1 M2 M3 M4
Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value
a1 2.505 2.500 2.501 2.500 2.501 2.500 2.502 2.500
(0.003) - (0.003) - (0.003) - (0.003) -
a2 -2.194 -2.200 -2.197 -2.200 -2.195 -2.200 -2.196 -2.200
(0.004) - (0.003) - (0.003) - (0.004) -
µ - - - - 0.100 0.100 - -
- - - - (0.000) - - -
λ - - - - - - 0.049 0.050
- - - - - - (0.000) -
µ1 0.100 0.100 - - - - 0.100 0.100
(0.000) - - - - - (0.000) -
µ2 -0.152 -0.150 - - - - -0.151 -0.150
(0.001) - - - - - (0.001) -
λ1 - - 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 - -
- - (0.000) - (0.000) - - -
λ2 - - -0.200 -0.200 -0.199 -0.200 - -
- - (0.000) - (0.000) - - -
σ1 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
(0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) -
σ2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) -
ρ 0.902 0.900 0.902 0.900 0.901 0.900 0.902 0.900
(0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) -
M5 M6 M7 M8
Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value Estimate True value
a1 2.500 2.500 2.501 2.500 2.502 2.500 2.502 2.500
(0.003) - (0.004) - (0.003) - (0.008) -
a2 -2.198 -2.200 -2.195 -2.200 -2.198 -2.200 -2.192 -2.200
(0.004) - 0.004 - (0.004) - (0.009) -
µ - - 0.100 0.100 - - 0.100 0.100
- - (0.000) - - - (0.000) -
λ - - - - 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
- - - - (0.000) - (0.001) -
µ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
µ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
σ1 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.201 0.200
(0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) -
σ2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000
(0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.001) -
ρ 0.902 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.902 0.900 0.900 0.900
(0.001) - (0.001) - (0.000) - (0.008) -
Table D.8: Monte Carlo Simulation: The table reports QML estimates averaged over M = 1′000
simulation runs for the endogenous estimator. Time series length is T = 8′000 and ρ = 0.9. Aver-
aged standard errors are given in parentheses and are based on numerically evaluating second order
derivatives of the log-likelihood function. 176
D.1.3 Efficiency: Endogenous vs Exogenous Estimator
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M1 M2 M3 M4
Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo
a1 2.503 2.503 2.507 2.503 2.503 2.503 2.503 2.503
(0.014) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004)
a2 -2.194 -2.195 -2.194 -2.195 -2.192 -2.195 -2.187 -2.195
(0.015) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
µ - - - - 0.100 0.100 - -
- - - - (0.000) (0.000) - -
λ - - - - - - 0.050 0.050
- - - - - - (0.001) (0.000)
µ1 0.100 0.100 - - - - 0.100 0.100
(0.000) (0.000) - - - - (0.000) (0.000)
µ2 -0.151 -0.149 - - - - -0.150 -0.149
(0.004) (0.001) - - - - (0.002) (0.000)
λ1 - - 0.050 0.049 0.050 0.049 - -
- - (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) - -
λ2 - - -0.201 -0.199 -0.201 -0.199 - -
- - (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) - -
σ1 0.201 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
σ2 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
ρ 0.002 - -0.001 - 0.000 - 0.000 -
(0.021) - (0.013) (0.014) - (0.010) -
M5 M6 M7 M8
Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo
a1 2.503 2.500 2.504 2.504 2.507 2.503 2.505 2.503
(0.013) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004)
a2 -2.198 -2.198 -2.193 -2.195 -2.192 -2.195 -2.195 -2.195
(0.024) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005)
µ - - 0.100 0.100 - - 0.100 0.095
- - (0.000) (0.000) - - (0.000) (0.000)
λ - - - - 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
- - - - (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
µ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
µ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
σ1 0.206 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
σ2 0.994 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
ρ -0.002 - 0.004 - -0.001 - 0.000 -
(0.022) - (0.014) - (0.016) - (0.015) -
Table D.9: Monte Carlo Simulation: The table reports QML estimates averaged over M = 1′000
simulation runs for the endogenous estimator. Time series length is T = 8′000 and ρ = 0. Aver-
aged standard errors are given in parentheses and are based on numerically evaluating second order
derivatives of the log-likelihood function. 178
M1 M2 M3 M4
Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo
a1 2.548 2.500 2.541 2.500 2.535 2.500 2.535 2.500
(0.115) (0.046) (0.078) (0.049) (0.067) (0.052) (0.105) (0.044)
a2 -2.093 -2.200 -2.108 -2.200 -2.116 -2.200 -2.118 -2.200
(0.154) (0.064) (0.163) (0.067) (0.081) (0.066) (0.103) (0.059)
µ - - - - 0.100 0.100 - -
- - - - (0.001) (0.000) - -
λ - - - - - - 0.048 0.050
- - - - - - (0.006) (0.001)
µ1 0.100 0.100 - - - - 0.099 0.100
(0.001) (0.000) - - - - (0.001) (0.001)
µ2 -0.144 -0.150 - - - - -0.144 -0.150
(0.051) (0.008) - - - - (0.022) (0.009)
λ1 - - 0.052 0.050 0.047 0.050 - -
- - (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) - -
λ2 - - -0.191 -0.200 -0.195 -0.200 - -
- - (0.030) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) - -
σ1 0.200 0.200 0.202 0.200 0.203 0.200 0.203 0.200
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
σ2 0.992 1.000 0.983 1.000 0.988 1.000 0.985 1.000
(0.016) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.013) (0.004)
ρ -0.009 - -0.014 - -0.003 - -0.006 -
(0.117) - (0.112) - (0.080) - (0.133) -
M5 M6 M7 M8
Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo
a1 2.520 2.476 2.525 2.500 2.528 2.500 2.518 2.500
(0.183) (0.070) (0.081) (0.048) (0.142) (0.047) (0.064) (0.055)
a2 -2.113 -2.142 -2.106 -2.200 -2.125 -2.200 -2.118 -2.200
(0.130) (0.111) (0.128) (0.065) (0.154) (0.062) (0.089) (0.072)
µ - - 0.100 0.100 - - 0.100 0.100
- - (0.001) (0.000) - - (0.001) (0.000)
λ - - - - 0.048 0.050 0.049 0.050
- - - - (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
µ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
µ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
σ1 0.211 0.236 0.206 0.200 0.220 0.200 0.211 0.200
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.012) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008)
σ2 0.984 1.011 0.978 1.000 0.972 1.000 0.982 1.000
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.005) (0.018) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012)
ρ -0.010 - 0.000 - 0.001 - 0.010 -
(0.101) - (0.089) - (0.116) - (0.074) -
Table D.10: Monte Carlo Simulation: The table reports QML estimates averaged over M = 1′000
simulation runs for the endogenous estimator. Time series length is T = 800 and ρ = 0. Aver-
aged standard errors are given in parentheses and are based on numerically evaluating second order
derivatives of the log-likelihood function. 179
D.1.4 Bias Analysis
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M1 M2 M3 M4
ρ 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9
a1 2.519 2.516 2.505 2.507 2.508 2.503 2.504 2.505 2.507 2.509 2.518 2.503
(0.072) (0.180) (0.062) (0.054) (0.077) (0.065) (0.051) (0.065) (0.101) (0.049) (0.054) (0.064)
a2 -2.096 -2.091 -2.102 -2.095 -2.097 -2.103 -2.088 -2.092 -2.103 -2.091 -2.094 -2.101
(0.158) (0.168) (0.066) (0.078) (0.114) (0.064) (0.069) (0.077) (0.086) (0.071) (0.069) (0.087)
µ - - - - - - 0.100 0.099 0.097 - - -
- - - - - - (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) - - -
λ - - - - - - - - - 0.048 0.050 0.050
- - - - - - - - - (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
µ1 0.099 0.103 0.098 - - - - - - 0.102 0.096 0.100
(0.013) (0.107) (0.030) - - - - - - (0.033) (0.002) (0.039)
µ2 -0.131 -0.093 -0.065 - - - - - - -0.128 -0.092 -0.054
(0.012) (0.075) (0.013) - - - - - - (0.036) (0.027) (0.060)
λ1 - - - 0.048 0.047 0.046 0.047 0.044 0.042 - - -
- - - (0.003) (0.022) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) - - -
λ2 - - - -0.194 -0.194 -0.192 -0.194 -0.194 -0.191 - - -
- - - (0.013) (0.038) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.085) - - -
σ1 0.212 0.215 0.220 0.217 0.218 0.222 0.235 0.227 0.237 0.238 0.240 0.250
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.022) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
σ2 1.030 1.047 1.027 1.026 1.034 1.042 1.024 1.025 1.046 1.030 1.015 1.017
(0.005) (0.013) (0.006) (0.005) (0.021) (0.016) (0.006) (0.010) (0.020) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
SrB 0.2047 0.2105 0.2652 0.1663 0.1685 0.1749 0.1804 0.1957 0.191 0.2203 0.2348 0.2714
ρ = 0 0.1963 0.1676 0.1742 0.1977
M5 M6 M7 M8
ρ 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9
a1 2.474 2.465 2.470 2.511 2.510 2.507 2.502 2.508 2.493 2.512 2.515 2.495
(0.140) (0.207) (0.138) (0.124) (0.144) (0.048) (0.129) (0.085) (0.061) (0.066) (0.052) (0.062)
a2 -2.155 -2.154 -2.147 -2.104 -2.094 -2.106 -2.103 -2.107 -2.122 -2.103 -2.092 -2.110
(0.211) (0.145) (0.143) (0.172) (0.183) (0.060) (0.104) (0.102) (0.074) (0.075) (0.071) (0.064)
µ - - - 0.100 0.098 0.097 - - - 0.095 0.094 0.093
- - - (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) - - - (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
λ - - - - - - 0.050 0.048 0.049 0.048 0.047 0.047
- - - - - - (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
µ1 - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
µ2 - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
λ1 - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
λ2 - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
σ1 0.237 0.243 0.243 0.215 0.222 0.218 0.227 0.219 0.225 0.214 0.215 0.231
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.069) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
σ2 1.006 1.010 1.016 1.025 1.047 1.052 1.031 1.021 1.021 1.035 1.039 1.043
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.020) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
SrB 0.0966 0.101 0.1072 0.164 0.1792 0.1735 0.148 0.1617 0.1473 0.1738 0.1704 0.1753
ρ = 0 0.0876 0.1632 0.1279 0.1727
Table D.11: Monte Carlo Simulation: The table reports QML estimates (in boldface) averaged
over M = 1′000 simulation runs for the exogenous estimator when the state is endogenous, i.e. ρ ∈
{0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. Time series length is T = 800. Averaged standard errors are given below the averaged
Monte Carlo estimates and are based on numerically evaluating second order derivatives of the log-
likelihood function. The row ’ρ = 0’ refers to the SrB test statistics when there is no endogeneity in
the data generated process.
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M1 M2 M3 M4
ρ 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9
a1 2.503 2.501 2.497 2.513 2.499 2.497 2.503 2.499 2.497 2.510 2.501 2.497
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002)
a2 -2.194 -2.196 -2.199 -2.194 -2.194 -2.197 -2.194 -2.194 -2.197 -2.194 -2.195 -2.199
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
µ - - - - - - 0.100 0.098 0.097 - - -
- - - - - - (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - - -
λ - - - - - - - - - (0.050) (0.052) (0.053)
- - - - - - - - - (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
µ1 0.099 0.098 0.096 - - - - - - 0.099 0.097 0.096
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - - - - - - (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
µ2 -0.142 -0.113 -0.084 - - - - - - -0.142 -0.111 -0.080
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) - - - - - - (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
λ1 - - - 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.049 - - -
- - - (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) - - -
λ2 - - - -0.199 -0.199 -0.196 -0.199 -0.199 -0.196 - - -
- - - (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) - - -
σ1 0.199 0.199 0.196 0.200 0.199 0.197 0.199 0.199 0.197 0.200 0.199 0.196
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
σ2 1.000 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.002 1.000 1.000 1.002 1.000 0.999 0.999
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
SrB 0.0172 0.0468 0.0789 0.011 0.0111 0.0153 0.011 0.013 0.0189 0.0181 0.0514 0.0858
ρ = 0 0.0098 0.0107 0.011 0.0106
M5 M6 M7 M8
ρ 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9
a1 2.520 2.496 2.494 2.503 2.499 2.497 2.503 2.499 2.496 2.503 2.499 2.497
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
a2 -2.197 -2.197 -2.200 -2.194 -2.194 -2.197 -2.194 -2.194 -2.197 -2.194 -2.194 -2.197
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
µ - - - 0.100 0.098 0.097 - - - 0.095 0.093 0.092
- - - (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) - - - (0.003) (0.002) (0.000)
λ - - - - - - (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050)
- - - - - - (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
µ1 - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
µ2 - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
λ1 - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
λ2 - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
σ1 0.199 0.199 0.197 0.200 0.199 0.197 0.200 0.199 0.197 0.199 0.199 0.197
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
σ2 1.000 1.000 1.002 1.000 1.000 1.002 1.000 1.000 1.002 1.000 1.000 1.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
SrB 0.0031 0.0086 0.0123 0.0092 0.0106 0.0148 0.0093 0.0095 0.0119 0.0147 0.0165 0.0202
ρ = 0 0.003 0.0091 0.0091 0.0145
Table D.12: Monte Carlo Simulation: The table reports QML estimates (in boldface) averaged
over M = 1′000 simulation runs for the exogenous estimator when the state is endogenous, i.e. ρ ∈
{0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. Time series length is T = 8′000. Averaged standard errors are given below the averaged
Monte Carlo estimates and are based on numerically evaluating second order derivatives of the log-
likelihood function. The row ’ρ = 0’ refers to the SrB test statistics when there is no endogeneity in
the data generated process.
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D.1.5 Empirical Estimation Results
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M1 M2 M3 M4
Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo
a1 2.8474 2.7852 2.7834 2.699 2.7823 2.7377 2.7863 2.7265
0.0374 0.0185 0.1146 0.0047 0.0126 0.0167 0.068 0.0618
a2 -1.4589 -1.5311 -1.6106 -1.3837 -1.6166 -1.5436 -1.4084 -1.3385
0.009 0.0142 0.0186 0.0013 0.0522 0.0184 0.003 0.00692
µ - - - - -0.0001 -0.0001 - -
- - - - 1.82E-06 1.27E-06 - -
λ - - - - - - -0.2694 -0.2835
- - - - - - 0.0095 1.85E-05
µ1 -0.0001 -0.0001 - - - - -0.0001 -0.0001
4.29E-05 1.76E-05 - - - - 4.70E-06 0.012
µ2 -0.0036 -0.0008 - - - - -0.0024 0.1246
0.0007 0.0003 - - - - 0.0002 0.0227
λ1 - - -0.2818 -0.2692 -0.2818 -0.2764 - -
- - 0.0184 0.0003 0.0003 0.0113 - -
λ2 - - 0.094 0.1838 0.0929 0.1034 - -
- - 0.0193 0.0049 0.0032 0.0149 - -
σ1 0.0083 0.0085 0.0081 0.0083 0.0081 0.0099 0.0081 0.0091
2.33E-05 1.08E-06 0.001 5.74E-07 4.53E-06 6.72E-06 0.0001 2.16E-05
σ2 0.0206 0.0194 0.0177 0.0259 0.0178 0.0181 0.0216 0.0201
0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 7.60E-06 0.0001 1.50E-05 0.0052 0.0009
ρ 0.3517 - -0.2805 - -0.2888 - 0.2162 -
0.0361 - 0.0124 - 0.038 - 0.005247 -
log(L̂) -26’822.6 -26’225.8 -26’761.0 -26’758.4 -26’763.0 -26’760.3 -26’816.0 -26’832.0
M5 M6 M7 M8
Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo
a1 3.8252 2.7802 3.9592 2.7318 2.7038 2.7769 2.7989 2.7592
0.018 0.0099 0.0022 0.2786 0.0168 0.005 0.0588 0.1248
a2 -0.1243 -1.114 -0.5246 -1.2507 -1.21 -1.5197 -1.5798 -1.2315
0.0632 0.0054 0.0014 0.01426 0.0232 0.0022 0.0271 0.48
µ - - 0.0003 1.00E-06 - - -0.0002 -0.0001
- - 1.93E-07 0.04385 - - 1.76E-05 9.11E-09
λ - - - - -0.2468 -0.2621 -0.2647 -0.2694
- - - - 0.0007 0.0007 0.0009 0.0125
µ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
µ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
σ1 0.0147 0.0088 0.0146 0.0086 0.0084 0.0081 0.0081 0.0081
2.82E-06 1.34E-06 1.35E-06 0.0232 5.36E-06 1.15E-06 1.36E-05 0.0002
σ2 1.9791 0.0325 2.0032 0.0292 0.0305 0.0202 0.0196 0.0235
0.0112 1.78E-05 3.81E-05 0.1417 0.0001 5.74E-05 4.00E-05 4.69E-06
ρ -0.9003 - 0.9436 - -0.1406 - -0.2594 -
0.0214 - 0.0006 - 0.0073 - 0.0315 -
log(L̂) -1’682.6 -26’225.2 -1’684.2 -26’188.9 -26’434.3 -26’714.7 -26’739.9 -26’804.7
Table D.13: Estimation results at sampling frequency 10 sec. for FX EUR/USD exchange rate.
The table reports (quasi-) maximum likelihood estimates (in boldface) with corresponding standard
errors given below. The columns labeled ’Endo’ (’Exo’) refer to the endogenous (exogenous) estimator,
respectively. The estimation period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 8′000
observations. log(L) denotes the estimated log-likelihood value of each model.
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M1 M2 M3 M4
Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo
a1 1.5396 1.539 1.5014 1.4756 1.5088 1.5086 1.5257 1.517
0.0007 0.0185 0.0815 0.0017 0.0938 0.0007 0.0682 0.0047
a2 -0.8373 -0.8347 -1.0736 -1.0361 -0.9419 -0.9414 -0.7793 -0.8509
0.0003 0.0142 0.2096 0.002 0.0116 0.0015 0.0161 0.0063
µ - - - - -4.13E-05 -4.94E-05 - -
- - - - 0.0395 8.29E-07 - -
λ - - - - - - -0.0783 0.0003
- - - - - - 0.0065 1.21E-05
µ1 0.0007 0.0005 - - - - 0.0006 -0.122
0.0106 1.76E-05 - - - - 0.1146 0.0004
µ2 -0.0024 -0.0006 - - - - -0.0023 0.036
0.0025 0.0003 - - - - 0.0204 0.001
λ1 - - -0.1264 -0.1274 -0.1265 -0.1265 - -
- - 0.043 0.0003 0.0141 0.0004 - -
λ2 - - 0.0097 0.0057 0.0171 0.0173 - -
- - 0.0684 0.0007 0.027 0.0007 - -
σ1 0.0245 0.0245 0.0242 0.0245 0.0231 0.0231 0.0245 0.0237
3.25E-06 1.08E-06 0.0001 1.13E-05 0.0002 1.27E-05 0.0006 2.36E-05
σ2 0.0745 0.0746 0.0677 0.0687 0.0662 0.0662 0.076 0.0698
1.43E-05 0.0001 0.001 3.16E-05 0.0002 4.51E-05 0.0004 3.66E-05
ρ 0.0402 - 0.0671 - 0.0092 - 0.0377 -
0.0002 - 0.0233 - 0.0036 - 0.0364 -
log (L̂) -15’389.4 -15’547.2 -14’907.1 -14’792.9 -15’304.1 -15’547.2 -15’767.2 -15’738.5
M5 M6 M7 M8
Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo Endo Exo
a1 1.5227 1.5399 1.5266 1.5195 1.5279 1.4849 1.4861 1.4845
0.0186 0.0027 0.0012 0.0017 0.0094 0.0012 0.0026 0.0013
a2 -1.1192 -1.0063 -1.1069 -1.0079 -1.0272 -1.0532 -0.9004 -0.898
0.0566 0.0045 0.002 0.001 0.0193 0.0008 0.0027 0.0003
µ - - 0.0001 1.02E-06 - - 0.0002 0.0002
- - 9.29E-06 3.88E-07 - - 6.57E-07 3.51E-06
λ - - - - -0.0796 -0.08 -0.0789 -0.0786
- - - - 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
µ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
µ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ1 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
λ2 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
σ2 0.0236 0.0232 0.0232 0.0232 0.0237 0.0245 0.0228 0.0228
0.0001 5.87E-06 9.25E-06 2.06E-05 3.81E-05 1.14E-05 9.52E-06 1.66E-05
σ2 0.0662 0.0656 0.0645 0.0647 0.066 0.0687 0.0648 0.0648
0.0005 3.98E-05 0.0002 4.69E-06 0.0003 3.13E-05 2.34E-05 2.23E-05
ρ 0.0736 - 0.0676 - 0.0454 - 0.0347 -
0.0153 - 0.0018 - 0.0022 - 9.75E-04 -
log (L̂) -15’059.5 -15’305.3 -15’727.5 -15’502.6 -15’324.6 -14’781.9 -15’724.3 -15’723.7
Table D.14: Estimation results at sampling frequency 20 min. for FX EUR/USD exchange rate.
The table reports (quasi-) maximum likelihood estimates (in boldface) with corresponding standard
errors given below. The columns labeled ’Endo’ (’Exo’) refer to the endogenous (exogenous) estimator,
respectively. The estimation period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 8′000
observations. log(L) denotes the estimated log-likelihood value of each model.
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Appendix E
Additional Graphs: Higher Order
Serial Correlation Plots other
Currency Pairs
E.1 EUR/CHF exchange rate
186










Panel A: EURCHF (07) 











Panel B: EURCHF (07) 











Panel C: EURCHF (07) 












Panel D: EURCHF (07) 
Figure E.1: The figure shows the estimated autocorrelation coefficient ϕ̂
(L)
m for lag values L =
1, . . . , 10 for the EUR/CHF spot exchange rate. The selected sampling frequencies are m =
10sec., 30sec. 1min. and 2hr., respectively. Redlines represent approximate α = 5% confidence
intervals as given in Box et al. (1994). Log-return series were constructed using Mid-quotes of the
currency pairs EUR/USD, EUR/CHF, EUR/GBP and EUR/JPY of the year 2007 using previous tick
price recording, starting on January 2nd 5pm.
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E.2 EUR/GBP exchange rate










Panel A: EURGBP (07) 











Panel B: EURGBP (07) 











Panel C: EURGBP (07) 












Panel D: EURGBP (07) 
Figure E.2: The figure shows the estimated autocorrelation coefficient ϕ̂
(L)
m for lag values L =
1, . . . , 10 for the EUR/GBP spot exchange rate. The selected sampling frequencies are m =
10sec., 30sec. 1min. and 2hr., respectively. Redlines represent approximate α = 5% confidence
intervals as given in Box et al. (1994). Log-return series were constructed using Mid-quotes of the
currency pairs EUR/USD, EUR/CHF, EUR/GBP and EUR/JPY of the year 2007 using previous tick
price recording, starting on January 2nd 5pm.
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E.3 EUR/JPY exchange rate










Panel A: EURJPY (07) 












Panel B: EURJPY (07) 










Panel C: EURJPY (07) 












Panel D: EURJPY (07) 
Figure E.3: The figure shows the estimated autocorrelation coefficient ϕ̂
(L)
m for lag values L =
1, . . . , 10 for the EUR/JPY spot exchange rate. The selected sampling frequencies are m =
10sec., 30sec. 1min. and 2hr., respectively. Redlines represent approximate α = 5% confidence
intervals as given in Box et al. (1994). Log-return series were constructed using Mid-quotes of the
currency pairs EUR/USD, EUR/CHF, EUR/GBP and EUR/JPY of the year 2007 using previous tick
price recording, starting on January 2nd 5pm.
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Appendix F
Additional Graphs: Endogeneity Plots
for other Currency Pairs
F.1 EUR/CHF exchange rate
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s=1 |ρ̂Wm,L,s| for models M1 − M4 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 8’000 observations with rolling win-
dow of W=200 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
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s=1 |ρ̂Wm,L,s| for models M5 − M8 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 8’000 observations with rolling win-
dow of W=200 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
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F.2 EUR/GBP exchange rate




s=1 |ρ̂Wm,L,s| for models M1 − M4 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 8’000 observations with rolling win-
dow of W=200 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
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s=1 |ρ̂Wm,L,s| for models M5 − M8 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 8’000 observations with rolling win-
dow of W=200 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
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F.3 EUR/JPY exchange rate




s=1 |ρ̂Wm,L,s| for models M1 − M4 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 8’000 observations with rolling win-
dow of W=200 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
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s=1 |ρ̂Wm,L,s| for models M5 − M8 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 8’000 observations with rolling win-
dow of W=200 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
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Appendix G
Additional Graphs: Endogeneity Plots
for shorter Time Series Length
G.1 EUR/USD exchange rate
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s=1 |ρ̂Wm,L,s| for models M1 − M4 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 800 observations with rolling window
of W=20 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
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s=1 |ρ̂m,L,s| for models M5 − M8 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd and contains for each model 8’000 observations with rolling window of
W=20 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
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G.2 EUR/CHF exchange rate




s=1 |ρ̂Wm,L,s| for models M1 − M4 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 8000 observations with rolling window
of W=20 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
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s=1 |ρ̂Wm,L,s| for models M5 − M8 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 8000 observations with rolling window
of W=20 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
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G.3 EUR/GBP exchange rate




s=1 |ρ̂Wm,L,s| for models M1 − M4 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 8000 observations with rolling window
of W=20 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
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s=1 |ρ̂Wm,L,s| for models M5 − M8 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 800 observations with rolling window
of W=20 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
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G.4 EUR/JPY exchange rate




s=1 |ρ̂Wm,L,s| for models M1 − M4 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 8000 observations with rolling window
of W=20 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
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s=1 |ρ̂Wm,L,s| for models M5 − M8 with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimation
period starts on January 2nd 5 pm and contains for each model 800 observations with rolling window
of W=20 for a given sampling frequency m = {5sec, . . . , 55sec, 1min, 2min, . . . , 1hr}.
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